The impact of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 on the enforceability of exemption clauses by Richards, Daniel Ross
THE IMPACT OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 68 OF 
2008 ON THE ENFORCEABILITY OF EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
DANIEL ROSS RICHARDS 
 
 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
 
 
MASTER OF LAWS 
 
 
 
at the 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROF PN STOOP  
 
 
 
OCTOBER 2019 
  
2 | P a g e  
 
SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the impact of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 (CPA) on the enforceability of exemption clauses, if any, with specific reference to sections 
22, 48, read with regulation 44(3), 49, 51, 52 and 58. An exemption clause is a term contained in 
an agreement (contract) which, in theory, eliminates, varies or restricts the legal responsibility of 
the parties to the contract. 
 
Certain requirements as set out in the CPA must be met when the enforcement of exemption 
clauses is considered. The CPA does not specifically prohibit the use of exemption clauses; 
however, it attempts to regulate or limit their use in contracts.  
 
The shift towards consumer alertness and fair-mindedness when entering into an agreement 
through the CPA is of great value. However, to ensure that the consumer is protected to the 
maximum, certain amendments to the CPA must be made to guarantee actual safeguard against 
unfair terms. Nevertheless, the protection offered to the consumer by the CPA remains limited.  
 
What is important is that exemption clauses in their totality will not die away, as they would 
possibly play a significant part in assigning the risk between parties in instances where none of 
the parties were responsible. I therefore say that exemption clauses still remain legal, binding and 
enforceable if their wording is clear-cut. By this I mean that they must comply with section 22, 
read with section 49(3)–(5) of the CPA, and must not be the terms or conditions contained in 
regulation 44(3) or section 51 of the CPA. 
 
Exemption clauses must therefore be formulated and conveyed in accordance with the CPA, and 
taking advantage of a consumer by making use of such clauses will consequently come to an end.  
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
An exemption clause (otherwise known as an exclusion clause or an exception clause) is a clause 
used in a contract which omits or limits the liability of a contracting party, in general the consumer, 
in instances of misrepresentation by the other contracting party, normally the supplier, for 
negligence, or in instances of breach of contract.1 An exemption clause is typically drafted by the 
party who will benefit from such clause, and it usually protects the contracting party in the stronger 
bargaining position, that is, commonly the supplier.2 
 
The South African courts have usually enforced exemption clauses, especially before the 
enactment of the Consumer Protection Act3, mainly as a result of their reliance on freedom of 
contract, as well as the common-law principle of pacta sunt servanda.4 This unfortunately allows 
suppliers to impose unreasonable exemption clauses on consumers.  
 
An exemption clause is not the exception to the rule when it comes to standard-form contracts as 
exception clauses are ever so often incorporated in the standard-form contracts. It can therefore 
be said that the consumer is the party in the weaker bargaining position and in actual fact has no 
real freedom concerning the terms of the agreement as the majority of such terms are not open 
for negotiation.5 In other words, the consumer is forced to come to an agreement pertaining to the 
provisions as set out in such a standard-form contract.6 The actual consequence thereof is that 
even though the law of contract in South Africa affords a party the freedom to enter into a contract, 
it can be said that that such freedom is quite theoretical or formalistic when it comes to standard 
form-contracts.7 
                                                          
1 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 288. 
2 For purposes of this dissertation, the term “supplier” will be used. “Supplier” is defined in section 1 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 as a person who markets any goods or services. 
3 The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (hereinafter the CPA). 
4 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 
804–806; Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 989; SA 
Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Beperk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A) 767A and Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 38. 
5 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 296. With the exception of negotiation regarding the price of the goods 
or services, the relevant payment terms, the delivery date and time, as well as any possible warranties. 
6 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 529. 
7 See Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 366; Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 496–497; and Bhana and Pieterse 2005 
(122) SALJ 885. 
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1.1 The legal framework 
 
An exemption clause (and the enforceability of such a clause) is regulated, firstly, in terms of the 
common law, and secondly, in terms of legislation. Exemption clauses were familiar in the Roman-
Dutch Law8 and are frequently used in a modern society. They have also been the subject of 
litigation in modern times.9 Our courts have usually, upheld exemption clauses but in recent years 
have been in the process of limiting the impact and consequence of exemption clauses. 
 
In recent times, the CPA10 was enacted with the aim, in broad terms, to protect and develop the 
social and economic welfare of consumers. 11  The CPA has reduced the application of the 
common law as it seeks to regulate exemption clauses and enforceability of such clauses.  
 
In chapter 2 of the CPA, several fundamental consumer rights are created. These consumer rights 
include the right of equal opportunity in the consumer market,12 namely, privacy,13 the right to 
choose, 14  the right to information and the disclosure thereof, 15  the right to reasonable and 
responsible marketing,16 the right to just and truthful dealing, the right to fair-minded, objective 
and reasonable contract terms and conditions,17 and the right to fair value, good quality and safe 
goods.18 
 
1.2 The aim of this dissertation 
 
The main aim of this dissertation is to analyse the impact of the CPA on exemption clauses. 
However, I will also discuss the influence of the common law on the implementation of an 
                                                          
8 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract:  general principles 290. 
9 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 
804–806; Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 989; and 
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
10 The CPA. 
11 Section 3 of the CPA. 
12 Section 8–10 of the CPA. 
13 Section 11–12 of the CPA. 
14 Section 13–21 of the CPA. 
15 Section 22–28 of the CPA. 
16 Section 29–39 of the CPA. 
17 Section 48–52 of the CPA. 
18 Section 53–61 of the CPA. 
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exemption clause, specifically the common-law principles and rules, and the judicial treatment of 
exemption clauses.  
 
With the commencement of the CPA, certain consumer rights have been codified by the CPA and 
certain unfair business practices, which were formerly unregulated, are now governed by the CPA. 
In terms of section 2(2) of the CPA, the Consumer Tribunal, the National Consumer Commission, 
a court or a person is permitted to look to foreign law for direction. In this dissertation I will therefore 
also compare South African law related to the enforceability of exemption clauses with English 
and Australian law. In this regard, the English Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Australian 
Consumer Law (contained in schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010) will be 
considered. Across the world, consumer rights and consumer protection law provide a way for 
consumers to fight back against abusive business practices, with specific reference to unfair 
contract terms (in this regard specific reference is made to exemption clauses). 
 
The shift towards consumer alertness and fair-mindedness when entering into an agreement 
through the CPA is of great value. However, to ensure that the consumer is protected to the 
maximum, certain amendments, as indicated above, must be made to the CPA to guarantee 
actual safeguard against unfair terms. Considering all the relevant discussions to follow, I will 
determine whether exemption clauses in their totality can be expected to cease or not. 
Furthermore, I will discuss the formulation of exemption clauses in accordance with the CPA, with 
specific reference to section 22, read with section 49(3)–(5) of the CPA. Further regard will be 
given to the terms listed in regulation 44(3) and section 51 of the CPA. 
 
1.3 Research methodology 
 
The research will largely entail an amalgamation of literature on certain common-law principles 
and the synthesising of the relevant general principles of exemption clauses within the ambit of 
South African law of contract. The legal comparative research will outline certain comparisons 
between South African, English and Australian law. 
 
1.4 Chapter division 
 
As indicated above, the focus in this dissertation will be on the provisions of the CPA and their 
impact on the enforceability of exemption clauses. However, in order to do an extensive analysis 
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of the above-mentioned, the common law and the judicial control of exemption clauses will also 
be considered. 
 
In chapter 2 I will discuss common-law principles, judicial limitation, interpretation and the 
enforceability of exemption clauses as a background to the main discussion of the CPA. Chapter 
3 will contain an analysis of the influence of the Constitution19 on the enforceability of exemption 
clauses. Chapter 4 will deal with the application field of the CPA. In this chapter I will define 
important concepts and analyse the effect of the CPA on the enforceability of exemption clauses. 
In chapter 5 I will compare the South African, English and Australian law. Finally, chapter 6 will 
contain a conclusion and recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution). 
14 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 2: COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL LIMITATION, 
INTERPRETATION AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
 
2.1 Introduction  
  
The notion of exclusionary clauses has been interpreted in different ways, and these clauses are 
also known as indemnity clauses, waivers, exculpatory clauses and, specifically, exemption 
clauses.20 
 
An exemption clause is not a concept that was developed recently; it is firmly rooted in Roman 
law, and has traditionally been used in Roman-Dutch law.21 Under Roman law, exemption clauses 
took the form of informal pacta. Of these, the pacta ad minuendam obligationem were deals 
(pacts) made in order to reduce the accountability of a debtor, whereas the pacta ad augendam 
obligationem were deals (pacts) made to increase the debtor’s accountability.22  
 
Contracting parties make use of exemption clauses to exclude liability (wholly or in part) which 
would have arose under normal circumstances. From Roman-Dutch law23, exemption clauses 
initially found their way into Europe in the 15th century, and ultimately made their way into England 
by the 17th century.24  
 
The essential principle, acknowledging exemption clauses, originated from the norm of freedom 
of contract which sequentially is founded on social, economic and political beliefs and was 
observed by Grotius as a man's right to contract.25 With the institution of standard-form contracts 
in the law of contracts, exemption clauses found their way into standard-form contracts to such 
an extent that in recent times exemption clauses are still firmly rooted in standard-form contracts.26 
                                                          
20 Lerm A critical analysis 8; Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 496. 
21 See De Groot Inl 3.14.12; Voet 21.1.10 as referred to in Van der Merwe Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & 
Lubbe Contract: general principles (2012) 258. 
22 Van Dorsten 1986 (49) THRHR 195. 
23 Van Dorsten 1986 (49) THRHR 197. With reference to Lee Commentary by Hugo Grotius  para 1.3.1, 
Van Dorsten holds the view that it was especially Grotius who advocated the position that agreement may 
be used to confirm or limit the normal incidents of a contract. 
24 Aronstam Consumer protection 16–17; Holdsworth History of English law 290–295. 
25 Aronstam Consumer protection 1. 
26 Aronstam Consumer protection 16–17 demonstrates the influence of exclusionary clauses in standard-
form contracts by referring to their large-scale use in charter agreements, Bill of Lading agreements and 
the so-called “common carrier” cases in which skippers of carriers sought to absolve themselves from 
discharging their public functions and, more specifically, their duties. See also McClaren 1914–1915 
Harvard LR 550. 
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The implementation of exemption clauses in accordance with the common law remained identical 
to what it was in the Roman-Dutch law.27 In the event of the contracting parties having full 
contractual ability and the exemption clause having been drafted in a clear-cut way, the 
contracting parties must abide by the provisions of such a contract.28 
 
The relevant aspects of exemption clauses will be discussed in the paragraphs below. These 
relate to the rules applicable to exemption clauses that pertain to the approach adopted and 
applied by our courts. They also relate to the rules that pertain to contractual form, consensus, 
sufficient notification, restrictive interpretation, public policy, negligence, fraud and dolus. 
 
However, before discussing the above, I will embark on a short discussion on what exactly an 
exemption clause is and the reason why it is typically considered an unfair and punitive contract 
term. 
 
2.2 What is an exemption or exclusion clause? 
 
An exemption clause (otherwise known as an exclusion clause or an exception clause) is a clause 
used in a contract which omits or limits the liability of a contracting party, in general the consumer, 
in instances of misrepresentation by the other contracting party, normally the supplier, for 
negligence, or in instances of breach of contract.29 An exclusion clause is ordinarily used in a 
standard form contract, excluding liability of the other contracting party.30 An example is the 
elimination of liability for misrepresentation or the exclusion of liability for breach of contract31. As 
previously indicated, exemption clauses are, generally speaking, regarded as unreasonable 
contractual terms.32 As stated by Van der Merwe et al,33 exemption clauses exclude or restrict the 
                                                          
27  Van Dorsten 1986 (49) THRHR 197. The author indicates that in classical Roman-Dutch law and 
formalistic Roman Law, all lawful agreements with iusta causa were enforceable. 
28  Hopkins 2007 (June) De Rebus 22 and Van Dorsten 1986 THRHR 189. See also, for example, 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 
804–806, Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 989 and Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA), which dealt with the enforceability of exemption clauses. 
29 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 288. 
30 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 42 Brand JA, remarked that, in South Africa 
exemption clauses in standard contracts are the rule rather than the exception. 
31 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles (2007) 289. 
32 Christie and Bradfield The law of contract 12 and Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 496. 
33 Van der Merwe et al Contract: general principles (2012) 297. 
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legal responsibility of a contracting party, which is typically enforced by the naturalia of a specific 
contract. 
 
Exemption clauses appear in diverse forms and are usually used in standard-form contracts. 
Despite the fact that exemption clauses are considered a vibrant part of the immense majority of 
contracts, such clauses are also, in practice, the most problematic clauses. This is because they 
ordinarily eliminate the liability of the supplier, for example, for damages suffered by the consumer 
as a result of defective performance.34 Exemption clauses may furthermore eliminate the legal 
responsibility of the supplier for the breach of a warranty or a specific term of a contract, for 
example, a warranty against hidden defects. 
 
The following is a distinctive example of an exemption clause:  
 
“The amenities which we provide at our amusement park have been designed and 
constructed to the best of our ability for your enjoyment and safety. Nevertheless we regret 
that the management, its servants and agents, must stipulate that they are absolutely 
unable to accept liability or responsibility for injury or damage of any nature whatsoever 
whether arising from negligence or any other cause howsoever which is suffered by any 
person who enters the premises and/or uses the amenities provided.”35 
 
Further to the aforesaid, a typical illustration of the way in which an exemption clause is worded, 
is found in First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Rosenblum and Another36 (hereinafter First 
National Bank v Rosenblum). The clause had the following formulation: 
 
“The bank hereby notifies its clients that, although the bank will apply all possible 
reasonable care, it is not accountable (liable), at all, for any losses or damages suffered by 
its clients, which losses or damages have been caused by rain, wind, flow of storm water, 
lightning, fire, theft, explosion, hail, action of the elements or by means of any other reason 
as well as war or riot and whether the losses or damages are as a result of the bank’s 
negligence or not.”37 
                                                          
34 Mckendrick Contract law 101. 
35 Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 988. This clause was 
visible in a window panel which was readily available to all its customers of the amusement park and its 
facilities. 
36 First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA) 194. 
37 First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA) 194C–D. 
17 | P a g e  
 
 
Suppliers often use exemption clauses in a contract as a tool to enforce unreasonable obligations 
on consumers. However, the courts still enforce these clauses even though they may be punitive 
and one-sided in certain circumstances,38 rendering such enforcement unfair. 
 
An exemption clause has always been seen as the rule rather than the exception in standard-form 
contracts, and it can therefore be said that the other contracting party, that is, the one in the 
weaker bargaining position, actually has no real freedom concerning the contract terms. This is 
because the majority of such terms are not subject to negotiation.39 In other words, the consumer 
is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it situation and is constrained to agree to the provisions set out in 
such a standard-form contract.40 The actual implication of this is that no real freedom of contract 
exists and it can therefore be said that the freedom is quite theoretical or formalistic.41 This factor 
must be taken into account by the courts where the supplier depends on disclaimer notices or 
exemption clauses to reduce or abolish its liability.  
 
It is essential to understand that, once the courts have to decide on the enforceability of exemption 
clauses according to the common law, they generally consider certain common-law rules and 
principles such as freedom of contract, the doctrines of pacta sunt servanda and exceptio doli, 
the caveat subscriptor rule, the use and exploitation of standard-form contracts, the contra 
proferentum-rule42, and judicial limitation. Although these rules and principles are interconnected, 
each one is separately pointed out below. 
 
2.3 The issue of standard-form contracts  
 
                                                          
38  Hopkins 2003 (1) TSAR 152–153, in particular, argues that this type of argument is based on an 
erroneous premise, especially because the harshness and oppressiveness that standard-form contracts 
bring are founded upon an unequal bargaining position between the contracting parties. This often results 
in the weaker contracting party being abused by the stronger contracting party; Hutchison and Pretorius 
The law of contract 271. 
39 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 296. With the exception of negotiation regarding the price of the goods 
or services, the relevant payment terms, the delivery date and time, and any possible warranties. 
40 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 529. 
41 See Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 496–497; Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 366; Bhana and Pieterse 2005 
(122) SALJ 885. 
42 See footnote 95. 
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Mass contracts have their foundation in the improvement of mass production and distribution, and 
are also known as standard-form contracts.43 In nature, these contracts are typically one-sided, 
benefiting the supplier that uses the contract. In layman’s terms a standard-form contract can be 
described as a standard template intended for wide-ranging and repetitive use by an organisation 
and its various clients. 
 
Making use of standardised contracts has a number of advantages. One advantage is that the 
legal costs pertaining to the drafting of the agreement are much lower than in the case of 
exemption clauses. This is because the terms of the agreement are not negotiable, less legal 
assistance is required, and time and money are saved for the both the consumer and the supplier. 
Also, risks are limited for the supplier (only), while the relevant (initiating) party can control any 
and all contractual arrangements without effort.44 
 
Notwithstanding these advantages, the vast majority of standard-form contracts contain unfair and 
punitive terms which are often abused by the suppliers to exploit consumers. As previously noted, 
in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom45 (hereinafter Afrox) it was held that exemption clauses stand as 
the rule rather than the exception in standard-form contracts. 
 
As explained above, contractual terms normally found in standard-form contracts are generally 
not open for negotiation and a consumer must either agree to the contract in totality or not at all. 
Because no real negotiations take place when concluding a standard-form contract, it cannot be 
held that there is freedom of contract when entering into such a contract.  
 
It should be noted that even in a vastly competitive market, suppliers only compete on the terms 
commonly known to a non-expert consumer, such as price, premiums and interest rates, instead 
of on punitive and oppressive terms.46 The reason for this is that consumers are commonly 
unaware of these terms or at least incapable of appreciating their significance, as lawyers tend to 
draft these terms in incomprehensible language and set them forth in fine print.47 It can be said 
that this take-it-or-leave-it basis established by the supplier and endorsed by the law is hugely 
                                                          
43 Furmston, Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract 20. 
44 Collins The law of contract 119; Wilson 1965 (14) 1 ICLQ 176. 
45 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
46 Hopkins 2003 (1) TSAR 155. See also the minority decision by Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 
SA 323 (CC) 121–185. 
47 Sutherland 2009 Stell LR 61. See also the minority decision by Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 
SA 323 (CC) 150–185. 
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harmful and inadequate to the well-being of South Africa’s defenceless majority.48 While standard-
form contracts have drawn ample attention, our courts have managed to distance themselves 
from the substantive concerns relating to the inherent unfairness of standard-form contracts.49 
 
2.4 The courts’ approach to exemption clauses in accordance with the common law 
 
As I indicated above, the courts reflect on the enforceability of exemption clauses with regard to 
the origin of consensus, public policy, lack of notification, negligence, restrictive interpretation, 
dolus and fraud.  
 
The courts, after bearing in mind the enforceability of an exemption clause, have frequently been 
confronted with encounters founded on a claim of lack (i.e. absence) of consensus between the 
contracting parties, consensus that was wrongfully obtained or obtained in an improper manner, 
the operation of public policy, or the application of restrictive interpretation. I will therefore discuss 
the most relevant bases below. 
 
2.4.1 Consensus or the lack thereof 
 
The defence mostly relied on by contracting parties who are in the weaker bargaining position 
when it comes to the enforcement of exemption clauses is that a party did not consent to such an 
exemption clause. 
 
By tradition it is recognised that the foundation of liability arising from a contract is either 
consensus, meaning that there was a genuine meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, or 
the equitable impression by one of the contracting parties that there is indeed consensus50. 
 
An exemption clause, or even the contract containing an exemption clause, could render the 
contract void as a result of the absence of consensus between the contracting parties. 51 
Consensus should consequently be reached between the contracting parties to form a valid 
contract.  
                                                          
48 Hopkins 2003 (1) TSAR 154. 
49 Lewis 2003 (120) SALJ 330 and Hopkins 2003 (1) TSAR 154. See also the minority decision by Sachs J 
in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 121–185. 
50 Jethro Reliance protection 1. 
51 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 290. 
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One of the essential requirements for a binding contract is consensus, or else, an appropriate 
meeting of the minds, between the relevant contracting parties52. Consensus, however, can be 
influenced by a number of elements, which in some circumstances are so severe that they can 
have an impact on the legitimacy of the contract. Error or mistake is one such element53. 
 
Nevertheless, true consensus is practically never reached, mainly in standard-form contracts 
where such contracts are entered into on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.54 On account of the aforesaid, 
the party in the weaker bargaining position will be subjected to the party in the stronger bargaining 
position.55 It is unfortunate that in certain cases where no real (true) consensus has been reached, 
the courts have failed to afford the necessary protection to the contracting party who did not 
anticipate to be bound by the terms of the contract to which they appended their signature. 
 
In Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments (Pty) Ltd56 (hereinafter Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments), 
Allen approached the court seeking an order declaring a written agreement, namely, the sale of 
an immovable property, not binding. He claimed that he had concluded the agreement based on 
the bona fide belief that he was purchasing the immovable property brought to his attention by 
Sixteen Stirling Investments (Pty) Ltd’s agents while, in reality, the property pointed out to Allen 
was not the immovable property referred to and described in the sale agreement entered into.  It 
was held that an error is believed to be iustus if such error was initiated by the misrepresentation 
of the other contracting party, which was the case in casu. The court therefore found that Allen’s 
mistake was iustus.  The court held that no consensus was reached between the parties and that 
the sale agreement concluded by the parties was therefore void ab initio. 
 
In the case of Shepherd v Farrell’s Estate Agency, 57  the estate agency marketed that it controlled 
the sale of commerce and that its motto was no sale no charge.  The appellant instructed the 
defendant to sell his business, and appended his signature to a mandate but failed to read the 
contents thereof.  In terms of the mandate, the appellant bound himself to pay agency commission 
if and when a sale took place, whether or not it was brought about by the defendant’s efforts. It 
was held that the appellant was not bound by this specific provision of the mandate.  The appellant 
                                                          
52 Van Der Merwe et al Contract: general principles (2012) 90 and Bourbon Leftley v WPK (Landbou) Bpk 
1999 1 SA 902 (C).  
53 See George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 2 SA 465 (A) 471A–D. 
54 See generally Durban Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
55 Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 497. 
56 Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (4) SA 164 (DCLD). 
57 Shepherd v Farrell’s Estate Agency 1921 TPD. 
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erroneously thought that the sale of business agreement was extensively in accordance with the 
advertisement and the mistake was triggered by the advertisement itself and the defendant’s 
failure to bring the conflict between the advertisement and mandate entered into to the attention 
of the appellant. The court held that the appellant had indeed appended his signature to the written 
agreement under a misapprehension as to its real consequence. 58  The court held that the 
appellant was entitled to rely on the mistake brought about by the advertisement. 
 
Consequently, it is trite in law, and confirmed in case law, that a unilateral error or mistake does 
not serve to avoid a contract unless it is iustus.59 This would have the effect that the affected party 
is not bound to such agreement, which means that the contract is valid but voidable.  
 
As referred to above, an error is believed to be iustus in instances where such error was caused 
by the misrepresentation of the other contracting party. In George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 
(hereinafter George v Fairmead) the court held that “when someone is requested to append their 
signature to a document, they cannot fail to recognise that they are called upon to indicate that 
they confirm the content of the document and by appending their signature to the document, they 
agree to contents which appear above their signature”. 60   
 
Further to the aforesaid, in George v Fairmead61 Fagan CJ pronounced the subsequent locus 
classicus dictum:  
 
“When can an error be said to be iustus for the objective of permitting another person to renounce 
their obvious acceptance of a term to an agreement? As I read the judgments, our courts have 
taken into account the situation that there is an additional party involved and have reflected on the 
position. They have, in effect, said: Has the consumer been to blame in the sense that by his 
conduct he has directed the supplier, as a reasonable man, to accept as true, that he was binding 
himself? ... If his error is as a result of a misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, by the 
supplier, then evidently, it is the supplier who is at fault and the consumer is not bound to the 
agreement.”  
 
                                                          
58 Shepherd v Farrell’s Estate Agency 1921 TPD 66, 68 and 70. 
59 See Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investment (Pty) Ltd 1974 (4) SA 164 (DCLD).   
60 George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) 472. 
61 George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) 471. 
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It was therefore held that if a party appends his62 signature to a contract without familiarising 
himself with the contents of such contract, that party cannot renounce his acceptance of the 
contents thereof, based on the fact that his error was iustus. In such conditions, the party’s 
(consumer’s) error is unreasoning and is therefore bound by the contract. 
 
More than three decades after the Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments decision, the court held in 
Perumal v Bayett and Another63 that Perumal was under a unilateral error which was the sole 
reason for entering into the agreement, but the error was iustus. The court accordingly held that 
no consensus ad idem was reached between the parties and that the sale agreement concluded 
by the parties was void ab initio. 
 
In Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer64 it was held that, as there was 
no meeting of the minds (consensus ad idem) between the parties, no agreement came into 
existence. Jansen JA again addressed the question of the basis of liability arising from a contract. 
In a minority judgment, Jansen JA recognised that there was a lack of consensus between the 
parties. Consequently, based on the consensual theory, no contract came into existence on 
account of the absence of real consensus65. The court accepted that consensual theory (die 
wilsteorie) is the basis of liability arising from a contract in our law.66 
 
In Morgan Air Cargo v Sim Road Investments & Another, Murphy J noted, with respect to the 
question whether an exemption clause is enforceable, that “… the importance thereof has moved 
from the ‘nature of the fault-element’ bringing about the misrepresentation to the nature and quality 
of the consensus caused by the misrepresentation.” 67 
 
The caveat subscriptor rule, which is discussed in paragraph 2.5 below, also relates to consensus. 
The court confirmed the caveat subscriptor rule in George v Fairmead68 and held that, although 
the contractual party in that case failed to read the contract, the contractual party was still bound 
                                                          
62  The generic use of the male gender pronouns “he”, “him” and “his” in this dissertation should be   
understood to include the female gender. 
63 Perumal v Bayett and Another (14337/2007) [2009] ZAKZDHC 40 [19] (31 August 2009). 
64 Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A) 78A. 
65 Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA 74 (A) 78E– F. 
66 Mondorp Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp en De Beer 1979 (4) SA  74 (A) 78G– H. 
67 Morgan Air Cargo v Sim Road Investments & Another [2009] 4 All SA 249 (GNP) 83. 
68 George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A). 
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to the terms of that contract.  Nonetheless, the courts have recently followed a more tranquil and 
flexible attitude on the application of this principle.69  
 
In Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands70 it was determined that in instances 
when a contracting party is in a position to indicate that he was talked into signing a contract whilst 
wrongly believing that the contents of the contract is true (but in fact is not, as a result of a false 
impression regarding its nature, meaning and implication or the contents of the document), the 
caveat subscriptor rule is not to be used to the advantage of the contracting party in the stronger 
bargaining position (i.e. the supplier), since the consumer would have performed under a iustus 
error. 
 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez71 the decision was again based on a less than rigorous examination 
of the disputed document by the signatory, as the court held that the document was deceptive 
because the term in question was not given adequate prominence. In a welcome change of trend, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that an exemption clause eliminating the legal responsibility for 
negligence of a motor vehicle dealer entrusted with a motor vehicle for the purposes of 
maintenance work “ought to be plainly and appropriately drawn to the knowledge of a consumer, 
who appended his signature to a standard instruction form, and not by way of an inconspicuous 
and hardly readable term mentioning the terms and conditions on the back side of the sheet of 
paper in query.”72 
 
It can therefore be said in summary that when exemption clauses are used, there may often be a 
lack of consensus between the contractual parties. Depending on the facts of each case, the legal 
position is that the caveat subscriptor rule is applied (see para 2.5 below). However, a contract 
assertor may have a duty to notify a contract denier of the existence of an unexpected clause in 
the contract, where the term undermines the essence of the contract.  
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, an exemption clause, which is normally punitive, continues to 
function to the disadvantage of the other party to the contract.  
                                                          
69 In Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) the court held that an exemption clause that is 
hidden and which undermines the essence of the contract must be brought to the attention of the consumer 
who signs the contract. 
70 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 518 (C) 524H-I. 
71 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
72 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) 578. 
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Even though the CPA deals extensively with consensus improperly obtained, such provision 
overlaps significantly with the common law. Hutchison and Pretorius73 accurately contend that the 
substantive provisions contained in the CPA extend further than the prevailing common law. 
 
2.4.2 Consensus improperly obtained 
 
Instances where consensus has been improperly obtained refer to undue influence, duress or 
misrepresentation. 
 
Our law comprises numerous common-law remedies to restrain indefinite freedom of contract. In 
Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v Chemfos (Bpk)74 it was apparent that our law allows for the 
setting aside of a contract on improperly obtained consensus due to, for example undue influence, 
duress or misrepresentation. Undue influence is a form of unjustifiable burden on a contracting 
party to persuade such contracting party to conclude a contract.  
 
It can be said that duress or metus is an improper burden to constitute threats on the part of one 
party to the contract against the other party to the contract. It consists of force directed against 
the will of a contracting party in the sense that that the contracting party is forced to enter into an 
agreement to its disadvantage. 
 
A misrepresentation is a variant of a dishonest, untruthful (i.e. false) statement. Where a contract 
is concluded between the parties based on the strength of a misrepresentation made to one of 
the parties to the contract by the other, or by way of undue influence or duress by the other 
contracting party, the contract is nonetheless valid because there is not a lack of consensus. 
Conversely, if the consensus was improperly attained, the contract is voidable at the request of 
the blameless contracting party. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 Hutchison and Pretorius The law of contract 114. 
74 Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v Chemfos (Bpk) 1986 (1) SA 819 (A). 
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2.4.3 Public policy  
 
It is established that exemption clauses which are in conflict with public policy75 are null and void 
and unenforceable.76  
 
A contract is defined as a legal commitment with the effect of closing the vent for any illegality77. 
Even though exemption clauses are permissible, the courts are regularly innovative in restraining 
or excluding the realm of the application thereof when construing such clauses in a contract.78  
 
One of the foundations upon which the courts decide whether an exemption clause is permitted 
while construing a contract, is public policy.79 Public policy introduces concepts of impartiality, 
integrity and reasonableness, and would preclude the execution of a term resulting in possible 
unfairness. 
 
As early as 1902 the courts measured exemption clauses against public policy. In Eastwood v 
Shepstone80, it was held that the courts have the power to treat a contract as null and void and to 
reject the recognition of contracts and transactions which are contrary to public policy or in 
contradiction with good morals. It is a power not to be hastily or impulsively implemented. 
However, once it is evident that a contract or a transaction is contrary to public policy, the court 
would be below par in its responsibility if it is hesitant to proclaim such a contract or transaction 
void. 
 
In Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd,81 the court again held that it is a common principle 
that a person entering into a contract or transaction without intimidation, without fraud, and 
understanding the consequences of his action when entering into such a contract or transaction, 
                                                          
75 Public policy in the new constitutional dispensation will be further discussed in chapter 3. 
76 See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); Johannesburg 
Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA); and Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
77Tembe Problems regarding exemption clauses 66. 
78 See Turpin 1956 (73) SALJ 144. 
79 Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775 784–785 had this to say about the notion: “Now in 
our law it is a principle that agreements contra bonos mores will not be enforced, and that is in reality the 
same as the English maxim as to contracts against public policy. It is a wide-reading principle…. to succeed 
on the ground of public policy it must be shown that the arrangement necessarily contravenes or tends to 
induce contravention of some fundamental principle of justice or of general statutory law, or that it is 
necessarily to the prejudice of the interests of the public.” 
80 Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS 294, 302. 
81 Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775. 
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would possibly at will abandon any and all of his rights. There are, however, definite exclusions to 
that rule, and surely the law will not acknowledge the existence of any contract or transaction 
contrary to public policy.82 
 
On the other hand, and contrary to the aforesaid, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Afrox83 held 
that an exemption clause was recognised and sustained, which clause released a private hospital 
from legal responsibility for impairment caused negligently to patients. The court was not 
persuaded by the respondent that the clause was in contradiction of public policy and that it 
caused offence to any constitutional provisions.84  
 
In Brisley v Drotsky it was held that “public policy is now entrenched in the Constitution and the 
essential values it safeguards. It includes human dignity, the realisation of equality and the 
development of human rights and freedom, non-racialism and non-sexism”.85 This norm was 
confirmed in Barkhuizen v Napier by the CC.86   
 
Further to the aforesaid, in Barkhuizen v Napier it was held by Ngcobo J that “public policy 
symbolises the legal principles of the public; it embodies those values which are treasured by the 
public87”. Ngcobo J also considered the continuous worth of public policy in resolving differences 
arising from contractual agreements. 88 Even though Ngcobo J acknowledged that defining the 
content of public policy was once a complicated subject, public policy nowadays is significantly 
subjective to our Constitution and the values which it brings about. 
 
The common law of contract has continuously denied the recognition of contracts which are 
believed to be in conflict with public policy. This was demonstrated in the matter of Sasfin (Pty) 
Ltd v Beukes89 (hereinafter Sasfin) where the court held that no court should shrivel from the 
responsibility of proclaiming a contract in contradiction of public policy once the circumstances so 
demand. The court held that the power to sustain that a contract is in contradiction of public policy 
must, however, be applied vigilantly and only in the most distinctive circumstances, for the fear of 
                                                          
82 Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 779. 
83 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 42. 
84 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 38.   
85 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para 94. 
86 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) 29. 
87 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 72-73, 83-86. 
88 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) paras 72-73. 
89 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
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ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of contracts arises out of an illogical and haphazard use of the 
power. 
 
Apart from the aforesaid, Harms JA in Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another held that 
it would be against public policy to allow the enforcement of an exclusion of legal responsibility for 
damages where the death of another was negligently caused, as it is unwarranted in view of the 
high value placed on the sanctity of life by the common law, along with the Constitution.90 
 
Our law of contract has continuously considered the legitimacy of a contract or contractual 
provisions (i.e. exemption clauses) by applying the standard of legitimacy as well as contractual 
interpretation. In Wells v South African Alumenite Co91 it was held that there is certainty that the 
situation (enforcement of exemption clauses) is tough and difficult, but if individuals append their 
signature to conditions, the consumer, should, in the absence of fraud, be bound to them. Public 
policy so demands.92 Contractual principles and their accompanied values have triumphed over 
the requisite to realise fairness between the contracting parties.93  
 
With particular reference to the prohibition of exclusion from legal responsibility for fraud, Innes 
CJ in Wells v SA Alumenite Co94 held that, based on public policy, the law will not recognise an 
undertaking whereby one of the parties to the contract is bound by such contract to disregard and 
surrender to the fraudulent behaviour of the other party to the contract. The courts will not enforce 
such an undertaking because by doing so, they would appear to defend and encourage fraud. 95 
 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd96, Wessels 
JA held that the defendant was not legally obliged to pay compensation to the plaintiff for any 
                                                          
90Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) 518–519. 
91 Wells v South African Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69. 
92 The interaction between public policy and pacta servanda sunt is not foreign to our courts: the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held in Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 that “[i]f there is one thing 
which, more than another, public policy requires, it is that men of full age in competent understanding shall 
have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall 
be held sacred and enforced by the courts of justice.” 
93 Smalberger JA in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B–F states that “[t]he power to declare 
contracts against public policy should … be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases … it must 
be borne in mind that public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract, and requires that 
commercial transactions should not be unduly trammelled by restrictions on that freedom.” 
94 Wells v South African Alumenite Co 1927 AD 72. 
95 Wells v South African Alumenite Co 1927 AD 72.  
96 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
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losses or damages suffered, caused to the immovable property in question by vis major or casus 
fortuitous. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the court further held that the defendant would have 
been held liable to pay compensation to the plaintiff if such loss or damage was due to its own, 
wilful misconduct or negligent conduct, or probably by the wilful unlawful activity or negligent 
conduct on the part of the employees, acting within the course and scope of employment.97 
 
Further to the aforesaid, it is clear that public policy plays a vital role concerning the interpretation 
of exemption clauses. With the aforesaid in mind, exemption clauses which endeavour to excuse 
a party of a contract from legal responsibility for fraud, or from legal responsibility for deliberate 
breach or wilful wrongdoing, will be considered to be against public policy and consequently set 
aside. 98  
 
In the case of Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and Another 99  a micro-lender 
endeavoured to impose a clause in its loan agreement with Makwakwa, whereby Makwakwa 
waived his right to apply for an administration order and excluded his loan from any administration 
order Makwakwa may obtain. The court held that in instances where a clause has the likelihood 
to deprive or has the consequence of depriving a contracting party of the right to approach the 
courts for redress, such clause is against public policy. Therefore, the micro-lender’s clause under 
dispute (the exception clause) was contrary to public policy and consequently not enforceable. 
 
In 2011 the SCA again held in Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Limited v Chickenland (Pty) Limited,100 
that a supplier could not place confidence on an elimination of legal responsibility clause 
(exemption clause) in its standard terms and conditions, in situations where the product delivered 
was substantially different to the product purchased. The court determined that when someone is 
dealing with non-performance instead of failed performance, the exemption does not benefit the 
supplier. The supplier contended that the standard terms and conditions on the reverse side of 
the credit application form enclosed certain clauses that discharged the supplier from liability. The 
SCA, after reflecting on the aforesaid clauses, determined that such clauses did not benefit Hirsch 
in a situation such as this, where it had delivered something different to that bargained for and, in 
addition, what was basically an illegal disqualified substance. The SCA consequently confirmed 
                                                          
97 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
98 Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 502. See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners 
and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 803. 
99 Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 (4) SA 581 (SCA). 
100 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Limited v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA). 
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the judgment delivered by Blieden J. 101  Ponnan J was of the view that the clause was so 
unreasonably punitive and unjust that public policy could not endure it102. 
 
Further to the aforesaid, the SCA in Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 
(2011),103 when considering the appropriate construction to be found on the exemption (i.e. non-
liability) clause, mentioned the case of Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and 
Another104, where Scott JA held that –  
 
“it is appropriate to think through the appropriate construction to be sited on the disclaimer. The 
right approach is well recognised. If the language of a disclaimer or exemption clause is such that 
it discharges the person who proposed the contract or transaction from liability in precise and 
explicit terms, effect ought to be given thereto. If there is uncertainty, the language ought to be 
interpreted against the person who proposed the contract or transaction.”105 
 
The most recent judgment delivered on exemption clauses and the enforceability thereof, when 
taking into account public policy, is Koen v Pretoria Central Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Pretoria 
Parkade,106 (hereinafter Koen v Pretoria Central Investments) Chesiwe AJ held that “disclaimer 
notices that are bad in law and not being able to be enforce(d) or allow an injured person to 
approach the courts for redress are bad in law and can therefore not pass the constitutional 
muster. Chesiwe AJ held further held that under these circumstances, to enforce any exemption 
clause as it appears on the disclaimer notice107 would be unfair and unjust.” 
 
Theoretically, public policy necessitates courts to give effect to the objective of the contracting 
parties by imposing the exemption clause. However, if an exemption clause is against public policy 
or if it is rare and uncommon in such a contract, the clause is unenforceable. 
 
 
                                                          
101 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 8 (GSJ). 
102 Botha (now Griesel) & Another v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) 782. 
103 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276SCA. 
104 Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 989. 
105 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 
794 (A) 804C. 
106 Koen v Pretoria Central Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Pretoria Parkade (33737/13) [2018] ZAGPPHC 113 (2 
March 2018). 
107 Koen v Pretoria Central Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Pretoria Parkade (33737/13) [2018] ZAGPPHC 113 (2 
March 2018) [54]. 
30 | P a g e  
 
2.4.4 Restrictive interpretation 
 
The impact of an exemption clause may well be restricted by way of restrictive interpretation but 
only within the limits of what the process of interpretation permits.108 This approach was applied 
in Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another.109  
 
In Transport and Crane Hire Ltd v Hubert Davies & Co Ltd110 McNally JA defined the practice of 
restrictive interpretation as follows: “This weapon was called ‘the accurate principles governing 
the interpretation of the contract (construction).’ It was used with great ability and resourcefulness. 
It was used so as to deviate from the ordinary sense of the words of an exemption clause and to 
place on them an edgy and unusual construction…”111  
 
In instances where the language used is vague, a court should construe a clause narrowly.112 In 
First National Bank v Rosenblum113 it was held that, in the instance where a contracting party 
desires to be exempted from a legal responsibility, which would normally confer upon such a 
contracting party in terms of the common law, such a contracting party has to evidently state his 
objective without any uncertainty. Marais JA held that – 
 
“[i]n matters of contract the contracting parties are taken to have anticipated their legal rights and 
responsibilities to be administered by the common law, except where the contracting parties have 
clearly and unequivocally shown the contrary. In the instance where one of the contracting parties 
desire to be released, either entirely or partly, from any legal responsibility which can ascend at 
common-law under a contract of the type which the contracting parties anticipate to enter into, it is 
for that contracting party to make sure that the magnitude to which such a contracting party is to be 
released is evidently explained.”114 
 
                                                          
108 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 290. 
109 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) 516D–I. 
110 Transport and Crane Hire Ltd v Hubert Davies & Co Ltd 1991 (4) SA 150 (ZS). Zimbabwean case law.  
111 At 160–162, cited from George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd 1983 QB 284 296–6. 
112 See Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co Ltd v Adamastos Shipping Co Ltd 1957 (2) QB 233 (CA) 269.Denning 
LJ, reflecting the judiciary’s attitude towards exemption clauses, stated that “[w]e have repeatedly refused 
to allow a party to a contract to escape from his just liability under it by reason of an exempting clause, 
unless he does so by words which are perfectly clear, effective and precise.”  
113 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA). 
114 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA) 195.   
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This practice could be used by the court only in instances where the language of the exemption 
clause is indistinct. If that is not the situation, the court should put such an exemption clause in 
force.  
 
Furthermore, the courts every so often apply the contra proferentum rule115, while interpreting 
restrictively.116 In the matter of Drifters Adventure Tours v Hircock117 the court believed that 
exemption clauses ought to be interpreted, altogether restrictively. In a case of uncertainty, an 
exemption clause that is rationally capable of having more than one meaning must be given the 
interpretation slightly less favourable and prejudiced against the drafter of such a clause that is in 
favour of the consumer. Further to the aforesaid and as already referred to above in paragraph 
2.4.3, the court held in Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another118 that, if the 
language of a disclaimer or exemption clause is clear to such extent that it discharges the person 
who proposed the contract or transaction from legal responsibility in precise and explicit terms, 
such disclaimer or exemption clause must be adhered to. When there is uncertainty, the language 
should be interpreted against the person who proposed the contract or transaction.119  
 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez120 the court held that an exemption clause, in instances where such 
a clause diminishes the precise essence of the contract, should evidently and pertinently be drawn 
to the attention of the consumer who appends his signature to a standard form contract.121 The 
SCA came to a corresponding decision in the matter of Freddy Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland 
(Pty) Ltd,122 where the court held that exclusion from legal responsibility for underlying defects 
was not applicable to circumstances where the product delivered was substantially different to the 
product purchased, for the reason that this resulted in non-performance. 
 
Restrictive interpretation, however, did not satisfactorily provide a consumer with the necessary 
protection in instances where the exception clause was clear-cut (clear and unambiguous), as 
                                                          
115 Also known as "interpretation against the draftsman", this is a doctrine of contractual interpretation 
providing that, where a promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning should be the one 
that works against the interests of the party who provided the wording. 
116 The rule means that the document is interpreted in favour of the party not represented for the drafting of 
the agreement. 
117 Drifters Adventure Tours v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 (SCA) 87E–G. 
118 Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
119 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 
794 (A) 804C. 
120 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) [33].   
121 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) [33].  
122 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) [23]. 
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such a clause would have been enforced by the court regardless of its effect on the consumer. 
The CPA, nonetheless, aims to protect a consumer against exception clauses, where such 
clauses are seen as unfair terms in terms of the CPA. 
 
2.5 Background to the enforcement of exemption clauses in terms of the common law  
 
The first issue pertaining to exemption clauses (and standard-form contracts) in our law of contract 
emanates from the constant faithfulness to freedom of contract.123 This principle prohibited the 
courts from applying reasonable solutions in circumstances where a contract or a term contained 
in such a contract is unfair, punitive and unjust and, as a result has led to unreasonable 
exemptions of liability being enforced against the consumer standing in the weaker bargaining 
position.124 The aforesaid resulted in a second issue, identified as the use and misuse of standard-
form contracts.125 This gave rise to a third issue,  namely, that the consumer, owing to his weaker 
bargaining position, remains caught in a  take-it-or-leave-it situation, with no facility to discuss the 
terms and conditions contained in such a standard-form contract, known as  contract of 
adhesion.126   
 
Exemption clauses have continuously been operative to the detriment of most consumers, 
regardless of the courts’ efforts to determine otherwise. If the language is adequately clear to be 
accorded clear meaning of such a term, the courts cannot prevent the application of such 
exemption clauses. Numerous causes exist for the constant governance of such exemption 
clauses.  
 
The common-law principle of pacta sunt servanda means that courts have to enforce contracts 
because, directly translated, this principle means that every contract entered into must be 
honoured. This common-law principle is consistent with constitutional values, namely, dignity and 
autonomy, to be precise.127 Our common law of contract is founded on this principle.  
 
                                                          
123 See Van Rensburg 1986 (49) THRHR 448, where the author discusses the traditional emphasis of the 
law of contract on party autonomy (freedom of contract). 
124 Hopkins TSAR 2003 (1) 155. 
125 See Stoop 2015 (27) 2 SA Merc LJ 191 193–194, where the author discusses issues related to standard-
term contracts (exemption clauses).  
126 See Stoop 2015 (27) 2 SA Merc LJ 191 193–194 and Aronstam Consumer protection 16–17. 
127 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 
486 (SCA); Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323; Den Braven SA (Pty) Ltd v Pillay 2008 (6) SA 229 (D); 
Nyandeni Local Municipality v Hlazo 2010 (4) SA 261 (ECM). 
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The principle of pacta sunt servanda has been the benchmark when executing a contractual term. 
It has also provided the concept that a contracting party is not obliged to notify the other 
contracting party of the meaning and consequences of the terms of the anticipated contract.  
 
In Afrox128 the court held that, once somebody signs a contract but nevertheless fails or neglects, 
to read such contract, such person does it at their own risk and such terms as contained in the 
contract will be binding on that person, as if that person had explicitly consented to them.  It has 
at all times been trite in our law that contracts which have been concluded at liberty must not be 
obstructed.129  
 
In the case of Grinaker Construction v Transvaal Provincial Administration130 the court held that, 
in the event of the consumer having struck a bad bargain, the court is not in a position to adjust 
the contract in the consumer’s favour purely out of compassion for such consumer.131  
 
In Mozart Ice Cream Classics Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff and Another132 the court held that 
without the common-law principle of pacta sunt servanda, the law of contract would be dependent 
on gross ambiguity, judicial notion and the absence of integrity between the parties to a contract. 
 
The law of contract in South African provides for contracting parties to have the freedom to 
conclude a contract and to have the capability to choose with whom. The basis for recognising 
exemption clauses originated from the principle of freedom of contract.133  One of the terms 
included in the aforesaid is the freedom to include exemption clauses in a contract. It is founded 
on the belief that nobody can be compelled to enter into a contract.134 Freedom of contract also 
                                                          
128 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [34 and 35]. 
129 Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 19 Eq 462. 
130 Grinaker Construction v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1982 (1) SA 312 (A) 97A-B. 
131 Van Eeden A guide to the Consumer Protection Act 69. The courts will, with only limited exceptions, 
protect and hold inviolable that which is contained within the four corners of the signed contract as 
conclusive proof of the consensus of the parties. 
132 Mozart Ice Cream Classics Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff and Another 2009 (3) SA 78 (C). 
133 Lerm A critical analysis of exemption clauses in medical contracts 8. The freedom not to contract is 
sometimes referred to as “freedom from contract”. See Willet Fairness in consumer contracts 18. See also 
Barnard A critical legal argument 72–73; Brownsword 1995 (22) 2 JLS 262–263; Hawthorne 2004 (67) 
THRHR 295; Hawthorne 1995 (58) THRHR 163; Pettit 1999 (79) BULR 263. 
134 Hawthorne 2004 (67) THRHR 295; and Van Rensburg 1986 (49) THRHR 448. 
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means that a court is unwilling to interfere in contracts entered into freely and of their own accord 
by contracting parties.135  
 
In the case of Burger v Central South African Railways 136 the court held that the right of a court 
to discharge a party to a contract from the effects of the contract, properly concluded by the party, 
simply for the reason that the contract seems to be unreasonable, is not recognised by our law.137  
 
Before the enforcement of the CPA and the delivery of the Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel (hereinafter 
Naidoo) judgment138 the courts, on the odd occasion, held that a contract should not be enforced 
as a result of unfairness, and the courts did not contest freedom of contract on reasonable 
grounds.139 It can therefore be said that the courts seem to be vigilant when determining whether 
to enforce contract terms based on the fact that the contract is unfair or unreasonable.140 In these 
cases the courts anticipated that any judicial regulation of contracts was against the notion of 
freedom of contract.141  
 
It can be interpreted that the aforesaid restriction by the courts that freedom of contract and the 
common-law principle of pacta sunt servanda are still favoured over and above the principle of 
fairness and reasonableness.142 This appears to be the situation regardless of the fact that, in 
accordance with the current constitutional system, these doctrines ought to be put to practical use 
bearing in mind the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights143, in agreement with section 
39(2) of the Constitution.144  
                                                          
135 Wells v SA Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69; Burger v Central SA Railways 1903 TS 571; Bhana and Pieterse 
2005 (122) SALJ 865 878–883. 
136 Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571. 
137 Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 576. 
138 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ).   
139 See Bhana and Pieterse 2005 (122) SALJ 865–866 and 872–876. It was indicated that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal closed off existing legal avenues through which the harshness of the unfettered operation 
of a classical liberal model of contract could have been ameliorated. See also Van der Walt 2000 (33) TSAR 
35–36, where it is indicated that the courts with their positivist attitude lost track of reality. 
140 Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) submitted that the Constitution did not give courts 
the power to invalidate contractual provisions because they happen not to coincide with the judges' own 
notions of fairness or good faith. See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) 93. In cases of negligence, this 
submission may be fraught with difficulties as it would be unfair to exclude liability. 
141 See Lewis 2003 (120) SALJ 330–338. 
142 See Hawthorne 2004 (67) THRHR 294. Hopkins correctly points out that there appears to be an obvious 
and apparent unwillingness on the part of the SCA to free the law of contract from the shackles of the 
sanctity of contract rule, which have for so long held back the progressive development of our law of 
contract. See Hopkins 2007 (June) De Rebus 23. 
143 Sections 7–39 of the Constitution, being Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
144 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 983 (CC) 43. 
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The Naidoo145 case marked a noteworthy development in the direction of fairness and justice in 
contracts because the court in this case held that it would be unjust and unfair to enforce an 
exception clause and disclaimer notice notwithstanding the principle of freedom of contract. 
Freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda have generally triumphed above fairness. However, 
one of the most recent cases decided regarding the common-law principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
is Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd146. The court 
again confirmed the principle that a party to a contract’s right to freedom to contract is not merely 
considered to be a constitutional right, necessitating protection by the courts, but is, furthermore, 
a right that ought to be valued by both parties to the contract. This judgment supports the belief 
that, once a contract has been concluded freely and willingly, legal responsibilities deriving from 
such a contract need to be adhered to by the contracting parties. 
 
A result of the term “freedom” is that, as soon as the contracting parties have entered into a 
contract, such parties must meet the terms of such a contract, better known as sanctity 
(sacredness) of contract. 147  This keystone judgment finds manifestation in the common-law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda and is established on individualism, autonomy, personal liberty, 
and freedom of contract.148 
 
Sacredness of contract necessitates that contractual obligations willingly entered into between 
the parties be adhered to by the contracting parties and, when necessary, imposed by the 
courts.149 It is trite in law that contracts willingly concluded between contracting parties must be 
imposed and the courts must not frustrate such an enforcement.150  Additionally, courts should 
not casually release a contracting party of its duty to execute as desired in accordance with the 
contract.  
 
                                                          
145 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ). 
146 Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA). 
147 Pretorius 2003 (66) THRHR 640; Willet Fairness in consumer contracts: the case of unfair terms 19-
20.  
148 Christie and McFarlane The law of contract 12; Cockrell 1992 (109) SALJ 41. See also a discussion of 
pacta sunt servanda in para 2.2.2 above. 
149 Hutchison The law of contract 21. 
150 See Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 582, in which Sir Gorge 
Jessel MR stated that “men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall 
be enforced by the courts of justice”. 
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Over and above the aforesaid, another common-law principle applicable is the caveat subscriptor 
rule, which plainly means the signatory should be cautioned.151 This means that as soon as a 
contract is reduced to writing and signed by the contracting parties, the terms contained in the 
contract are binding on the parties of that contract, as the signatures of the parties are confirmation 
that they have agreed to such terms. This rule places the onus on the consumer to ensure that 
he understands the terms contained in the contract prior to signing it, as the consumer will be 
bound to it.  
 
The court confirmed the caveat subscriptor rule in George v Fairmead152 and found that, although 
the contractual party in that case had failed to read the contract, such terms were still binding on 
such party.  However, the courts have lately followed a more relaxed and flexible approach to the 
application of this term:153  
 
“The caveat subscriptor rule is founded on the reliance theory which is every so often described by 
referring to Blackburn J’s renowned dictum from the English case Smith v Hughes: “… whatever 
an individual’s actual objective might be, by acting in such a manner that a reasonable person would 
consider his actions to be a reflection of him agreeing to the terms of a contract suggested by the 
other contracting party, and that such contracting party, upon the aforesaid notion, concludes the 
contract. Such a party therefore conducting himself would be similarly bound, as if he had 
anticipated to consent to the terms of the other contracting party””. 154 
 
It is essential to note that there are occurrences where one can avoid the application of the caveat 
subscriptor rule.155 Such exceptions are iustus error, fraud, undue influence and duress.156 The 
exceptio doli generalis was established in the Roman law and it functioned as a defence.157 This 
defence enabled the consumer, taken to court, to raise situations which would make the 
implementation of the contract similar to that of fraud.158 
 
                                                          
151 Van der Merwe et al Contract: general principles (2012) 36; Christie The law of contract 174–176. 
152 George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) 465 SA 46F. 
153 In Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) 33, the court held that an exemption clause that is 
hidden and which undermines the essence of the contract must be brought to the attention of the consumer 
who signs the contract. 
154 Smith v Hughes 1871 LR 6 QB 597 and 607. 
155 Woker 2003 (15) 1 SA Merc LJ 110. 
156 Woker 2003 (15) 1 SA Merc LJ 110. 
157 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Others 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 605. 
158 In Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W) 215 it was accepted that the exceptio doli generalis 
rule formed part of the South African law. 
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The exceptio doli had two functions. The first was that, in a case where the consumer assumed 
that the supplier was guilty of fraud, the exceptio doli specialis was raised prior to instituting a 
claim. The second was that, where the consumer suspected that the supplier was claiming 
something which such supplier was legally entitled to but, with reference to reasonableness and 
good faith, was ineligible to, the exceptio doli generalis was similarly raised.159 
 
In the case of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas and Others160  (hereinafter Bank of 
Lisbon), the court pointed out its inclination for individualism and, in doing so, got rid of the 
exceptio doli generalis where a contract would possibly be affirmed unenforceable based on 
deliberations of unfairness. The majority held that the exceptio doli generalis did not form part of 
our law.161 In addition, the court failed to point toward any other remedy in our law which would 
possibly attain an effect similar to the exceptio doli generalis.  
 
In the case of Brisley v Drotsky,162 the SCA criticised some, but not all, efforts to revive the 
exceptio doli. Nonetheless, it was shown in the minority judgment in this case that our law is 
currently in a developing stage where contractual fairness is progressively growing as a juristic 
and ethical standard.163 
 
Taking all the above-mentioned into consideration, with specific reference to the application of 
common-law principles to exemption clauses, the legislature has intervened by passing the CPA, 
which act deals extensively with the drafting, application and enforceability of exemption clauses 
in contracts.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
It is clear-cut that our courts, under the common law, have dealt with the question of the 
enforcement of exemption clauses on the foundation of freedom of contract. The courts’ method 
has been affected by the customary interpretation that contracts freely concluded between the 
contracting parties ought to be enforced and that the courts should not interfere with the 
                                                          
159 See Joubert General principles 279. 
160 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas and Others 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
161 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas and Others 607B. Cf Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation 
Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (A); Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 (A). See also Van der Merwe, 
Lubbe and Van Huyssteen 1989 (106) SALJ 236. 
162 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [14 and 29]. 
163 See Van der Walt 2000 (33) TSAR 38. 
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enforceability thereof. Nonetheless, the application of the common-law principles by the courts 
has been so arbitrary that it cannot be predicted with confidence, whether the courts would be of 
assistance to the distressed contracting party.164 
 
The Constitution 165  has had particular repercussions for common-law principles. With the 
commencement of the Constitution, the notions of public policy and ubuntu began to play a very 
significant part when the courts wish to enforce exemption clauses.166 
 
The CPA and the Naidoo167 judgment mark a vital defining moment in our law of contract regarding 
the usage and enforcement of exemption clauses displayed by way of a disclaimer notice. The 
CPA presents all-embracing modifications, and acts as an all-purpose legislation prohibiting a 
range of terms (including exemption clauses) which would have been enforced in accordance with 
the common law. The CPA produces a notion of fairness by the citation of a range of terms which 
are prohibited and terms which are assumed to be unfair.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
164 Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 379. 
165 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
166 Discussion in this regard will follow in chapter 3. 
167 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ).   
168 Discussion in this regard will follow in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC POLICY AND UBUNTU 
ON THE USE OF EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
South African private law, specifically the contract law, is essentially uncodified. The role of 
abstract values, for example good faith and fairness, in our contract law needs to be measured 
against the extensive background of our legal system. 
 
Both the Constitutional Court169 and the Supreme Court of Appeal170 have established that our 
common-law principles of contract law are dependent on the Constitution. Nevertheless, in so 
doing, continuous importance is placed on the classical liberalist notions of freedom and dignity.  
At the same time, the courts have given a lower profile to the prospective role of substantive 
equality, to a considerable extent, within a constitutionalised contract law. 
 
An exemption clause is, in effect, an agreement between the contracting parties, and as such, in 
general, enforceable. However, exemption clauses which are against public policy, are invalid and 
unenforceable. Public policy renders contracts that are in themselves invasive, null and void. 
Public policy is now entrenched in the Constitution, as well as in the essential values it protects. 
Such values include human dignity, the advancement of human rights, the achievement of 
equality, freedoms (including freedom of contract), non-sexism and non-racialism.171 
 
3.2 The Constitution 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa. The Constitution provides the legal 
foundation for the existence of the Republic, setting out the rights and duties of its nation, and 
defining the structure of the government. 
 
                                                          
169 Hereinafter the CC. 
170 Hereinafter the SCA. 
171 Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [91]. 
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All laws enforced and applied in our country, inclusive of the common law of contract, now derive 
their force from the Constitution. It can therefore be said that the Bill of Rights172, enclosed in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution, has had a considerable influence on the law of contract, and 
continues to have such an impact. 
 
The Bill of Rights is the basis of the democracy in our country.  The Constitution treasures the 
rights of each and every citizen and upholds the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.173 
 
The rights contained in the Bill of Rights can be restricted simply in accordance with the law of 
general application, to the degree that such restriction is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom, and by considering all 
relevant factors.174 
 
The Bill of Rights contains all human rights that safeguard the civil, political and socio-economic 
rights of each and every citizen in our country. The rights contained therein are applicable to all 
law, inclusive of the common law, and bind all divisions of government.175 It can therefore be said 
that the Constitution, specifically Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights, is a real expression of principles, 
policies and values which triumph in a South African society.176 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the introduction of the Constitution has particular implications 
for common-law principles, with specific reference to pacta sunt servanda and the notion of 
autonomy.177 
 
In the context of specifically contractual claims, both the CC and the SCA have laid down that the 
obligation of the courts to advance the common law in terms of the Constitution and its 
fundamental values extends directly to the principles and concepts of the positive law.178 The 
effect of the Constitution on the enforceability and application of exemption clauses has received 
                                                          
172 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
173 Section 7 of the Constitution. 
174 Section 36 of the Constitution. 
175  Including the national executive, Parliament, the judiciary, provincial governments and municipal 
councils. 
176 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 11. 
177 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 11. 
178 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 13. 
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some consideration in the past number of years. Both the CC and the SCA have accepted that 
the Constitution has horizontal application, however there is still significant ambiguity regarding 
the exact degree and way of such horizontal application, especially when it comes to the issue of 
substantive fairness in contracts.179  
 
A number of sections of the Constitution are relevant when the enforcement of an exemption 
clause is considered. Bearing in mind all the applicable sections, it is my view that the rights to 
dignity, equality and freedom of the contracting party in the weaker bargaining position should be 
taken into account.180 It must be determined whether the Constitution binds all courts and all 
persons, whether the exemption clause deprives a contracting party of a fundamental right, and 
whether a contracting party’s fundamental rights may be limited. In the paragraphs that follow, the 
relevant and applicable sections of the Constitution and their influence on the interpretation and 
enforcement of exemption clauses will be discussed. 
 
3.2.2 Sections 7 and 39 of the Constitution 
 
Section 7 of the Constitution181 preserve all the rights of all people in South Africa. Section 39 of 
the Constitution, 182 in its turn, sets out the manner in which the Bill of Rights should be interpreted.  
                                                          
179 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [22, 24 and 93]; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 
(SCA) [32]; Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) [12 and 14–17]; South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) [30]; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 
(SCA) [7]; Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) [27–8 and 
50–4]; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 19 (SCA) [23–5]; Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [51–2, 56–8, 70–3, 104 and 124]; and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA256 (CC) [71]. See Bhana and Meerkotter 2015 (132) 3 SALJ 494. 
180 Bauling and Nagtegaal 2015 De Jure 149; Barnard AJ A critical legal argument 229; Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); and Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 
(4) SA 1 (SCA). 
181  Section 7 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
“(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people 
in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  
(2)  The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
(3)  The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or 
elsewhere in the Bill”. 
182  Section 39 of the Constitution enshrines the interpretation of Bill of Rights, which section reads as 
follows: 
“(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—  
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom;  
(b)   must consider international law; and  
(c)   may consider foreign law.  
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
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Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) repeated the constitutional prominence 
of (contractual) self-sufficiency (i.e. autonomy) and established that contracting parties are 
permitted to enter into a contract, even if it is to a party’s disadvantage.183 
 
The leading CC case to date to speak expressly of the foundational value of freedom remains that 
of Ferreira v Levin no and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 184 (hereinafter 
the Ferreira case). The contradictory considerations of the constitutional value of freedom by the 
respective judges in the Ferreira case highlighted the multi-faceted nature of freedom and, 
therefore, also of autonomy.185 In this regard, specific reference is made to Ackermann J, who 
submitted that – 
 
“[h]uman dignity has little significance without freedom; for without freedom personal growth and 
fulfilment is impossible. Without freedom, human dignity is little more than a mere concept. Freedom 
and dignity are linked without option of being separated. To refute individuals their freedom is to 
refute them from their dignity. So, a person’s right to freedom ought to be defined as extensively as 
probable, in agreement with a similar extent of freedom for others.”186 
 
Contrary to Ackermann J, Sachs J’s attitude towards freedom involves the multi-dimensional 
constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality, both individually and jointly. However, 
subsequent case law has not followed through with Sachs J’s approach. The SCA has adopted 
an approach to freedom of contract that rather echoes Ackermann J’s understanding of 
freedom.187 
 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that when a court, tribunal or forum is developing the 
common law, such development should encourage the essence, purpose and objects of the Bill 
                                                          
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or 
conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the 
Bill”. 
183 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [58]: "Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own 
affairs, even to one's own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity". 
184 Ferreira v Levin no and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
This is in the context of the interim Constitution and with reference to the right to freedom and security of 
the person. 
185 Bhana Constitutionalising contract law 92–95. 
186 Ferreira v Levin and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC);1996 
1 BCLR 1 (CC) [49 - 51]. 
187 Bhana Constitutionalising contract law 97. 
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of Rights. In Brisley v Drotsky,188 the court, per Cameron JA positioned South African common 
law of contract within the Bill of Rights.  Cameron JA explained that the common law of contract 
is currently conditioned on the Constitution,189 meaning that “public policy”, as applied to contracts, 
is nowadays recognised in the Constitution together with its foundational values of human dignity, 
freedom and equality.190 Public policy signifies the legal principles of the public, and under the 
constitutional system the Constitution is the most trustworthy declaration of public policy.  
 
In terms of the extensive constitutional framework, the values of freedom and human dignity 
contain the fundamental principle of freedom of contract, save for any obscene excesses.191  In 
other words, the SCA held that the constitutional values of freedom and dignity re-legitimate the 
classical liberal notion of the autonomy of individuals, to administer their own lives by contract as 
long as their self-respect and dignity are not debilitated. Further to the aforesaid, in the case of 
Afrox,192  the SCA held that the common-law principle of freedom of contract, in itself, is a 
constitutional value.193 
 
The SCA has successively started to recognise the impact of the constitutional value of equality 
(and dignity) on contractual validity, at least insofar as it concedes that a court must take 
cognisance of imbalances in the bargaining power to ensure that the parties are not compelled to 
enter into a contract on terms which invade their dignity and equality.194 
 
The common law principles pertaining to contracts, particularly contractual autonomy, must find a 
legal home in the Bill of Rights.  Without a definite right to freedom of contract, both the CC and 
the SCA have purported to place freedom of contract within the foundational triage, namely, the 
essential constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality.195 However, the extent thereof 
must be determined on each individual case. When the Constitution was drafted, it was chosen 
not to insert freedom of contract as an essential right, although its significance as a constitutional 
                                                          
188 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
189 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [88]. 
190 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [91]. 
191 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [94]. 
192 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
193 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [17–24], especially [23] where freedom of contract 
was referred to as “[d]ie grontwetlike waarde van kontrakteersvryheid...”; and Bhana Constitutionalising 
contract law 97–98. 
194 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [12]; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 
14 and 16; and Bhana Constitutionalising contract law 98. 
195 Bhana Constitutionalising contract law 90. 
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value seems to have been acknowledged from time to time.196 It can therefore be said that 
freedom of contract should indeed be considered when interpreting a contract, specifically an 
exemption clause. 
 
3.2.3 Section 8 of the Constitution 
 
The courts have held that, considering the provisions of section 8 of the Constitution197, the 
Constitution binds all courts and, in principle, all persons, in view of the positive duty imposed on 
all courts to advance the common law in agreement with the values expressed in the Constitution. 
It is held that the provisions of the Constitution must every so often also find direct application 
between individuals, that is, consumers.198 
 
The majority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier, delivered by Ngcobo J, is authority for the 
affirmation that the CC is more favourable towards an interpretation of section 8(2) in the direction 
of indirect application of the Bill of Rights in instances where the constitutionality of a contract term 
is challenged. According to the majority judgment, direct application of the Constitution is fraught 
with problems.199  
 
In light of the aforesaid it can be said that an interpretation of section 8(2) proposes that not every 
fundamental right binds private persons, and such right will be binding only to the degree to which 
it is relevant.  
                                                          
196 See Malan AJA in Reddy v Siemens 2006 SCA 164 (SA) [15]; see also Brand JA in Afrox Healthcare 
Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) [23]. 
197 Section 8 of the Constitution, enshrining the application of the Bill of Rights, reads as follows: 
“(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs 
of state.  
 (2)  A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.  
 (3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), 
a court —  
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and  
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with 
section 36(1).  
(4)  A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the 
rights and the nature of that juristic person.” 
198 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 12–13. 
199 See Ngcobo J’s judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [23–30]. 
45 | P a g e  
 
It is clear from section 8(3) that if a right contained in the Bill of Rights is applicable in the private 
domain, it will, rather than directly, be given effect through the improvement of the common law.200 
The majority in Barkhuizen v Napier conveyed that assessing the constitutionality of a contractual 
term directly against a right contained in the Bill of Rights would be problematic.201  
 
Even though, for the time being, courts would possibly be more satisfied with indirect horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights to a dispute arising from a contract that implicates constitutional 
rights, the possibility still exists for courts to get directly involved if a contracting party has 
implemented a contractual power in a way that fails to have regard to the constitutional rights of 
the other contracting party. 
 
3.2.4 Section 34 of the Constitution 
 
With regard to the distinctive examples of exception clauses in chapter 2202, it is evident that an 
exemption clause deprives a party to a contract from instituting legal action, which in turn deprives 
such party from having access to a court or the relevant forum. 
 
Section 34 of the Constitution203 provides expression to one of the foundational values, namely, 
assuring that every person has the right to seek legal redress of a court, and it moreover provides 
assurances for fair and orderly resolutions of disputes by courts or independent and unprejudiced 
tribunals. 204 
 
The aforesaid was confirmed by the CC in Barkhuizen v Napier. This confirms that the aforesaid 
is essential to the steadiness of a well-ordered civilisation. It is definitely important to a society 
that such society is established on the rule of law.  
 
In the majority judgment of Barkhuizen v Napier, the court found that section 34 does not merely 
mirror the foundational values that bring about our constitutional order; it also establishes public 
                                                          
200 See Woolman 2007 SALJ 762 and Rautenbach 2009 (3) TSAR  624 - 631 in which the authors promote 
the probability of a direct application of the Bill of Rights to private contract terms. 
201 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [23–30]. 
202 Para 2.2 above. 
203 Section 34 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum”.  
204 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [31]. 
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policy.205 The court held that an unreasonable or unfair time limitation clause would be conflicting 
with public policy as public policy considered the essence of doing unpretentious justice between 
persons, to be cognisant of the notion of ubuntu.206 However, the court found that the clause was 
not unfair or unreasonable, and it further found that section 34 did not exclude time limitation 
clauses. Furthermore, it held that there was no proof that the plaintiff did not freely and willingly 
conclude the relevant contract. It further decided that the time limitation clause did not 
consequently infringe on any of the applicant’s constitutional rights. 
 
Over and above the aforesaid, Sachs J 207 concluded, in a minority judgment, that public policy, 
nowadays brought alive by section 34 of the Constitution, gives a person a right to access to the 
courts. 
 
Taking all of the aforesaid in consideration, it is clear that in terms of section 34 of the Constitution, 
everyone has a guaranteed right to access to the courts, and consequently exemption clauses, 
with specific reference to time-bar clauses, would possibly infringe this right. In order to determine 
whether such clause can invade the right enclosed in section 34 of the Constitution, section 36 of 
the Constitution comes into play. 
 
3.2.5 Section 36 of the Constitution 
 
It should be noted that the rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution are not fixed; 
therefore, the limitation of such rights (and freedoms) is enshrined in section 36 of the 
Constitution,208 also known as the general limitation clause. Such limitations must be reasonable 
                                                          
205 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [33]. 
206 See paras 3.3 and 3.4 below in respect of public policy and ubuntu. 
207 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
208 Section 36 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —  
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
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and can only be done with good cause. 209 It can therefore be said that not all contraventions of 
an individual’s fundamental rights are unconstitutional.  
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it is clearly provided for in the Constitution that individuals who limit 
(or attempt to limit) rights ought to meet with the requirements contained in the Constitution.210 
Incidentally, not all requirements will be discussed, as they do not fall within the scope of this 
dissertation; however, what is important is the element of proportionality.211  
 
3.2.6 Relevant case law 
 
Our courts have shown that in a constitutionalised contract law, equality plays a substantial role, 
insofar as contracting parties can establish the presence of unequal bargaining power.   
 
Public policy furthermore requires some degree of fairness in contracts.212 The law desires to 
embrace normative and constitutional values so as to become accustomed to the shifting 
requirements of the community, particularly where the need arises to defend the party to a contract 
that is in the weaker bargaining position. In this regard it was held in the minority judgment by 
Olivier JA in Brisley v Drotsky, that there was a need to bring about a balance between the well-
being of legal stability and social realities.213 
 
A discussion of the post-constitution judgments of Brisley v Drotsky, Afrox Health Care Bpk v 
Strydom, Napier v Barkhuizen, and Barkhuizen v Napier will follow. 
 
3.2.6.1 Brisley v Drotsky 
 
                                                          
209 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
210 Section 36(2) of the Constitution provides as follows: “Except as provided in subsection (1) of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights." 
211 In this regard, see Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) [145]; De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) 
[23]; Malachi v Cape Dance Academy International (Pty) Ltd 2010 6 SA 1 (CC) [15]. See also Currie and 
De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 272. From the aforesaid case law, it can be concluded that the 
Constitutional Court also works with proportionality during the first stage of the enquiry to determine if a 
deprivation of freedom was undertaken "arbitrarily and without just cause" in applying section 12(1)(a) of 
the Constitution, but nevertheless endeavours to consider the matters referred to in section 36(1)(a) to (e) 
after it has concluded that there was an arbitrary deprival without just cause. 
212 Bhana and Pieterse 2005 (122) SALJ 868 correctly submit that a contract does not operate in isolation 
but in a social context. Society should thus exercise some control over a contract, so as to ensure that there 
is justice and equity. 
213 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) 63, 69–70, 72, 75–76 and 78. 
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This SCA case emphasises the point that even a straightforward lease agreement which 
consumers enter into on a daily basis shows how hazardous, unilateral and unfair an exemption 
clause (i.e. the non-variation clause exempting the landlord from legal responsibility under an oral 
alteration to the contract) can be if put into operation to the detriment of a party in a weaker 
bargaining position, being the tenant. 214  
 
Cameron JA positioned contract law within our constitutional dispensation, where he relied on 
section 39(2) of the Constitution, for all intents and purposes, to infuse contract law with the 
founding values of our Bill of Rights.215 
 
Subsequent cases, in particular Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom, Napier v Barkhuizen and 
Barkhuizen v Napier, have thus supported the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, 
essentially via the portal of public policy. 
 
3.2.6.2 Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom   
 
A public policy encounter again came before the SCA in this case. The SCA held that, insofar as 
exemption clauses were involved, in accordance with the common-law approach, such exemption 
clauses would possibly be affirmed to be against public policy and as such be regarded 
unenforceable.216 Regardless of such acknowledgment, the court held that there was no evidence 
showing that the respondent was in an imbalanced or weaker bargaining position with regard to 
Afrox at the conclusion of the admission agreement.217 The court found that, in contemplation of 
whether a term contained in a contract was against public interests, the values contained in the 
Constitution had to be considered.218 Public interest upholds the notion that when a contract is 
freely and voluntarily entered into between contracting parties, having the necessary capacity, 
such contract terms are necessary to be sustained and imposed by the courts.219  
 
                                                          
214 Bhana Constitutionalising contract law 275-278. Furthermore see Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 
(6) SA 21 (SCA) [12]; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [8 – 9] and Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) 
SA 323 (CC) [59]. 
215 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [91–94]. 
216 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) [34]. 
217 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [35]. 
218 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [37]. 
219 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [38]. 
49 | P a g e  
 
What the court in this case had to determine was whether the exemption clause was unanticipated 
to bring about the obligation to have such exemption clause directed to the consumer’s 
attention.220  
 
In Afrox the respondent disputed the legitimacy of the exemption clause enclosed in an admission 
form. The form released the hospital from legal responsibility for medical negligence. The 
respondent argued that the exemption clause was against public policy and that if such a clause 
were to be enforced, it would be unreasonable, unfair and against the notion of good faith. In this 
regard, the respondent depended on Olivier J’s minority judgment in Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO.221 The respondent further held that the clause violated his 
fundamental right to have right to use health care services. The SCA affirmed its previous decision 
in Brisley v Drotsky, on the part of good faith, reasonableness and fairness in private contractual 
relationships.222 
 
The SCA held that the exemption clause was, objectively viewed, not unforeseen, and therefore 
there was no legal duty upon the admission clerk to draw the respondent’s attention to the clause. 
Consequently, it was held that the exemption clause was binding on the respondent.223 
 
Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox have set the stage for the broader constitutionalisation of South 
African contract law. Indeed, this has become the foundation of further SCA judgments,224 as well 
as the first CC judgment dealing with the constitutionalisation of contract law.225 
 
3.2.6.3 Napier v Barkhuizen 
 
The issue at heart in Napier v Barkhuizen226 and finally in Barkhuizen v Napier227 was the degree 
of the influence that the Constitution has on the contractual relationship between individuals and 
                                                          
220 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [42]. 
221 Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) 322-324. 
222 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [32]. 
223 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [42]. 
224Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) [12]; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications 
(Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) [12]; Napier [11–14]. 
225 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [57]. Discussion to follow. 
226 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
227 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
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the constitutionality of contractual provisions which limit an individual’s right of access to the 
courts.228 
 
In the case of Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (hereinafter Napier v Barkhuizen) the 
insurance policy determined that in instances where the insured was unsuccessful in timeously 
serving summons on the insurer (within 90 days of being notified of the insurer's rejection of the 
claim), such a claim against the insurer by the insured would lapse. The respondent, Mr 
Barkhuizen, argued that this clause infringed on his constitutional right of access to the courts set 
out in section 34 of the Constitution. In the Pretoria High Court, De Villiers J held that time-
limitation clauses are indeed unconstitutional. Mr Napier took the matter on appeal to the SCA. 
 
Cameron JA acknowledged the approach taken in both Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox in 
acknowledging that the common law is nowadays conditioned on the Constitution and that courts 
must take into account the fundamental constitutional values of equality, dignity and freedom 
when developing the common law of contract in harmony with the spirit, importance and objects 
of the Constitution.229 The SCA, however, cautioned that this did not mean that judges now have 
the power to set aside contracts or to pronounce them unenforceable founded on their individual 
views of fairness, justice or good faith. However, a judge must pronounce contracts in their totality, 
or the terms contained therein, to be unenforceable in instances where such contracts or terms 
are in conflict with public policy as cognisant of the values which are brought about by the 
Constitution.230 
 
The judges held that the respondent concluded the contract out of free will whilst exercising his 
constitutional rights to dignity, equality and freedom. No circumstances existed to undermine the 
deal he concluded, and consequently he must be bound to the contract.231  
 
3.2.6.4 Barkhuizen v Napier 
 
After the above judgment was handed down, Mr Barkhuizen petitioned to the CC, where after the 
CC essentially held that, as between private contracting parties, the Constitution can apply 
                                                          
228 Kuschke 2008 De Jure 463. 
229 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [6]. 
230 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [7]. 
231 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [28] and Kuschke 2008 De Jure 465. 
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indirectly to a contract, by way of an invocation of the common law of contract’s standard of public 
policy.232 
 
The CC further established the public policy assessment, which assessment is held to be two-
staged, providing that a contract ought to be objectively as well as subjectively reasonable in the 
specific conditions, to be enforceable. Ngcobo J, in the majority judgment, held that, as soon as it 
is recognised that the exemption clause is not against public policy, it is a prerequisite for the 
consumer to demonstrate that, in the relevant circumstances of the situation, there was a noble 
reason why there was a failure to act in accordance with public policy. Ngcobo J further held that 
the Constitution necessitates contracting parties to fulfil their contractual responsibilities which 
were entered into willingly and without restrictions, and that, while it is essential to recognise the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, courts should be allowed to reject the enforcement of a clause if 
the effect thereof would be unfairness or unreasonable. 
 
The CC was further presented with an opportunity to pronounce on the constitutionalisation of our 
common law of contract, in particular, to adjudicate on the constitutionality of a contractual time-
limitation clause. The primary focus was on public policy, as the external constitutional corrective 
for South African common law of contract.233  Still, in examining the external reach dimension of 
contractual autonomy, the CC needed first to reposition the common law of contract, as a whole, 
within the ambit of the Bill of Rights.234  It stands to reason therefore that Ncgobo J, in delivering 
the majority judgment, took as his starting point the classic doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, it 
being the embodiment of freedom of contract and contractual autonomy.  At the same time, 
however, the CC endorsed the approach to freedom of contract as adopted by the SCA.235  So, 
whilst the CC expressly recognised that pacta sunt servanda is not to be held above criticism, it 
conditioned on constitutional control, applying its mind only to the external reach dimension of 
autonomy.  Moreover, like the SCA, it did so only in the classical liberal image of the values of 
freedom, dignity and equality.236  
 
                                                          
232 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [23 and 28–30]. 
233 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [28–30]. 
234 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [23 and 28–30]. 
235 The CC did, however, disagree with the SCA insofar as the SCA had refused to give weight to the mere 
fact that “a term is unfair or may operate harshly…” (Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [12] note 64 
and Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [72] note 17). 
236 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [15, 30, 55 and 57] and Bhana Constitutionalising contract law 
100. 
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As stated elsewhere in this dissertation,237 Barkhuizen v Napier is authority for the affirmation that 
the CC is more favourable towards an interpretation of section 8(2) of the Constitution in the 
direction of indirect application of the Bill of Rights in instances where the constitutionality of a 
contractual term is challenged.238  
 
3.2.6.5 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 239 
 
This case law was discussed in the previous chapter, relating to public policy and restrictive 
interpretation.240 
 
What is of importance in this matter, is that the SCA dealt with the implication for contracts, of the 
constitutional right to life, enclosed in section 11 of the Constitution.  Incidentally, the SCA was 
more forthcoming where it introduced the probability of an exclusion clause that purports to 
exclude liability for causing another’s death through negligence, as being contrary to public policy, 
as this would be contrary, not only to the common law’s great respect for the sacredness of life, 
but also to the spirit of section 11 of the Constitution. 
 
3.2.6.6 Conclusion  
 
The eventual decision of the court in Barkhuizen v Napier seems to accept that the question was 
not primarily whether such clause (a time-bar clause) was contrary to the Constitution, but whether 
it was against public policy as demonstrated by the constitutional values particularly the values 
established in the Bill of Rights.241 It was held that the clause was indeed sanctioned by a law of 
general application, namely, the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, and that it will possibly only be 
against public policy if, in the specific circumstances, it were unreasonable.  
 
Further to the aforesaid, in the Naidoo242 case, Nicholls J referred to Barkhuizen v Napier, with 
specific reference to public policy, and held that the limits of contractual sacredness lie at the 
                                                          
237 See para 3.2.3 above. 
238 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [23–30]. 
239 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) [12] (per Harms J, for the 
majority); cf [14–16] (per Marais J, for the minority). 
240 See para 2.4.4 above. 
241 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 17. 
242 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) [47]. 
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edges of public policy which would receive greater force and precision, taking into account the 
Constitution specifically as contained in the Bill of Rights.243 
 
Considering the aforesaid, it is clear that exemption clauses against public policy are void and 
unenforceable. Public policy must be decided on by referring to the values which inspire our 
constitutional democracy as given expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
 
3.3 Public policy 
 
The concept of public policy was discussed in length in the previous chapter.244 A discussion of 
the application, or the influence, of public policy on the enforcement of exemption clauses, will 
follow. 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, public policy has introduced notions of fairness, justice and 
reasonableness, and would preclude the enforcement of a term which would, in theory, result in 
unfairness. 
 
The concept of public policy can therefore be understood to refer to the courts’ reflections of what 
is in the interests of the community or society when contracts are interpreted. Cameron AR stated 
in Brisley v Drotsky that “[p]ublic policy ... invalidates contracts, which are in itself offensive - a 
doctrine of significant antiquity. In its current facade ‘public policy’ is now entrenched in our 
Constitution as well as the fundamental values it cherishes”. 245 
 
Both the SCA and the CC have established that the constitutional values of freedom, dignity and 
equality inform public policy and that a contractual provision inclusive of exemption clauses, which 
violates a constitutional value, may be set aside or affirmed to be unenforceable regarding the 
common law, for being against public policy. 
 
Public policy must be decided on with regard to the values which brings about our constitutional 
democracy as identified in the provisions of the Constitution. Subsequently, a contractual term, 
which is contrary to the values cherished in the Constitution, is against public policy and therefore 
                                                          
243 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) [46]. 
244 See para 2.4.3 above. 
245 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) [4]. 
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unenforceable.246 Therefore, a contract, in its totality or a contractual term, including an exemption 
clause, which infringes on any constitutional values, such as dignity, equality, and freedom, will 
be against public policy and consequently unenforceable. 
 
One of the leading cases on contracts and more specifically public policy, is Sasfin.247 This case 
is also measured to be the point of departure of the modern law of the unlawfulness or 
unenforceability of contracts through the common law, due to the fact that this case was decided 
before the commencement of the Constitution. Since the rejection of good faith in favour of public 
policy by the courts in Brisley v Drotsky 248 and Afrox, Sasfin remains the foremost authority for 
assessing the enforceability of contracts which, in other jurisdictions, would raise queries of good 
faith. 249  Smalberger JA in his judgment held that our common law does not acknowledge 
agreements which are against public policy. Smalberger further held that, with regard to the 
question of what is intended by public policy and the instance when it can be said that agreements 
are against public policy, the interests of the community or public are of overriding significance. 
Agreements which are evidently contrary to the interests of the community, whether such 
agreements are contrary to law or morality, or run counter to social or economic expedience, will 
accordingly, on the grounds of public policy, be unenforceable.  
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, in 1988 the exceptio doli was successfully removed from our law. 
In Bank of Lisbon, Joubert JA held that it was time to lay the exceptio doli to rest as an 
unnecessary redundant anachronism.250  
 
It was not long after Bank of Lisbon that public policy was raised as a fairness defence. 
Smalberger JA held as follows:   
 
No court must shrivel from the responsibility of pronouncing a contract against public policy when 
the circumstance so requires. The power to affirm contracts to be against public policy must, 
nonetheless, be applied cautiously and merely in the most distinctive of cases, lest uncertainty as 
to the validity of contracts arising from an arbitrary and indiscriminate usage of the power. One 
ought to be vigilant not to enter into a contract which is against public policy simply as a result of its 
                                                          
246 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [9]. 
247 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
248 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
249 Mupangavanhu 2013 (1) SPECJU 115. 
250 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas and Others 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 607B. 
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terms offending one's individual sense of decency and fairness... In the words of Lord Atkin in 
Fender v St John-Mildmay “the code should only be raised in distinct cases in which the impairment 
to the public is significantly undeniable, and is not dependent on the idiosyncratic interpretations of 
a small number of judicial minds.251 
 
In recent times, in the matter of Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank SA Ltd252 (hereinafter 
Bredenkamp), the SCA was again confronted with an encounter against a contract on the grounds 
of inconsistency with the Constitution. The court restated that “fairness is not an independent 
prerequisite for the implementation of a contractual right”. 253  Nevertheless, the court also 
reiterated the Sasfin-principle, in that our common law fails to recognise contracts which are 
against public policy.254 The difference, apparently, is that public policy is now embedded as 
constitutional values.  
 
In Bredenkamp it was found that public policy and the boni mores are nowadays profoundly 
entrenched in the Constitution and its fundamental values.255 
 
Ngcobo J held in Barkhuizen v Napier256 that, even though public policy was a point in law raised 
the first time on appeal, the court was capable of using its discretion to contemplate this 
argument. 257  Public policy necessitates contracting parties to abide by the contractual 
responsibilities that have been freely and voluntarily accepted by the parties.258 As previously 
stated, the Constitution makes provision for the fact that certain situations would possibly arise 
where the limitation of a right is allowed by a “law of general application” and whether such 
limitation would be reasonable and permissible. In this matter, it was the right to seek judicial 
redress. The limitation must, however, imitate public policy.259 A person should, nevertheless, be 
given an adequate, reasonable and fair chance to seek judicial redress.260 
 
                                                          
251 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B–G. 
252 Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank SA Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
253 Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) [53]. 
254 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 7I–9H. 
255 Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) [39]. 
256 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [51]. 
257 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [39]. 
258 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [57]. 
259 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [48]. 
260 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [51]. 
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Notwithstanding the aforesaid, public policy is informed by the notion of ubuntu. Ngcobo J 
accordingly held that “public policy takes into consideration the requirement to do ‘simple justice’ 
amongst individuals and that it is informed by the notion of ubuntu.”261 It seemed as if the concepts 
of good faith in contractual relations and ubuntu are to be applicable to law of contract.262 
 
3.4 Ubuntu 
 
The concept of ubuntu263 was first introduced as a constitutional concept in S v Makwanyane264 
which case was followed by several academic discussions on the subject. 
 
Regrettably ubuntu was not specifically incorporated in the values contained in the provisions of 
the Constitution. Even so, regardless of the exclusion, the constitutional standing of ubuntu as a 
value has been reiterated by the CC,265 SCA266 and High Court.267 
 
Nevertheless, some recent cases constructed the prospect that good faith, with the notion of 
ubuntu, will be accepted and applied directly as a law-of-contract principle and constitutional 
                                                          
261 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) [51]. 
262 See Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). 
263 Mokgoro 1998 (1) 1 PER/PELJ 2. Ubuntu can be defined as follows: 
“Ubuntu is a philosophy of life, which in its most fundamental sense represents personhood, humanity, 
humaneness and morality; a metaphor that describes group solidarity where such group solidarity is central 
to the survival of communities with a scarcity of resources, where the fundamental belief is that motho ke 
motho ba batho babangwe/umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which, literally translated, means a person can only 
be a person through others. In other words, the individual’s whole existence is relative to that of the group: 
this is manifested in anti-individualistic conduct towards the survival of the group if the individual is to 
survive. It is a basically humanistic orientation towards fellow beings”. 
264 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
265 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) [37],  Sachs J (as he then was) 
held that the spirit of ubuntu “suffuses the whole of our constitutional order”; City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) [38] 
where Van der Westhuizen J held that “[t]his court has also recognised the concept of ubuntu as underlying 
the Constitution”; Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) [46], where 
Skweyiya J held that “[i]t seems to me that Batho Pele gives practical expression to the constitutional value 
of ubuntu, which embraces the relational nature of rights”. 
266 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and Others v Tshabalala-Msimang and Another NNO 2005 (6) 
BCLR 576 (SCA); New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Health and Another 2005 (3) SA 238 
(SCA) [39]; See also Law Society, Northern Provinces v Mogami and Others 2010 (1) SA 186 (SCA), where 
Harms JA held at [22] as follows: “I believe that the application of the basic principles of ubuntu placed an 
ethical duty on him to respond to her queries”, and in Mohamed's Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern 
Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) the issue at the centre of the appeal concerned the 
question whether the common law maxim of pacta sunt servanda should be developed to infuse the law of 
contract with the Constitutional values of ubuntu, fairness and good faith. 
267 In Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn and Another 2008 (2) SA 
375 (C) [31] Davis J held as follows: “… a point reinforced by the value of ubuntu which seeks to assert that 
individual values are reflected from community”.  
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value, rather than being recognised merely as an underlying value with no direct practical 
implications.268 
 
Moseneke J, in delivering the majority judgment in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd269 (hereinafter Everfresh), also elected to express himself rather strongly on 
the topic of the probable application of ubuntu and the role of good faith according to the common 
law:  
 
“Certainly, it is extremely anticipated and actually essential to infuse the contract law with 
constitutional values, together with values of ubuntu, which encourage much of our constitutional 
compact. On many occasions in the past, has this court had regard to the importance and content 
of the notion of ubuntu. It emphasises the collective nature of society and conveys in it the notions 
of humaneness, social justice and fairness, and covers the important values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity. Were a court 
to entertain Everfresh's argument, the underlying notion of good faith in contract law, the maxim of 
contractual doctrine that agreements seriously entered into should be enforced, and the value of 
ubuntu, which inspires much of our constitutional compact, may lean towards the argument in its 
favour. Contracting parties undoubtedly need to relate to one another in good faith. In instances 
where there is a contractual responsibility to negotiate, it would be barely imaginable that our 
constitutional values would not necessitate that the negotiation ought to be done reasonably, with 
the view of reaching an agreement, in good faith; it is nevertheless concluded that it is unnecessary 
to decide on the merits of any of these difficult questions.” 270 
 
In relation to Everfresh, one of the most important constitutional values providing a basis for such 
development is the value scheme of ubuntu, and the Constitution has brought with it amplified 
pleas for more substantive fairness in contracts generally. 
 
Subsequent to the judgments of the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane and Everfresh under 
the interim Constitution, as well as Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers271 under the 
                                                          
268 See Potgieter & Another v Potgieter NO & Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) [32–34] to the effect that good 
faith as such does not provide an independent basis for striking down contractual terms or interfering in the 
enforcement of a contract. However, some recent cases indeed raise the probability that good faith can in 
certain instances be directly applied and developed as a principle and constitutional imperative. See also 
Combined Developers v Arun Holdings & Others 2015 (3) SA 215 (WCC). 
269 Everfresh Market Virginia 2012 1 SA 256 (CC). 
270 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) [73–74]. 
271 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
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final Constitution, ubuntu was confidently recognised as a fundamental constitutional value that 
should be used in evolving the common law to uphold constitutional values as required by section 
39(2) of the Constitution.272 
 
In the past the courts have, in their endeavours to curtail the multifaceted effects of indemnity 
clauses, been using these common law devices, which sometimes proved to be ineffectual. It is 
high time that South Africa, driven by constitutional values which find manifestation in judicial 
pronouncements, emerges from consumer manipulation. Our contract law is now infused with 
fairness values, good faith and ubuntu to assist it in hard cases of bargain in interpretation.273 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
The Constitution marks a critical defining moment in our law of contract on the usage and 
implementation of exemption clauses. That is because exemption clauses would possibly be set 
aside if such clauses are contrary to public policy. Public policy, in turn, is entrenched in the 
Constitution and referred to, together with the concepts of good faith and ubuntu, as constitutional 
interest. 
 
The effect of the Constitution on the usage of exemption clauses has been significant. It can 
therefore be said that the notions of freedom of contract and sacredness of contract are not the 
only considerations anymore. With the enactment of the Constitution the notions of fairness, 
reasonableness and good faith have arisen and when the courts decide on the validity of 
exemption clauses, these principles have to be considered. 
 
Public policy furthermore requires some degree of fairness in contracts. The law has to grip 
normative and constitutional values so as to become accustomed to the altering needs of the 
community, specifically in instances where it is required to protect the weaker bargaining party to 
a contract. 
 
The legislature has stepped in to fill the opening in circumstances where the contracting party in 
the weaker bargaining position has been ill-treated by their stronger counterparts through the 
CPA. It is nowadays evident that exemption clauses are no longer an entitlement of the parties to 
                                                          
272 Du Plessis The harmonisation 390. 
273 Tembe Problems regarding exemption clauses (LLD thesis University of Pretoria, 2017) 163. 
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the contract. However, public policy is now rooted in legislation to circumvent punitive effects 
ordinarily caused by exemption clauses. 
 
The CPA specifies important consumer rights, namely, the right to equality, the right to privacy, 
the right to choose, the right to fair disclosure and information, the right to fair and responsible 
marketing, the right to fair and honest dealing, the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and 
conditions and the right to fair value, good quality and safety.  
 
Even with the commencement of the CPA there remains a need to develop the law concerning 
exemption clauses further than precedent. In the next chapter I will therefore discuss the impact 
of the CPA on exemption clauses within the ambit of consumer protection, which includes the 
application of the CPA by the courts. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT ON EXEMPTION 
CLAUSES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
4.1 The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) 
 
The CPA was signed into law on 24 April 2009 by the President of South Africa. The CPA, 
however, came into full effect only on 31 March 2011. It is essential to note that the CPA sets out 
the minimum requirements to guarantee sufficient consumer protection in our country.  
 
As evident from the discussion below, the CPA strives to protect defenceless consumers, and 
currently the CPA is applicable to consumers, including juristic persons, with a yearly revenue of 
not more than R2 000 000,00 (two million rand), subject to additional exclusions which may apply 
from time to time.274 It should also be noted that the CPA does not apply to transactions concluded 
between two juristic persons with a yearly revenue of more than R2 000 000,00 (two million rand).  
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
With the commencement of the CPA, the common law, to a certain extent, as referred to in the 
previous chapters of this dissertation, as well as various consumer rights, was codified by the 
CPA, and various unfair business practices, formerly unregulated, are now regulated by the CPA. 
 
As clearly stated in section 2 of the CPA, it is clear that the CPA ought to be construed in such a 
manner as to carry out its purposes as contained in section 3 of the CPA.275 In addition, when the 
CPA is interpreted, applicable foreign law, international law, conventions, declarations or 
protocols can be taken into consideration.276 What is of further importance is that in terms of 
section 2(10), it is stated that no provision contained in the CPA is to be interpreted to prevent a 
consumer from exercising any rights provided to the consumer in terms of the common law. 
 
The purposes of the CPA, contained in section 3 thereof, are, among other things, to progress 
and uphold the economic and social well-being of consumers in our country by introducing a legal 
structure intended for the achievement and upkeep of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, 
                                                          
274 Sections 5(2), (3) and (4), read with the threshold published in GN 294 in Government Gazette 34181 of 
1 April 2011. 
275 Section 2(1) of the CPA. 
276 Section 2(2) of the CPA. A comparison between the CPA and foreign law or international law will be 
discussed in chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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well-organised, maintainable and accountable to the advantage of consumers generally,277 by 
promoting fair business practices, 278  protecting consumers from “unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices; and … deceptive, misleading, unfair 
or fraudulent conduct”.279  
 
A consumer is generally defined in the CPA.280 The definition of a supplier is also of importance 
in that a supplier is defined as a person (natural or juristic) who markets any goods or services281. 
 
In terms of section 5(1) of the CPA, the CPA is applicable to all transactions which occur within 
the Republic of South Africa, unless it is excluded by sections 5(2), 5(3) or 5(4). It is also applicable 
to the promotion of goods or services, or of the supplier of goods or services, in the Republic, with 
two exceptions. The first exception is that such goods or services are not possibly reasonably the 
subject of a transaction to which the CPA is applicable with reference to section 5(1)(a). The 
second is that the promotion of such goods or services has been exempt in accordance with 
sections 5(3) and 5(4). The CPA, furthermore, applies to goods or services which are supplied or 
performed in accordance with a transaction to which the CPA is applicable, regardless of whether 
any of those goods or services are offered or supplied together with any other goods or services, 
or separate from any other goods or services. The CPA also applies to goods which are supplied 
in accordance with a transaction that is excluded from the application of the CPA but only to the 
degree provided for in section 5(5). 
                                                          
277 Section 3(1)(a) of the CPA. 
278 Section 3(1)(c) of the CPA. 
279 Section 3(1)(d)(i)–(ii) of the CPA. The subsections referred to, have been selected on the basis that they 
relate directly to the discussion in this chapter. 
280 Section 1(a)–(e) of the CPA. A consumer is defined as –  
“(a) a person to whom those particular goods or services are marketed in the ordinary course of the 
supplier’s business; 
(b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary course of the supplier’s 
business, unless the transaction is exempt from the application of this CPA by section 5(2) or in terms of 
section 5(3); 
(c) if the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods or a recipient or beneficiary of those 
particular services, irrespective of whether that user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a transaction 
concerning the supply of those particular goods or services; and 
(d) a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable in terms of section 5(6)(b) to 
(e)”. 
Furthermore, with regard to the definition of “consumer”, see Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak 
2017 (1) SA 333 (SCA). The SCA held that Mr Halstead-Cleak, at the time of the incident, was not utilising 
the electricity nor was there any relationship between Eskom, as the supplier or producer, and Mr Halstead-
Cleak. Therefore, Mr Halstead-Cleak was not a consumer for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, Eskom 
was not liable to Mr Halstead-Cleak for the harm caused in terms of section 61(1) of the Act. 
281 Section 1 of the CPA. 
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In brief, it can be said that section 5 of the CPA provides that the provisions of the CPA will be 
applicable to every “transaction”, 282  “agreement”, 283  advertisement, production, distribution, 
“promotion” (promote)”284, sale or “supply”285 of “goods”286 or “services”,287 unless exempted.  
                                                          
282 In terms section 1 of the CPA, ‘‘transaction’’ means— 
“(a) in respect of a person acting in the ordinary course of business— 
(i) an agreement between or among that person and one or more other persons for the supply or 
potential supply of any goods or services in exchange for consideration; or 
(ii) the supply by that person of any goods to or at the direction of a consumer for consideration; or 
(iii) the performance by, or at the direction of, that person of any services for or at the direction of a 
consumer for consideration; or 
(b) an interaction contemplated in section 5(6), irrespective of whether it falls within paragraph (a)”. 
283 In terms of section 1 of the CPA, “agreement” means –  
“an arrangement or understanding between or among two or more parties that purports to establish 
a relationship in law between or among them”. 
284 In terms of section 1 of the CPA, ‘‘promote’’ means to— 
“(a) advertise, display or offer to supply any goods or services in the ordinary course of business, 
to all or part of the public for consideration; 
(b) make any representation in the ordinary course of business that could reasonably be inferred 
as expressing a willingness to supply any goods or services for consideration; or 
(c) engage in any other conduct in the ordinary course of business that may reasonably be 
construed to be an inducement or attempted inducement to a person to engage in a transaction”. 
285 In terms of section 1 of the CPA, ‘‘supply’’, when used as a verb, means— 
“(a) in relation to goods, includes sell, rent, exchange and hire in the ordinary course of business 
for consideration; or 
(b) in relation to services, means to sell the services, or to perform or cause them to be performed 
or provided, or to grant access to any premises, event, activity or facility in the ordinary course of 
business for consideration”. 
286 In terms section 1 of the CPA, ‘‘goods’’ includes— 
“(a) anything marketed for human consumption; 
(b) any tangible object not otherwise contemplated in paragraph (a), including any medium on which 
anything is or may be written or encoded; 
(c) any literature, music, photograph, motion picture, game, information, data, software, code or 
other intangible product written or encoded on any medium, or a licence to use any such intangible 
product; 
(d) a legal interest in land or any other immovable property, other than an interest that falls within 
the definition of ‘service’ in this section; and 
(e) gas, water and electricity”. 
287 In terms of section 1 of the CPA, ‘‘service’’ includes, but is not limited to— 
“(a) any work or undertaking performed by one person for the direct or indirect benefit of another; 
(b) the provision of any education, information, advice or consultation, except advice that is subject 
to regulation in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 
2002); 
(c) any banking services, or related or similar financial services, or the undertaking, underwriting or 
assumption of any risk by one person on behalf of another, except to the extent that any such 
service— 
(i) constitutes advice or intermediary services that is subject to regulation in terms of the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act No. 37 of 2002); or 
(ii) is regulated in terms of the Long-term Insurance Act, 1998 (Act No. 52 of 1998), or the 
Short-term Insurance Act, 1998 (Act No. 53 of 1998); 
(d) the transportation of an individual or any goods; 
(e) the provision of— 
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With regard to consumer agreements, Chapter 2, part G, under the right to fair, just and 
reasonable terms and conditions (sections 48 to 52 of the CPA) deals with unfair, unreasonable 
and unjust contract terms. Furthermore, the CPA prescribes that notice to a consumer is a 
necessity, pertaining to certain contractual, with specific reference to terms where the supplier 
anticipates to limit its liability (i.e. exemption clauses).288 
 
The CPA, by the provisions of section 48, outlines when terms and conditions as set out in a 
contract are deemed to be unfair.  It can therefore be said that the broad fairness benchmark for 
consumer contracts is set out in this section. Further to the aforesaid, the factors rendering a 
contract, in its totality or merely a specific contract term, unfair, unreasonable or unjust are set out 
in section 48(2). This section must be read with regulation 44(3), which regulation contains the 
so-called grey list. Section 48 of the CPA and the application thereof on exemption clauses will 
be fully discussed below.289 
 
All terms contained in a contract or a notice which attempts to limit the supplier’s accountability 
must be unambiguously brought to the consumer’s attention and needs to be in “plain (simple) 
language”.290  Section 49 of the CPA and the application thereof on exemption clauses will be fully 
discussed below.291 
 
Section 51 contains a list of prohibited transactions, agreements, terms and conditions that will 
be discussed in more detail below.  
 
                                                          
(i) any accommodation or sustenance; 
(ii) any entertainment or similar intangible product or access to any such entertainment or 
intangible product; 
(iii) access to any electronic communication infrastructure; 
(iv) access, or of a right of access, to an event or to any premises, activity or facility; or 
(v) access to or use of any premises or other property in terms of a rental; 
(f) a right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over or in connection with, any land or other 
immovable property, other than in terms of a rental; and 
(g) rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable in terms of 
section 5(6)(b) to (e), irrespective of whether the person promoting, offering or providing the 
services participates in, supervises or engages directly or indirectly in the service”. 
288 Section 49 of the CPA. 
289 See para 4.4.2 below. 
290 Section 22 of the CPA makes provision for a right to information in plain and understandable language. 
291 See para 4.5.3 below. 
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The CPA further in section 52 gives certain powers to the court to ensure fair and just conduct 
terms and conditions. 292 In addition, section 58 obliges a supplier to draw the fact, nature and 
possible consequence of potentially harmful activities and facilities to the attention of the 
consumer.293 
 
The CPA therefore sets definite consumer rights, including the right to fair, just and reasonable 
contract terms which is contained in sections 48 to 52 of the CPA. These sections may 
expressively influence the validity and enforceability of exemption clauses and it should be noted 
that if such an exemption clause is not in accordance with the provisions as set out in the CPA, it 
possibly will be asserted to be unlawful and set aside by courts. 
 
The CPA comprehensively deals with exemption clauses. The applicable sections of the CPA will 
be discussed herein below as the applicable sections, and the interpretation thereof will have an 
influence on the manner in which our courts approach the enforceability of exemption clauses. 
 
4.3 Preceding the commencement of the CPA 
 
Preceding the commencement of the CPA, defences raised against the enforcement of an 
exemption clause derived from the common law, the Constitution and ubuntu as public policy.294 
 
In addition to the aforesaid, the courts have already, in some instances, achieved rejection of the 
enforcement of exemption clauses. The relevant decisions were based on the fact that the 
suppliers failed, alternatively, neglected to bring the specific clause to the knowledge of the 
consumer. By this is meant that there was a failure of reasonable reliance on the side of the 
supplier.295 
 
The Naidoo296 case paved the way with reference to exemption clauses, without the application 
of the CPA. In Naidoo the court had a different interpretation pertaining to the execution of an 
                                                          
292 Section 52 of the CPA. 
293 Section 58 of the CPA. 
294 The case law referred to in chapter 3. See also Potgieter & Another v Potgieter NO & Others 2012 (1) 
SA 637 (SCA) [32–34].  
295 Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A); Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA); 
Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 4 SA 518 (C). 
296 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ). 
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exemption clause compared to previous case law, and marks a noteworthy development towards 
fairness and justice in a contract.  
 
Although the judgment in Naidoo was delivered in 2012, after the general effective date of the 
CPA, the CPA does not have retrospective effect and was therefore not applied in Naidoo, as the 
accident occurred in 2008. The court therefore relied on previous case law, the Constitution and 
public policy. 
 
Further to the aforesaid, the court in Naidoo did not uphold the exemption clause. The decision 
was made on the basis that the enforcement of the exemption clause would have been unfair 
(unreasonable) and unjust to a consumer who had suffered bodily injuries in the course of his stay 
at the hotel. 
 
On 15 October 2008, Naidoo (the plaintiff) desired to leave the premises of the hotel but realised 
that one of the entrance gates of the hotel was closed. He waited in anticipation for a security 
guard to come and open the gate. At that moment the plaintiff was inside his bus. After realising 
that the gate was still closed, the plaintiff approached the gate. It became apparent that the gate 
had jammed and that the wheels of the gate had come off its rails. The gate then fell on the plaintiff 
as he approached the entrance, which resulted in severe bodily injuries.297 
 
The hotel depended on its disclaimers and the relevant exemption clauses which were printed on 
the rear side of its register. The court had to determine whether the disclaimer relied upon was 
indeed on display, and whether such disclaimer or exemption clause excused the defendant from 
liability for the damages suffered by the plaintiff.298  
 
The plaintiff did not contest the fact that he had not read the defendant’s terms and conditions, 
even after noticing the instruction which read "Please read terms and conditions on reverse!"299 It 
                                                          
297 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) [10–14]. 
298 Clause 5 of the registration card stated as follows: 
“The guest hereby agrees on behalf of himself and the members of his party that it is a condition of his/their 
occupation of the Hotel that the Hotel shall not be responsible for any injury to, or death of any person or 
the loss or destruction of or damage to any property on the premises, whether arising from fire, theft or any 
cause, and by whomsoever caused or arising from the negligence (gross or otherwise) or wrongful acts of 
any person in the employment of the Hotel”. 
299 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) [36]. 
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was, furthermore, not contested that the plaintiff was aware of the fact that such clauses were 
included in a standard-form contract and the fact that such terms were binding on the plaintiff.300  
The court held that, although it was confident that the exemption clause in the Naidoo case would 
fall short of the constitutional requirements, it was not obliged to pursue this subject any further. 
This was this was due to the fact that the court had made the inference, subsequent to the 
judgment of Barkhuizen v Napier, that in the state of affairs of the Naidoo case, it would be unfair 
and unjust to impose the exemption clause in question. Supporting its decision, the court referred 
to the following statement of Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier: “A court will take into consideration 
the requisite to identify ‘freedom of contract’, but the court will not merely rely on the principle of 
freedom of contract if it supersedes the necessity to warrant that the parties to a contract have 
access to courts.” 301 
 
As previously stated, the court held that it would have been unfair and unjust to enforce the 
exemption clause. The court further held that the plaintiff had discharged the onus of proving his 
delictual claim and that neither the disclaimer notice nor the exemption clause relied upon by the 
defendant would have constituted a worthy defence.302 
 
The decision in Naidoo is ground-breaking in the history of exemption clauses as it demonstrates 
a significant step in the direction of recognising fairness and reasonableness in contracts.303  
 
Before discussing all the relevant clauses of the CPA relating to exemption clauses, it would be 
appropriate to submit that, if the CPA were to apply in the Naidoo case, the court would have held 
that the disclaimer notice on the back of the registration card did not constitute sufficient notice in 
line with section 49304 of the CPA. In other words, a term, condition or notice and its nature and 
consequence of was not brought to the knowledge of the consumer in such a way that it achieved 
the relevant requirements as set out in section 49. Furthermore, section 22305 of the CPA also 
would have been applied. If the court were to apply section 48306(2)(d)(i)-(ii), it would have easily 
                                                          
300 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) [38]. 
301 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323. 
302 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) [54]. 
303 Mupangavanhu 2014 (17) 3 PER/PELJ 1187–1188. 
304 Section 49 of the CPA: “Notice required for certain terms and conditions”. 
305 Section 22 of the CPA: “Right to information in plain and understandable language”. 
306 Section 48 of the CPA: “Unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable contract terms”. 
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reached the same conclusion in that the disclaimer notice was unfair, unreasonable, unjust or 
unconscionable. Last but not least, section 51307 of the CPA would have also been applied. 
 
As previously stated, the Naidoo decision is a ground-breaking decision in our law on the topic of 
exemption clauses, and the Naidoo decision has been referred to as authority in matters relating 
to such clauses and the fact that it will be unfair and unjust to enforce them.308  
 
In light of the aforesaid, the relevant sections of the CPA will be discussed in depth below. 
 
4.4 Analyses of the relevant sections of the CPA 
 
It can be said that the position under the common law of contract regarding the enforcement of 
exemption clauses has been amended by the CPA. The CPA provides for rules restricting the 
freedom of contract of a consumer and supplier: both the formation and contents of contracts are 
regulated under the CPA. Part G of Chapter 2 of the CPA regulates consumer agreements entered 
into between a consumer and a supplier under the heading Right to fair, just and reasonable terms 
and conditions. The application of Part G should be read with section 22, contained in Part D of 
Chapter 2 of the CPA (Right to information in plain and understandable language). 
 
A discussion of each relevant section of the CPA, specifically pertaining to exemption clauses, 
will follow below. For the sake of completeness, the relevant sections will be quoted in the 
footnotes.  
 
4.4.1 Section 22 of the CPA 
 
Section 22309 of the CPA introduces and regulates the right of a consumer to receive information 
in plain (simple) and understandable language. Prior to discussing section 22, it should be noted 
                                                          
307 Section 51 of the CPA: “Prohibited transactions, agreements, terms or conditions”. 
308 Koen v Pretoria Central Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Pretoria Parkade (33737/13) [2018] ZAGPPHC 113 (2 
March 2018) and Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO [2018] ZASCA 124 (26 
September 2018). These cases will be discussed throughout this chapter. 
309 Section 22 of the CPA provides as follows: 
“(1) The producer of a notice, document or visual representation that is required, in terms of this Act or any 
other law, to be produced, provided or displayed to a consumer must produce, provide or display that notice, 
document or visual representation— 
(a) in the form prescribed in terms of this Act or any other legislation, if any, for that notice, document or 
visual representation; or 
(b) in plain language, if no form has been prescribed for that notice, document or visual representation. 
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that it is a requirement, in terms of section 2(1) of the CPA, that every provision of the CPA must 
be construed to give effect to the purposes of the CPA as set out in section 3 thereof. Therefore, 
the consumer’s right to plain language should also be executed in view of section 3. 
 
Preceding the enactment of the CPA, the courts applied the notion of plain language in 
accordance with the common law. This meant that in instances where there was ambiguity in the 
language, it ought to be interpreted against the party who put forward a contract or term in a 
contract containing such ambiguity.310 The National Credit Act311 was the first piece of legislation 
enacted in South Africa that required agreements to be drafted in plain language.312  
 
The term “plain language” can be elusive because it is often misunderstood to mean that the 
contents of an agreement, specially, exemption clauses, must be dumbed down or simplified,313 
which is not the case. 
 
Section 22 stipulates that the relevant documentation referred to in this section should be in the 
form set by the CPA. Should there be no such form, the relevant documentation ought to be in 
                                                          
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a notice, document or visual representation is in plain language if it is 
reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the notice, document 
or visual representation is intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer of 
the relevant goods or services, could be expected to understand the content, significance and import of the 
notice, document or visual representation without undue effort, having regard to— 
(a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the notice, document or visual representation; 
(b) the organisation, form and style of the notice, document or visual representation; 
(c) the vocabulary, usage and sentence structure of the notice, document or visual representation; and 
(d) the use of any illustrations, examples, headings or other aids to reading and understanding. 
(3) The Commission may publish guidelines for methods of assessing whether a notice, document or visual 
representation satisfies the requirements of subsection (1)(b). 
(4) Guidelines published in terms of subsection (3) may be published for public comment”. 
310 See in this regard Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha & Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA); First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA); and Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
311 The National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
312 The CPA, section 64. (1) The producer of a document that is required to be delivered to a consumer in 
30 terms of this Act must provide that document- (a) in the prescribed form, if any, for that document; or (b) 
in plain language, if no form has been prescribed for that document. (2) For the purposes of this Act, a 
document is in plain language if it is reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer of the class of 
persons for whom the document is 35 intended, with average literacy skills and minimal credit experience, 
could be expected to understand the content, significance, and import of the document without undue effort, 
having regard to- (a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the document; (b) the 
organisation, form and style of the document; 40 (c) the vocabulary, usage and sentence structure of the 
text; and (d) the use of any illustrations, examples, headings, or other aids to reading and understanding. 
See Stoop “Section 22” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2019) 22-16. 
313 De Stadler and Van Zyl 2017 (29) 1 SA Merc LJ 98. 
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plain (simple) language.314 Section 22 is consequently only applicable to notices (required by 
legislation), visual representations (disclaimer boards at shopping centres, venues, etc) and 
written agreements (exemption clauses written on the back of access cards, etc). Section 22 does 
not apply to oral agreements.315 
 
Even though no clear description of plain language is given in the CPA, section 22(2) contains the 
right of a consumer to receive information in plain and clear language. This section, from time to 
time referred to as the right to plain language is possibly the most significant pro-active measure 
for procedural fairness enclosed in the CPA.316  
 
In section 22(2) of the CPA, plain language is referred to as language which allows an everyday 
consumer with average literacy skills and a nominal understanding as a consumer of the relevant 
goods or services, to comprehend the content, importance and consequence of a document, 
notice or visual representation, without excessive effort. 
 
In terms of section 22(2)317 of the CPA, the following should be considered when determining 
whether a notice, term, documentation or representation is indeed in plain language: the context, 
completeness and uniformity, as well as the organisation, form and style thereof. Furthermore, 
the vocabulary, sentence structure and usage must be considered. Last but not least, what must 
also be borne in mind is the usage of any illustrations, examples, headings or other utilities to 
reading and understanding such notice, term, documentation or representation. 
 
Gouws318 states that certain conspicuous parts recorded in section 22(2)(a)-(d) are purely guiding 
principles and the failure to comply therewith will not per se render the contract not simple (i.e. 
basic).319  
                                                          
314 The CPA, section 22(1)(b). 
315 Du Preez 2009 (1) TSAR 75 - 76. 
316 Stoop  http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/23191/Stoop-Inaugural%20lecture-
31%20Aug%202017.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed on 7 October 2018). 
317 having regard to— 
(a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the notice, document or visual 
representation; 
(b) the organisation, form and style of the notice, document or visual representation; 
(c) the vocabulary, usage and sentence structure of the notice, document or visual representation; 
and 
(d) the use of any illustrations, examples, headings or other aids to reading and understanding. 
318 Gouws 2010 (22) 1 SA Merc LJ 89. 
319 For further discussion, see Newman 2010 (31) 3 Obiter 735. 
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In one of the most recent cases in which the CPA was applied, namely, Four Wheel Drive CC v 
Leshni Rattan NO (hereinafter the Four Wheel Drive case),320 Pillay J held that – 
 
“in accordance with section 22(1)(b) of the CPA the “producer” of B2 was obligated to abide 
by the requirement that it be “in plain language, if no form has been prescribed by the CPA.” 
B2 fails to comply with the definition of “clearly” since the quality of its writing does not 
satisfy the requirements of section 22. Subsequently B2 itself denies a consumer of his 
legal rights in terms of section 22. It follows that when the plaintiff failed to “satisfy the 
requirements of section 22” it also failed to provide the deceased with an agreement in 
terms of section 50(2)(b)(i).”321 
 
The concept “clearly” is not specifically referred to in section 22. However, such concept is defined 
in section 1 of the CPA.322  The court therefore, according to Stoop,323 referred to the requirements 
of section 22 with its reference to the concept clearly. 
 
It can therefore be said that the aforementioned has the effect that a contracting party will not be 
allowed to word terms so broadly that they can be interpreted in various manners. The CPA states 
that if there is any uncertainty regarding the meaning of certain words or terms and conditions, 
the benefit will go to the consumer.324 
 
In terms of the CPA, the usage of plain and understandable language is an unavoidable 
requirement relating to consumer contracts and documents anticipated for consumers.325  
 
The use of a specific language undoubtedly has an influence on whether a document is 
comprehensible. Consequently, this is a persuasive reason to ensure that the relevant document 
                                                          
320 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA). 
321 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA) 62–63. 
322 The word “clearly”, in relation to the quality of any text, notice or visual representation to be produced, 
published or displayed to a consumer, means in a form that satisfies the requirements of section 22. 
323 Stoop “Section 22” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2019) para 22–16. 
324 Section 4(4) of the CPA. 
325  Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 3 PER/PELJ (also available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 2018).  See also 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 (1) SA 219 (KZD). This case has to do with the National 
Credit Act, 2008 (NCA). However, the NCA and the CPA have identical plain language provisions and many 
of their principles can therefore be applied to other consumer agreements. Therefore, this judgment is also 
of importance when applying the sections of the CPA. 
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is accessible and, more specifically, that the relevant terms are accessible in more than one official 
language.326 For example, when a consumer understands only Afrikaans, and the exemption 
clause in drafted in English, this will undoubtedly have an influence on whether the document is 
understandable. 
 
It is submitted that where there is no standard form to which an agreement must conform, and the 
concept of plain language must be adhered to, this will have a considerable, and not always 
positive, effect. The reason for this is that the understanding of plain language differs from 
consumer to consumer. Therefore, a definition of plain language should be introduced in the CPA 
in order to exclude any misconception regarding the exact meaning of the term. The alternative 
would be extensive and expensive litigation in order to decide whether an exemption clause is 
indeed written in plain language. 
 
One of the factors to be considered when determining whether a specific term, or the contract in 
its totality, is unfair under section 48 is the degree to which such term or contract in its totality 
fulfils the requirement of plain language.327  Non-fulfilment of this requirement may add to a 
conclusion of unfairness in accordance with section 52 of the CPA.328 
 
4.4.2 Section 48 of the CPA, read with regulation 44(3) 
 
Section 48329 encloses a list of factors to be considered when deciding whether a specific term or 
the agreement in totality is unfair. 
                                                          
326 De Stadler and Van Zyl 2017 (29) 1 SA Merc LJ 108. 
327 Section 52(2)(g) of the CPA. 
328Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 5 PER/PELJ 546.  
(also available at  http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 
2018). 
329 Section 48 of the CPA provides as follows: 
“(1) A supplier must not— 
(a) offer to supply, supply, or enter into an agreement to supply, any goods or services— 
(i)  …. or 
(ii)  on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust; 
(b)  … 
(c)  require a consumer, or other person to whom any goods or services are supplied at the direction of the 
consumer— 
(i)  to waive any rights; 
(ii)  assume any obligation; or 
(iii)  waive any liability of the supplier, on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or impose any such 
terms as a condition of entering into a transaction. 
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As identified in chapter 2 of this dissertation, exemption clauses are in general considered to be 
unreasonable contract terms as they eliminate or limit liability of a consumer. This is typically 
brought about by the naturalia of a contract. 
 
Section 48(1) makes provision not only for the control of the contents of agreements but also for 
the control of offers, supply, negotiation, administration and associated matters.  Section 48(1)(a) 
controls the contents of agreements and notices and therefore prohibits the insertion of unfair 
terms or an unfair price or offers to supply. It can consequently be said that the prohibition 
contained in section 48(1) is embedded in wide terms and endeavours to cover all circumstances. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, section 48(1)(c) is more particular than section 48(1)(a) and is, 
amongst other things, directly targeted at barring the waiving of rights or assumption of risks or 
liability on terms that are unfair.330 The prohibition contained in this section consequently, amongst 
other things, prohibits unfair exemption clauses. Section 48(1)(c) specifically emphasises the fact 
that any contract or term is prohibited in instances where such a contract or term necessitates a 
consumer to give up any right, to undertake any obligations or relinquish any liability of the supplier 
on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Exemption clauses, by definition, represent a 
waiver of rights of the consumer. The elimination of liability by the supplier tend to be unfair or 
unreasonable towards the consumer. 
 
Section 48(2) sets out guiding principles to determine which term or condition is ostensibly unfair. 
Section 48(2)(d) is of specific importance when one has to consider an exemption clause. This 
section provides that a contract or term of such a contract is unfair if the contract or term was 
subject to a term contained in section 49(1) and the fact, nature and consequence of that contract 
                                                          
(2)  Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or agreement, a term or condition of a 
transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust if— 
(a)  it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or other person to whom 
goods or services are to be supplied; 
(b)  the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable; 
(c) … 
(d)  the transaction or agreement was subject to a term or condition, or a notice to a consumer contemplated 
in section 49 (1), and— 
(i) the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable; or 
(ii)  the fact, nature and effect of that term, condition or notice was not drawn to the attention of the consumer 
in a manner that satisfied the applicable requirements of section 49”. 
330 See Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2019) para 48-18 where she argues that 
section 48(1)(c) could have been omitted in light of the wide probation against unfairness in section 48(1)(a). 
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or term was not brought to the knowledge of the consumer in a way that fulfils the requirements 
set out in section 49(1). Section 49(1) provides that contractual clauses which limit the risk or 
indemnify a supplier must be drawn to the attention of the consumer.331  
 
Therefore, in summary, the general standard in terms of section 48 to determine ostensible 
unfairness is that an offer to supply, the supply, marketing, entering into a contract, negotiation, 
administration, the waiver of rights, the assumption of the supplier’s risk, the waiver of the 
supplier’s liability, a term or a price that is unfair is prohibited. 
 
There is, however, no closed list of factors, or requirements, regarding unfair contract (agreement) 
terms in the CPA. Consequently, what is indeed considered to be unfair is open to subjective 
interpretation by the courts.  
 
Certain terms are assumed to be unfair if they comprise one or more of the purposes or 
consequences set out in regulation 44(3) of the CPA Regulations.332 For that reason regulation 
44(3) is branded the so-called grey list.333 It is said that the grey list holds a list of terms which 
possibly will be unfair.334 The ultimate judgment of a court on whether a term is unfair depends on 
the state of affairs of each specific situation.335 A grey list is therefore not exhaustive but it gives 
                                                          
331 See the discussion in this regard in Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 505 518–519. See also a discussion of 
section 49 of the CPA in para 4.5.3 below. 
332 These regulations were published in GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011. See also Stoop The concept 
“fairness” 102. 
333 Ideally, the grey list should have been included in the text of the Act, in the same part as the black list. It 
would then have had greater legitimacy and would have been more prominent and accessible to consumers. 
See Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 521. 
334 Stoop The concept “fairness” 102. The terms listed in regulation 44(3) may still be fair in the particular 
circumstances of the case. 
335 Naudé 2007 (124) 1 SALJ 130. 
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a good indication of what constitutes fairness.336 A grey list restricts the free interpretation of 
fairness in legislation and assist courts in making fair decisions.337 
 
What is of importance is that the grey list contained in regulation 44(3) provides a number of terms 
that are ordinarily unfair for the reason that they are mostly excessively one-sided.338 It is evident 
from the terms listed in regulation 44(3) that a term in an agreement that necessitates a consumer 
to waive their rights may perhaps be regarded as a presumed unfair term. 
 
In the Four Wheel Drive case,339 it was recommended that the alleged obligations of the consumer 
to insure a courtesy vehicle after 72 hours or return it before then, where these obligations were 
not included in the written agreement, ultimately concluded with the consumer:  
 
[Such obligations] are inconsistent with the prohibitions in section 48(1) against entering into or 
administering a transaction for the supply of the Discovery in a way which was unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust, by calling for the deceased to undertake responsibilities on such terms, and by imposing them 
as a condition of entering into the transaction.340  
                                                          
336   Listed below are some exclusion clauses paraphrased from Regulation 44(3) that are presumed to be 
unfair, namely, terms that have the effect or purpose of – 
(i) excluding or limiting the liability of a supplier for death or personal injury caused to the 
consumer through an act or omission of a supplier for damage caused by goods in terms 
of section 61(1);   
(ii) excluding or limiting the legal rights or remedies of the consumer in the event of partial or 
total breach of contract;   
(iii) limiting the supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaking by the supplier’s 
agents making the commitments subject to compliance;   
(iv) limiting or having the effect of limiting the supplier’s vicarious liability for its agents;   
(v) forcing the consumer to indemnify the supplier against liability incurred by it to third parties;   
(vi) excluding or limiting the consumer’s right to rely on statutory defence of prescription;   
(vii) modifying the normal rules regarding the distribution of risk to the detriment of the 
consumer;   
(viii) to exclude or deterring the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal 
remedy not covered by the CPA or any other legislation;   
(ix) restricting the evidence available to the consumer or imposing on the consumer the burden 
of proof which should lie with the supplier in accordance with the applicable law;   
(x) imposing a limitation period that is shorter than the applicable common law or legislation 
for legal steps to be taken by the consumer;   
(xi) entitling the supplier to calm legal costs on a higher scale than usual where there is not a 
term entitling the consumer to claim such costs on the same scale as the supplier;   
(xii) providing that the law other than that of the Republic applies to a consumer agreement 
concluded and implemented in the Republic at the place where the consumer was residing 
in the Republic at the time when the agreement was concluded. 
337 Stoop The concept “fairness” 102–103. 
338 Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2019) para 48-19. 
339 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA). 
340 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA) 67. 
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The court also held that – 
 
… claiming that such obligations existed when they were not included into the transaction and that 
the deceased is not capable of accepting or refuting such a claim is unfair, unreasonable and unjust 
as expatiated … in section 48(2).341 
 
After reading the provisions of section 48 of the CPA, it can be said that the overall fairness 
benchmark for consumer contracts is contained in this section. In order to decide whether the 
term is actually unfair, a number of substantive and procedural factors play a part and need to be 
considered. 
 
In section 48(2)(a) and (b) of the CPA, two basic criteria of unfairness are expressed concerning 
extreme partiality. The one is described as one-sidedness, and the other as adverseness to the 
consumer. Van Eeden342 makes the assumption that if a contract contains a term that fulfils the 
aforesaid basic criteria, such a term will be deemed to be “unfair, unreasonable or unjust”, 
regardless of its meaning as set out in section 48(1) of the CPA. In terms of the first part of section 
48(2)(c), if a consumer, when entering into a contract, relied upon false, misleading or deceptive 
representation as to a material fact, such reliance renders the contract or contractual term unfair. 
The second part of section 48(2)(c) deals with a statement of opinion by a supplier to the 
impairment of a consumer. In terms of this part, if a consumer, to their detriment, relied on a 
statement of opinion by a supplier, the contract or contractual term would be unfair. 
 
In light of the above, I state that the CPA accounts for value judgment because the criteria of basic 
unfairness given in section 48(2)(a) and (b) are exposed to subjective interpretation. What is 
important is that, in accordance with section 48, a particular term or the contract in its totality would 
possibly be affirmed to be unfair. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the CPA provides, in accordance with section 48(2)(d)(ii), that a 
term of a consumer contract or the consumer contract in its totality is unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust in instances where the fact, nature and consequence of that term or contract, or of a 
condition or notice, was not brought to the knowledge of the consumer in such a way that it fulfils 
the relevant requirements of section 49.343 
                                                          
341 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA) [66].  
342 Van Eeden A guide to the Consumer Protection Act 169–182.  
343 See a discussion of section 49 in para 4.4.3 below. 
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It is therefore my view that section 49 of the CPA strikes unswervingly at exemption clauses and 
that this section is intended to ensure that the consumer is given adequate opportunity to interpret 
the meaning of exemption clauses contained in consumer contracts. This would give the 
consumer the chance to understand such provisions and give the required prominence to 
exemption clauses.344 
 
There is no separate definition in the CPA for the words “unfair”, “unreasonable” and “unjust”, as 
all three words are mere alternative expressions of one another. Selection of a single term with 
an accompanying definition would have made the application of these provisions easier. The bar 
contained in section 48(1) refers to the unfairness of terms in general and not terms in standard-
form contracts or any non-negotiated terms. As a result, even terms explicitly decided upon after 
hard bargaining are, theoretically, subject to the unfairness standard.345  
 
As stated above, regulation 44(3) contains the so-called grey list of terms that would possibly be 
unfair, and determination of such unfairness depends on the state of affairs of each situation. The 
burden of proof is on the supplier, and the supplier must prove that the relevant term contained in 
regulation 44(3) is without a doubt fair. However, this would have been more obvious if such grey 
list had been integrated into the text of the CPA, as it would be easier to access the Act itself than 
to try to find and interpret the relevant regulations. Furthermore, no reference is made in section 
48 that it must be read with regulation 44(3), and therefore the so-called grey list of terms is not 
ordinarily known to a supplier to support in the drafting of its terms in accordance with the CPA. 
 
4.4.3 Section 49 of the CPA 
 
Section 49346 provides that certain types of terms (notably exemption clauses) need to be brought 
to the knowledge of the consumer in a conspicuous manner and form which will, in all probability, 
                                                          
344 See a discussion of section 49 in para 4.4.3 below. 
345 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 307. 
346 Section 49 of the CPA provides as follows: 
“(1) Any notice to consumers or provision of a consumer agreement that purports to— 
(a) limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other person; 
(b) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer; 
(c) impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any other person for any cause; or 
(d) be an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer, 
must be drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the 
formal requirements of subsections (3) to (5). 
(2) In addition to subsection (1), if a provision or notice concerns any activity or facility that is subject to any 
risk— 
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draw the attention of the ordinarily alert consumer. Furthermore, the section provides that certain 
terms regarding certain types of risks should be signed, or signed and initialled, by the consumer 
entering into the relevant consumer agreement.347 
 
As stated elsewhere in this dissertation, exemption clauses are contractual terms that, in theory, 
eliminate, vary or limit the accountability of a contracting party or contracting parties.348 
 
It appears from section 49 that adequate notice to the consumer prior to concluding the contract 
is a criterion, and inadequate after performance. To get proper clarity, this section should be read 
simultaneously with section 48(2)(d). 
 
Section 49 states that certain categories of terms or notices contained in a consumer contract 
must meet certain requirements.349 This is directed at making it more probable that the consumer 
would, in fact, be aware of such terms or notices when concluding a contract. Examples are the 
commencement of participation in an activity (i.e. riding on a roller coaster at an amusement park, 
using gymnasium equipment, etc) or gaining access to a facility (i.e. entering a shopping centre, 
parking area, etc) to which such terms and notices relate.350 
                                                          
(a) of an unusual character or nature; 
(b) the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware or notice, or which 
an ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to notice or contemplate in the 
circumstances; or 
(c) that could result in serious injury or death, 
the supplier must specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk to the attention of the 
consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the requirements of subsections (3) to (5), and the consumer 
must have assented to that provision or notice by signing or initialling the provision or otherwise acting in a 
manner consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the 
provision”. 
(3) A provision, condition or notice contemplated in subsection (1) or (2) must be written in plain language, 
as described in section 22. 
(4) The fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice contemplated in subsection 
(1) must be drawn to the attention of the consumer— 
(a)   in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer, 
having regard to the circumstances; and 
(b)  before the earlier of the time at which the consumer— 
(i) enters into the transaction or agreement, begins to engage in the activity, or enters or gains access to 
the facility; or 
(ii) is required or expected to offer consideration for the transaction or agreement. 
(5) The consumer must be given an adequate opportunity in the circumstances to receive and comprehend 
the provision or notice as contemplated in subsection (1).” 
347 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 516. 
348 See para 2.2 above.  
349 The formal requirements are set out in section 49(3)–(5) of the CPA. 
350 “Section 42” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2014) para 42-2. 
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Section 49(1) specifically lists four types of terms which must be brought to the knowledge of the 
consumer. Specific to the topic of this dissertation is section 49(1)(a), which deals with exemption 
clauses which limit the risk or liability of the supplier or a third party. 
 
Further to the aforesaid, section 49 sets out three requirements in relation to the four types of 
terms listed in subsection 1 thereof. The requirements are, firstly, that these types of terms should 
be in plain, simple language351, secondly, that their presence, nature and consequence must be 
brought to the consideration of the consumer in a way and form that is noticeable and is expected 
to attract the attention of a consumer352 and, thirdly, that the consumer must be provided with 
reasonable opportunity to accept and understand such terms. 353  Each of the aforesaid 
requirements will be discussed below. 
 
4.4.3.1 Discussion of the first requirement under section 49(3) 
 
Section 22 has already been discussed.354 However, I would like to reiterate that this section 
provides for the right to be given information in plain and understandable language. It is evident 
from section 49(3) that plain language is one of the influential factors when deciding on the 
fairness of a term of a consumer contract or a notice. 
 
The use of plain language promotes transparency, honesty and the degree of disclosure, and 
enhances procedural fairness.355 The objective of measures aimed at procedural fairness is to 
allow consumers to take care of their own interests when trading with suppliers.356 
 
4.4.3.2 Discussion of the second requirement under section 49(4) 
 
                                                          
351 Section 49(3) of the CPA. 
352 Section 49(4)(a) of the CPA. See also Section 49(4)(b)(i)–(ii) of the CPA. This must be done “before the 
earlier of the time at which the consumer … enters into the transaction or agreement, begins to engage in 
the activities, or enters or gains access to the facility … [or] is required or expected to offer consideration 
for the transaction or agreement.”. 
353 Section 49(5) of the CPA. 
354 See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
355 Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 5 PER/PELJ. 
(also available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 
2018). 
356 Stoop The concept “fairness” 131. 
79 | P a g e  
 
It is clear from this requirement that the existence, nature and consequence of the term must be 
brought to the knowledge of a consumer in an eye-catching (i.e. conspicuous or obvious) fashion 
and form that would to ensure the attention of the ordinarily alert consumer. 
 
Naudé357 is of the opinion that it is inexact as to what format would be deemed adequately eye-
catching. The term “conspicuous” is not defined in the CPA and its interpretation is therefore open 
for discussion. 
 
According to Naudé, it ought to not be adequate for an exemption clause to appear in print on the 
back of the relevant document. She goes on to state that not even distinct colour fonts justify such 
printing on the reverse side of a document.358  
 
After scrutinising various meanings of “conspicuous”, it is my view that the term can be defined 
as clearly visible. One can therefore say that the fact, nature and effect of the content of an 
exemption clause must be brought to the knowledge of the consumer in such a way that its 
meaning or extent is clearly visible as the consumer reads the document containing the clause. 
This implies that it may be sufficient when an exemption clause is printed in a different font near 
the key terms of the document. This should enable any consumer who reads the key terms of 
such document to observe the exemption clause.359 
 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez360 it was held that an exemption clause which compromises an actual 
feature of the contract should evidently and significantly be brought to the knowledge of the 
consumer whose signature is appended to such a standard-form contract. It should not be merely 
an inconspicuous and hardly readable clause which makes reference to the conditions on the 
back of the contract.  
 
It has been discussed that Afrox possibly would have had a different outcome, had the CPA been 
enacted at the time, because the CPA would have placed a legal responsibility on the hospital to 
draw the fact, nature and consequence of the exemption clause to Mr Strydom’s attention, prior 
to entering into the contract.361 
                                                          
357 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 508. 
358 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 508. See also Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ). 
359 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 508–509. 
360 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
361 Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 378 and Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 510. 
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Section 49(4)(b) states that, when the fact, nature and effect of notice contemplated in section 
49(1) (which includes exemption clauses) should be drawn to the attention of the consumer. What 
is clear from this provision is that it is not adequate to draw the relevant terms to the consumer’s 
attention subsequent to entering into the contract, or subsequent to the commencement of the 
consumer’s participation in the activity, or subsequent to entry or gaining of access to the facility. 
This provision requires that the existence, effect and nature of the provision or notice be drawn to 
the attention of the consumer, firstly, when the consumer enters into the transaction or agreement, 
begins to engage in the activity or enters or gains access to the facility or, secondly, when the 
consumer is required to offer consideration, whichever is the earlier.  Therefore, when the 
transaction is entered into over the telephone (e.g. when accommodation or a holiday is booked), 
the supplier would have brought any exemption clauses to the consumer’s attention before 
finalising the booking.362  
 
4.4.3.3 Discussion of the third requirement under section 49(5) 
 
Section 49(5) provides that the consumer has to be given an adequate opportunity (in the 
circumstances) to receive and comprehend the notice or provision contemplated in section 49(1) 
(which includes exemption clauses). The purpose of this subsection is to support consumers by 
compelling suppliers to provide consumers with adequate information to allow the consumer to 
make an educated (i.e. informed) decision. An informed decision can be described as a decision 
that is based on knowledge of a subject or situation; in other words, making a decision based on 
knowing (all) the facts.363  
 
One of the fundamental characteristics of the CPA is that it obliges suppliers to make information 
available, which information must be complete, given in good conscience and presented in an 
understandable layout in order to assist consumers to make informed decisions. As long as the 
suppliers have done what they are supposed to do, consumers will usually be bound by the 
agreement entered into with the suppliers.364 
 
It can therefore be said that a consumer challenged with an exemption provision needs to be 
offered adequate opportunity to read, reflect on and query any features of the terms prior to 
                                                          
362 Tait and Newman 2014 (35) 3 Obiter 635. 
363 Based on a combination of the definitions of “decision” and informed as defined in the South African 
Pocket Oxford Dictionary. 
364 “Advisory Note 9” http://www.cgso.org.za/your-obligations/ (accessed on 19 October 2018). 
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determining whether or not to agree to it. What this subsection attempts to avoid is a consumer 
being pressured into agreeing to the exemption clause.365 
 
This evidently places some responsibility on any party concluding an agreement with a consumer 
to draw to the consumer’s attention to any provision that seeks to limit the liability of the supplier 
or to enforce any legal responsibility on the consumer. 
 
4.4.4 Section 49(2) of the CPA 
 
Over and above the three requirements contained in section 49(3)–(5), section 49(2) provides that 
the consumer should also append his signature or initials to all the provisions relating to the risks 
as listed in this section. 
 
Naudé366 is of the opinion that the requirement of section 49 that a consumer sign the agreement 
after it has been signed by the other party is predominantly challenging if courts do not adequately 
comprehend that substantive unfairness alone ought to be enough to set aside a term. This should 
be the case irrespective of the procedural aspects of the relevant term, for instance, the specific 
consumer’s awareness and understanding of the term as demonstrated by his signature. 
 
Sections 48 and 51 of the CPA should be read together, as both sections deal with a list of terms 
which may be prohibited and which are prohibited when it comes to the drafting of an exemption 
clause and subsequently enforcement thereof. Section 51 provides a list of the varieties of terms 
which are deemed to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust and therefore prohibited (i.e. banned). 
 
4.4.5 Section 51 of the CPA 
 
The CPA encourages the general prohibition of unfair terms by also reckoning certain terms to be 
completely banned. These include exemption clauses in respect of gross negligence, and false 
acknowledgments by the consumer that no representations were made by or on behalf of the 
supplier.367 
 
                                                          
365 Tait and Newman 2014 (35) 3 Obiter 635. 
366 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 516. 
367 Naudé (126) 3 2009 SALJ 515. 
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Section 51368 provides a list of the varieties of terms which are deemed to be unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust and therefore prohibited. These terms are commonly known as the presumed black list 
of terms. To complement this list, section 48, as discussed above, provides a flexible mechanism 
for dealing with terms not listed in section 51 (the grey-list terms). Even though section 51 contains 
the so-called black list, it does not enclose a substantial list of terms but rather contains a list of 
factors or recommendations of what may not form part of a term. 
 
Naudé369 is of the understanding that subsections (a) and (b) of section 51 of the CPA are 
expansive without need. Furthermore, Stoop370 believes that the initial part of the list is ambiguous 
and lengthy. The list could have been more precise, as it is related to the purpose and policy of 
the CPA. I am inclined to agree with Stoop that the subsections are overstated. In my view they 
simply should have read that a supplier may not make or enter into any transaction or agreement 
subject to any term, notice or condition if it directly or indirectly causes the consumer to relinquish 
any rights, or limits the consumer’s rights in the CPA, or in any additional manner disregards the 
CPA.371 
 
                                                          
368 Section 51 of the CPA provides as follows: 
“(1) A supplier must not make a transaction or agreement subject to any term or condition if— 
(a) its general purpose or effect is to— 
(i) defeat the purposes and policy of this Act; 
(ii) mislead or deceive the consumer; or 
(iii) subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct; 
(b) it directly or indirectly purports to— 
(i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of this Act; 
(ii) avoid a supplier’s obligation or duty in terms of this Act; 
(iii) set aside or override the effect of any provision of this Act; or 
(iv) authorise the supplier to— 
(aa) do anything that is unlawful in terms of this Act; or 
(bb) fail to do anything that is required in terms of this Act; 
(c) it purports to— 
(i) limit or exempt a supplier of goods or services from liability for any loss directly or indirectly attributable 
to the gross negligence of the supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier; 
(ii) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer for a loss contemplated in subparagraph (i); 
or 
(iii) impose an obligation on a consumer to pay for damage to, or otherwise assume the risk of handling, 
any goods displayed by the supplier, except to the extent contemplated in section 18(1)”. 
369 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 519. 
370 Stoop The concept “fairness” 218. 
371 In support of such view, see Stoop The concept “fairness” 218. 
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It is furthermore essential to highlight that subsections 51(1)(c)(i)-(ii) prohibit exemption clauses 
with reference to gross negligence.372  
 
It is clear from this provision that a supplier who wishes to limit or exempt its liability for any direct 
or indirect loss due to gross negligence of the supplier will not be permitted to do so. However, 
liability for any direct or indirect loss due to negligence leading to personal injury or death has 
been omitted from section 51. As correctly pointed out by Sharrock,373 this was an unfortunate 
oversight.374 In other legal systems375 such clauses are indeed blacklisted and, in my opinion, 
should have been included in the CPA.376  In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott & Another, the 
court left the question open as to whether liability for death caused by negligence could be 
excluded by agreement. Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that it was arguable that such an 
exemption was contrary to public policy, for the reason that it runs against the high value the 
common law and, nowadays also the Constitution, places on the sacredness of life. 377 
 
It is clear from the above, that sections 48, 49 and 51 of the CPA appear to contain conflicting 
provisions. Sections 48 and 51 prohibit a supplier from demanding from a consumer to waive any 
rights granted to them by the CPA, to undertake any obligation, or to waive any liability of the 
supplier. According to these sections, such terms must be brought to the consumer’s attention. 
Yet section 49 states that any provisions which amount to a waiver of the consumer’s rights must 
be drawn to consumer’s attention. It can be interpreted that as long as a waiver is drawn to a 
consumer’s attention, and as long as liability for gross negligence is not waived (in terms of section 
51(c)(i)), a waiver of liability is permissible provided that it is drawn to a consumer’s attention, be 
it through a signature point or by otherwise drawing such a provision in an agreement to a 
consumer’s attention. Unfortunately, this is one of the examples of the conflicting provisions 
contained in the CPA and we will simply have to be patient and see how the courts will construe 
this provision.  
                                                          
372 See the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 
1977 (2) SA 324 (D) (2) SA 794 (A), where the courts found that a carrier could not exempt itself from gross 
negligence. See also gross negligence as discussed by Naudé (2017) 1 SALJ. 
373 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 320. 
374 Section 49(2) of the CPA effectively allows a supplier to contract out of liability for serious injury or death 
by stipulating notice requirements which the supplier must follow to do this. 
375 See, for instance, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) section 2(1); section 6(1)(a) of the Australian 
Consumer Protection Act. These pieces of legislation will be discussed in chapter 5.  
376 See Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 510. Naudé considers that section 49(2) of the CPA, by laying down 
specific incorporation requirements for such clauses, impliedly sanctions them. 
377 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) [12]. 
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Even though the black list of terms provided in section 51 of the CPA is not exclusive, the CPA 
should nonetheless arrange for the National Consumer Commission to review the black list on a 
regular basis and to make the necessary recommendations, if any, to the Department of Trade 
and Industry. The reason for this is that conditions and situations change and therefore provision 
should be made, or should be amended, to ensure that all prohibited, unfair terms are listed. 
 
4.4.6 Section 52 of the CPA 
 
Section 52 controls the powers of court to guarantee fair, reasonable and just terms and 
conditions. It consequently provides what orders a court may make in this regard and what 
features need to be considered when determining whether a term or a consumer agreement is 
unfair378. 
It should be noted from the outset that section 52 is relevant only in instances where the CPA 
does not otherwise make available a remedy adequate to correct the applicable prohibited, unfair 
and biased conduct of the supplier.379 
 
Section 52(2) also contains a list of unambiguous aspects (i.e. factors) which a court is obliged to 
reflect on in any proceedings before it, where it is apparent that the supplier conducted business 
unconscionably 380  or used misleading, incorrect or ambiguous representations, 381  or that an 
agreement or term is unfair.382 The word “must” show that the court has to contemplate all these 
aspects in each instance, at all times.383  
 
The majority of the factors contained in section 52(2)384 relate to so-called procedural unfairness, 
and consequently emphasise the particular situations and all relevant factors, regarding the 
                                                          
378 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 515. 
379 Section 52(1)(a). Also see “Section 52” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2018) para 52-4. 
380 Section 40 of the CPA. 
381 Section 41 of the CPA. 
382 Section 48 of the CPA. 
383 Stoop PER/PELJ 2015 (18) 4 1099. 
384 Section 52(2) of the CPA: 
“In any matter contemplated in subsection (1), the court must consider— 
(a) the fair value of the goods or services in question; 
(b) the nature of the parties to that transaction or agreement, their relationship to each other and their 
relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bargaining position; 
(c) those circumstances of the transaction or agreement that existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the 
time that the conduct or transaction occurred or agreement was made, irrespective of whether this Act was 
in force at that time; 
(d) the conduct of the supplier and the consumer, respectively; 
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individual consumer involved in relation to the contracting process, such as their bargaining power 
or understanding of the relevant term. However, some of the factors are applicable to the 
substantive fairness of a term, most importantly the reference to the legitimate interests of the 
supplier contained in section 52(2)(f).385 Prior to discussing the listed factors, I will briefly discuss 
the procedural and substantive fairness of a term. 
 
As stated, most of these factors are procedural as they refer to defects in the bargaining process, 
such as the consumer’s lack of knowledge of a term and lack of bargaining power, and therefore 
relate to procedural fairness. However, control on the premise of substantive unfairness alone 
would be justified in some circumstances, given that the mere use of standard contract terms 
creates procedural fairness, as a result of the lack of incentive for the consumer to read and 
bargain about such terms.386 
 
The CPA does not adequately provide for factors that relate to substantive fairness, namely, 
where there is unfairness in the substance or content of the specific term itself. This makes it 
difficult for drafters of contracts to predict whether contract terms or, more specifically, exemption 
clauses will pass the fairness test set by the CPA. According to Naudé,387 it is clear that the 
realities surrounding standard-form contracts sometimes justify control on the basis of substantive 
unfairness alone, notwithstanding a particular consumer’s sophistication or bargaining power in 
the economic sense, or the accessibility of another possibility in the marketplace.388   
 
                                                          
(e) whether there was any negotiation between the supplier and the consumer, and if so, the extent of that 
negotiation; 
(f) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the consumer was required to do anything 
that was not reasonably necessary for the legitimate interests of the supplier; 
(g) the extent to which any documents relating to the transaction or agreement satisfied the requirements 
of section 22; 
(h) whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any 
particular provision of the agreement that is alleged to have been unfair, unreasonable or unjust, having 
regard to any– 
  (i) custom of trade; and 
  (ii) any previous dealings between the parties; 
(i) the amount for which, and circumstances under which, the consumer could have acquired identical or 
equivalent goods or services from a different supplier; and 
(j) in the case of supply of goods, whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the 
special order of the consumer.” 
385 Naudé and Koep 2015 Stell LR 86. 
386 Tembe Problems regarding exemption clauses” 163. 
387 See “Section 52” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2016) para 52-7. 
388 It is also correctly recognised by Sachs J in his minority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 
323 (CC) [149]. 
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The majority of the factors listed in section 52 that must be taken into consideration by the court 
are addressed by measures or factors directed to achieve procedural fairness in accordance with 
the CPA. This means that the factors in section 52 mostly focus on procedural unfairness, which 
is unfairness in the way in which the contract was concluded by the parties.389  
 
Stoop further acknowledges that it can be said that substantive fairness is considerate of the 
consequence of the contracting process, while procedural fairness is considerate of the 
contracting process itself. If it is determined that a contract is substantively unfair, then there is 
something offensive regarding the terms, or the contract terms are unfair as between the 
contracting parties. Procedures directed at procedural fairness address behaviour in the course 
of the bargaining process and are normally aimed at guaranteeing transparency. 390 
 
Transparency has two elements, namely, transparency regarding the terms of a contract and 
transparency in the sense of not being deceived prior to entering into the contract or during the 
performance of a contract, as to characteristics of the price, goods, terms and service. 
Transparency regarding the terms of a contract relates to the question of whether the terms of the 
contract are readily available, in clear (plain) language, of good structure, and cross-referenced, 
with distinction being given to terms that are unfavourable to the consumer or because they grant 
significant rights to the consumer. 391  
 
According to the CPA, procedural fairness necessitates a supplier to make available detailed 
information to a consumer.392 Procedural fairness further necessitates that a consumer must be 
attentive of terms which are to their disadvantage, so that they can guard themselves from terms 
with that effect.393 The factors listed in section 52, relevant in this dissertation, will be discussed 
under either procedural or substantial unfairness. 
 
The nature of the parties to a transaction or an agreement, their relationship to each other and 
their comparative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bargaining positions394 are 
associated with procedural unfairness, that is, to the surrounding circumstances of the consumer, 
                                                          
389 For a full discussion see Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 361–385. 
390 Stoop 2015 (18) 4 PER/PELJ 1093. 
391 Stoop 2015 (18) 4 PER/PELJ 1093. 
392 Section 22 of the CPA. 
393 Stoop The concept “fairness” 214. 
394 Section 52(2)(b) of the CPA. 
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which will differ from consumer to consumer. Even well-educated, sophisticated and experienced 
consumers do not read and bargain the standard terms of an agreement because the transaction 
costs are simply too high and it is therefore often regarded as reasonable by consumers to sign 
an agreement without reading it.  
 
The circumstances of a transaction or an agreement which existed or were reasonably predictable 
at the moment that it was concluded, regardless of whether the CPA was effective at that time,395 
are related to procedural unfairness. The circumstances which a court is required to deliberate on 
are not well-defined, but most probably only the circumstances which both of the contracting 
parties were aware of or should have been reasonably foreseen by the contracting parties, would 
be applicable.396 This applies even to circumstances ascending after the conclusion of a contract 
which was concluded prior to the enforcement of the CPA.397 The words “reasonably foreseeable” 
refer to circumstances ascending subsequent to the conclusion of the contract. This indicates that, 
when deciding on the fairness of enforcement of a contract or a contractual term, the time at which 
it was challenged is relevant and not the time the contract is entered into.398 In this regard, the 
CPA is consequently applied retrospectively. 
 
The conduct of the supplier and the consumer, separately,399 is related to procedural unfairness. 
An illustration of conduct by the supplier which a court may perhaps consider is the use of pressure 
on the consumer to conclude the agreement in haste and without proper contemplation of its 
repercussions or significance.400 
 
The extent of any negotiation between the supplier and the consumer401 is related to procedural 
unfairness. Even though the extent of the negotiations must be considered, this does not imply 
that terms not negotiated on are unfair. However, it has to be substantively unfair to warrant 
interference by the courts.402 Notwithstanding this factor, the courts ought to be cautious not to 
                                                          
395 Section 52(2)(c) of the CPA. 
396 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 311. 
397 Section 52(2)(c) of the CPA. In this regard, the CPA is therefore applied retrospectively. 
398 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 311. 
399 Section 52(2)(d) of the CPA. 
400 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 311. 
401 Section 52(2)(e) of the CPA. 
402 “Section 52” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2016) para 52-15. 
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interfere with bespoke terms which were openly negotiated between the supplier and the 
consumer, specifically business-to-business contracts, even if such terms are tedious.403 
 
Whether, through the behaviour of the supplier, the consumer was obliged to do something that 
was not reasonably required to protect the reasonable interests of the supplier404  relates to 
substantive unfairness. Not only must it be made known that a term (or conduct) safeguards the 
authentic interests of the supplier; it must similarly be decided whether such a term is reasonably 
essential to safeguard the supplier’s sincere (reasonable) interests. The proportionality of a term 
is consequently reflected.405 
 
The degree to which some documents relating to a transaction or a contract fulfil the requirements 
as set out in section 22406 is a particular factor which a court must study with reference to a 
transaction or a contract between a consumer and supplier where unfairness is alleged.407 As 
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, section 22 requires that a contract, notice or term be 
drafted in the prescribed form (if any) or in plain language. 
 
Whether a consumer is acquainted with or ought to have reasonably known of the presence and 
scope of a specific provision of the contract which provision is alleged unfair, relating to any 
custom of trade and any preceding transactions between the contracting parties,408 is related to 
substantive unfairness. Implementation of a term that is not in itself unfair may well be considered 
unfair if a consumer did not know, and could not reasonably have known, of the presence of the 
term and, accordingly, failed to safeguard his interests. 409  It can consequently be said that 
satisfactory opportunity must be given to the consumer to familiarise themselves with the terms 
of the contract. Further factors to be considered are the relationship between the contracting 
parties and the presence of an ongoing, co-operative relationship which will possibly show that 
the bargaining positions of the contracting parties were one and the same or that imbalances in 
bargaining positions have not been ill-used. Previous dealings between the contracting parties 
                                                          
403 “Section 52” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2016) para 52-15. 
404 Section 52(2)(f) of the CPA. 
405 Stoop The concept “fairness” in the regulation of contracts under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 226. 
406 Section 52(2)(g) of the CPA. 
407 Stoop 2015 (18) PER/PELJ 4 at 1104. 
408 Section 52(2)(h) of the CPA. 
409 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 313. 
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possibly will also be a consideration.410 The presence of previous dealings between contracting 
parties will possibly be an indication that the consumer has the necessary knowledge of a term, 
which, in turn, points toward fairness of such a term.411 
 
Section 52(2) does not specifically indicate whether the list of specific matters is an exhaustive 
one. I submit that the list is not exhaustive: the court must have regard to the matters expressly 
mentioned (to the extent that they are applicable), but it is not precluded from considering other 
factors that have a bearing on substantive unfairness.412 
 
Section 52(1)(a), read with section 52(3), makes provision that, if a provision or notice fails to 
comply with the requirements of section 48, the court would possibly declare such provision or 
notice to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust and may make such other order as is deemed 
reasonable in the circumstances.413 
 
Section 52(3) sets out a list of potential orders414 that a court may deliver if it concludes that a 
contract, notice or term was wholly or partly unconscionable, unfair, unjust or unreasonable. 
 
Unlike section 52(4), which deals with prohibited terms,415 section 52(3) does not specifically give 
the court power to affirm an unfair provision null and void, or separate it from the contract, or alter 
                                                          
410 Section 52(2)(h)(ii) of the CPA. 
411 In terms of section 52(2)(h) of the CPA, regard must be had to any custom of trade and any previous 
dealings between the parties under this factor when a consumer's knowledge of a specific term is 
considered.  
412 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 314. 
413 Tait & Newman 2014 (35) 3 Obiter 641. 
414 In terms of section 52(3) of the CPA, such orders include the following:   
“an order that any money or property be restored to the consumer;  
an order that the consumer is compensated for losses or expenses relating to the transaction or the 
proceedings of the court;  
an order that the supplier ceases any practice, or alters any practice, form or document so as to avoid 
repetition of the supplier’s conduct.” 
415 Section 52(4) of the CPA provides as follows: 
“If, in any proceedings before a court concerning a transaction or agreement between a supplier and a 
consumer, a person alleges that an agreement, a term or condition of an agreement, or a notice to which a 
transaction or agreement is purportedly subject, is void in terms of this Act or failed to satisfy any applicable 
requirements set out in section 49, the court may— 
(a) make an order— 
(i) in the case of a provision or notice that is void in terms of any provision of this Act— 
(aa) severing any part of the relevant agreement, provision or notice, or alter it to 
the extent required to render it lawful, if it is reasonable to do so having regard to 
the transaction, agreement, provision or notice as a whole; or 
90 | P a g e  
 
it so as to make it fair. Section 52(4) provides that in litigation regarding a transaction or contract 
between a supplier and a consumer, an aggrieved party may void a term or condition in the CPA 
for failure to conform to the requirements of section 49. 
 
Section 52(4)(a)(ii) of the CPA makes provision that in court proceedings where it is specifically 
purported that any contract, term or condition of a contract, or notice fails to conform with the 
appropriate requirements of section 49 of the CPA, a court would possibly separate such contract 
terms or such notice from the contract, or state that such term or notice is of no force or effect.416 
 
Although section 52 of the CPA fails to mention that courts have the power to deliver orders on 
unfair terms, the courts would possibly still make use of the lists of significant factors and possible 
court orders provided for in this section to provide the necessary guidance when exercising their 
wide-ranging powers in accordance with provincial legislation.417 
 
Section 52 does not stipulate which party bears the onus of proving that a term is unfair. Courts 
will consequently have to construct such a test by taking into consideration the factors contained 
in section 52(2) of the CPA. These factors include the reasonable value of the goods or services, 
the behaviour of the contracting parties individually, and whether there was negotiation of some 
sort between the contracting parties. If there was indeed negotiation, the courts must consider the 
degree of such negotiation, along with the degree to which a document regarding the transaction 
fulfils the plain language requirement.418 
 
Naudé419 states that section 52 is written based only on the example of court action relating to a 
single contract, with a single consumer in mind, which is challenging. Subsections (1) and (3) 
confer power on the courts regarding only transactions or contracts between a supplier and a 
consumer. Subsection (2) provides a list of factors applicable in instances where the fairness of a 
                                                          
(bb) declaring the entire agreement, provision or notice void as from the date that 
it purportedly took effect; or 
(ii) in the case of a provision or notice that fails to satisfy any provision of section 49, 
severing the provision or notice from the agreement, or declaring it to have no force or 
effect with respect to the transaction; and 
(b) make any further order that is just and reasonable in the circumstances with respect to that 
agreement, provision or notice, as the case may be.” 
416 Tait and Newman 2014 (35) 3 Obiter 642. 
417 Naudé 2010 (127) SALJ 526. 
418 Mupangavanhu 2015 (48) 1 De Jure 131. 
419 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 526–527. 
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transaction or contract is assessed. This example of judicial control over a single consumer 
contract is extremely challenging in the consumer context, given the intrinsic restrictions of court 
action.420 
 
4.4.7 Section 58 of the CPA 
 
Section 58421 places a legal responsibility on a supplier to explicitly warn the consumer of the fact, 
nature and likely consequence of a risk. Such responsibility pertains to any action or facility that 
could involve either an unusual risk or a risk that the consumer cannot realistically be expected to 
anticipate, or a risk that may result in severe bodily injury or death. 
 
Section 58 ought to be read alongside section 49 as it necessitates a supplier of certain inherently 
risky facilities or activities to draw the fact, nature and likely consequence of the risk to the 
consumer’s attention in such a way that it conforms to the criteria contained in section 49.422 As 
evident from section 58, the fashion and form of the notice should also conform to the criteria 
contained in section 49.423   
 
Van Eeden424 argues that the phrase fact, nature and potential effect, in its totality, visibly shows 
that the supplier is obliged to guarantee that a consumer sufficiently consider and understand 
such risk and has the necessary appreciation of the risk instead of a superficial alertness to the 
risk.  
 
From the aforesaid, it is obvious that a supplier of dangerous and risky facilities and activities must 
exclusively notify a consumer of the risk of any probable injury or death and must do so in a visible 
and noticeable way that is expected to attract the attention of a typical consumer. If a clause in a 
                                                          
420 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 526–527. 
421 Section 58 of the CPA provides as follows: 
“(1) The supplier of any activity or facility that is subject to any— 
(a) risk of an unusual character or nature; 
(b) risk of which a consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware, or which an ordinarily alert 
consumer could not reasonably be expected to contemplate, in the circumstances; or 
(c) risk that could result in serious injury or death, must specifically draw the fact, nature and potential 
effect of that risk to the attention of consumers in a form and manner that meets the standards set out in 
section 49. 
(2)  …” 
422 Mupangavanhu 2014 (17) PER/PELJ 3 at 1179. 
423 Jacobs, Stoop and Van Niekerk 2010 (13) PER/PELJ 378. For a full discussion of section 49, see para 
4.4.3 above. 
424 Van Eeden A guide to the Consumer Protection Act 178–179. 
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contract or a notice is connected to an activity or facility which constitutes a risk of an uncommon 
character or nature, or a risk with which a consumer is not familiar, or a risk that may result in 
severe bodily injury or death, the supplier must unambiguously bring the fact, nature and possible 
consequence of that risk to the consumer’s attention. 
 
In addition, any notice or clause contained in a consumer contract which restricts the risk or legal 
responsibility of a supplier or any third party ought to be drawn to the attention of a consumer for 
their consideration.  
 
4.4.8 Section 61 of the CPA 
 
Section 61(1)425 pertains to absolute426 legal responsibility ascending from hazardous and unsafe 
goods, product failure, hazard or defect,427 and inadequate warnings or instructions. 
 
In Koen v Pretoria Central Investments428 it was found that section 61(1) of the CPA makes 
provision for strict liability for harm caused as a result of insufficient information or forewarning 
provided to a consumer. This applies to harm in relation to danger ascending from or associated 
with the use of goods, regardless of whether the harm was brought about by negligence on the 
part of the producer, importer, distributor or retailer. In this instance it is the negligence of the 
defendant as a service provider for parking as, according to the plaintiff, the warning instructions 
were inadequate. 
 
 
 
                                                          
425 Section 61 of the CPA provides that –  
“the producer, importer, distributor or retailer of any goods is liable for any harm caused wholly or partially 
as a consequence of –   
(a) supplying unsafe goods; 
(b) product failure or defect in any goods; and   
(c) inadequate instructions or warnings provided with regard to any hazard arising from the use of any 
goods,   
irrespective of whether the harm resulted from any negligence on the part of the producer, importer, 
distributor or retailer.” 
426 Strict liability. 
427 As defined in section 53 of the CPA. 
428 Koen v Pretoria Central Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Pretoria Parkade Investments (33737/13) [2018] 
ZAGPPHC 113 (2 March 2018) [52]. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
From the aforesaid it is evident that the CPA has provided considerably better protection for a 
consumer in the framework of the use and exploitation of an exemption clause.429 One of the 
objectives of the CPA is to exclude the position where a consumer is uninformed about and 
unfamiliar with the presence of an exemption clause in a contract entered into. However, the 
drafters of the CPA in some instances failed; alternatively, they neglected to put their thoughts to 
paper. 
 
Section 22 of the CPA regulates a consumer’s right to information in plain and understandable 
language. Even though it is required to make use of plain and understandable language when 
drafting contracts or documents which are intended for consumers,430 simplifying the language 
and structure may not be a complete solution but it would certainly assist many consumers in 
understanding their rights and obligations in terms of a contract.431 The term “plain language” can 
be deceptive as it is often misconstrued to mean that the contents of an agreement, specifically 
exemption clauses, have to be dumbed down or simplified,432 which is not the case. 
 
The CPA sets out certain essential consumer rights, including the right to fair, just and reasonable 
contract terms, which is regulated by sections 48 to 52. These rights could possibly have a 
considerable influence on the validity and implementation of exemption clauses, since terms 
which do not conform to the requirements as set out in the CPA could be affirmed to be improper 
and therefore set aside by the courts. Section 48 contains the general prohibition against unfair 
terms, with the effect of controlling the content of the exemption clause. Nonetheless, section 49 
sets out strict requirements when incorporating certain kinds of terms. For example, terms may 
be required to be in plain language, and such terms must be signed or initialled by the consumer. 
Alternatively, the consumer must have acted in a way that is consistent with acknowledgment of 
such terms. Section 51 returns to the subject of content control by providing a list of banned terms 
                                                          
429 Tait and Newman 2014 (35) 3 Obiter 643. 
430  See the discussion in Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 5 PER/PELJ (also available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 2018). Also see 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 (1) SA 219 (KZD). This case has to do with the National 
Credit Act, 2008 (NCA). However, the NCA and the CPA have identical plain language provisions and many 
of their principles can therefore be applied to other consumer agreements. Therefore, this judgment is also 
of importance when applying the sections of the CPA. 
431 Newman 2010 (31) 3 Obiter 745. 
432 De Stadler and Van Zyl 2017 (29) 1 SA Merc LJ 98. 
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(the black list, in comparison to the grey list in regulation 44(3)). Finally, section 52 confers powers 
on courts in matters concerning unfair terms contained in a consumer contract. 
 
The protection offered by the CPA to the consumer is of great value; however, the protection 
offered to the consumer remains limited. It should be noted that exemption clauses still remain 
lawful, binding and enforceable if their wording is unambiguous;433 in other words, if it complies 
with section 22, read with section 49(3)–(5) of the CPA, and excludes terms listed in regulation 
44(3) and section 51 of the CPA.  
 
Even though it is important for a supplier to ensure that a consumer makes an informed choice, it 
must further be noted that once the exemption clause is brought to the consumer’s attention in 
terms of the CPA, the terms of that contract are binding on the consumer. The CPA, in its current 
form, affords only limited protection to consumers, as service providers are still capable of using 
exemption clauses. The difference is only that they are now directed as to how to word the clauses 
and bring them to the consumer’s knowledge in the manner and form prescribed in the CPA; 
alternatively, in plain language. 
 
It should, however, be noted that it is not adequate for a supplier to merely draw the unfair term 
to the attention of the consumer with the intention of achieving an informed decision.434 Therefore, 
in cases where a term which is unfair, unreasonable or unjust was not brought to the consumer's 
attention in the recommended manner and form, the court could refuse to impose such an 
exemption clause based on the fact that it is unfair.435 
 
The move in the direction of consumer awareness and fairness when entering into a contract is 
of great value. However, to ensure that the consumer is protected to the maximum, certain 
amendments to the CPA must be made to guarantee actual protection against unfair contract 
terms. 
 
In the following chapter I will compare the relevant sections of the CPA, aimed at protecting the 
consumer, with specific reference to the enforcement of exemption clauses, with foreign law. I will 
                                                          
433 Hutchison and Pretorius The law of contract 271. See also Marx and Govindjee 2007 28(3) Obiter 622–
635; Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 496–509; and Brand and Brodie Good faith in contract law 108. 
434 Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 385. 
435 Sections 48(2)(b) and 52(3) of the CPA. 
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do this comparison based on the fact that the courts may consider foreign law when interpreting 
the CPA. 
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CHAPTER 5: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW, 
THE CONSUMER RIGHTS ACT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As pointed out in chapter 4 of this dissertation and in accordance with section 2(2) of the CPA, it 
is permitted to look at foreign law for direction. In this chapter, specific reference will be made to 
the consumer protection laws of Australia436 and the United Kingdom437 in comparison to the CPA. 
The reason for this is that both the Australian Consumer Law (or Laws) and the CRA are 
moderately recently enacted laws aimed at protecting the rights of ordinary consumers. 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, specific reference will be made to the transparency of terms 
(plain language), determining the unfairness of a term, and the so-called grey-list and black-list 
terms. Prior to comparing the applicable sections, a short background of the relevant legislation 
will be provided. 
 
5.2 Australian Consumer Law (ACL) 
 
The Australian Consumer Law (hereinafter the ACL) came into operation on 1 January 2011. The 
ACL, set out in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (hereinafter the CCA),438 
is legislation offering security to consumers, applied as a law of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
It is integrated into the law of each of Australia's states and territories and operates nationally. On 
commencement of this law, it replaced 20 different consumer laws throughout the Commonwealth 
and the states and territories439, even though certain other acts remained in force.440 
                                                          
436 The Australian Consumer Law (hereinafter the ACL). 
437 The Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 (hereinafter the UCTA), the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (hereinafter the UTCCR 1999) and the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The CRA changed 
and combined the UCTA and the UTCCR. Specifically, it amended the UCTA in respect of business and 
consumer contracts and repealed the UTCCR. 
438 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 Act No. 51 of 1974 as amended. The Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (hereinafter the CCA) covers most areas of the market: the relationships between suppliers, 
wholesalers, retailers and consumers. Its purpose is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting fair 
trading and competition, and through the provision of consumer protections. 
439  “The ACL” http://consumerlaw.gov.au/sites/consumer/files/2015/06/ACL framework overview.docx 
(accessed on 6 November 2018). 
440 "Exceptions under commonwealth, state & territory legislation" Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission 
https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/legislation/exceptions-
under-commonwealth-state-territory-legislation (accessed on 6 November 2018).  
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Like the CPA, the ACL’s objective is to protect consumers and guarantee reasonable trading 
throughout Australia.441 The ACL (Schedule 2 of the CCA) deals with disingenuous or deceptive 
behaviour, unacceptable conduct, unfair practices, conditions and warranties, product safety and 
information, the legal responsibility of manufacturers of merchandise with safety defects, offences 
and country of origin representations. 
 
Part 2-3 of the ACL regulates unfair contract provisions. Broadly speaking, the provisions can be 
used to declare a term in a standard-form consumer contract invalid, in the event that such a term 
is unfair.442  
 
The contract under discussion needs to be a consumer contract443 over and above the fact that 
such a contract must be a standard-form contract. The application of the provisions of the ACL is 
restricted only to consumer contracts where the recipient (i.e. consumer) is a natural person. In 
deciding if a contract is indeed a consumer contract, the reason for the transaction must be 
ascertained. This could produce technical hitches for a supplier in some cases where the goods 
or services could be utilised for both personal and domestic or household use. 
 
In terms of the ACL, a term must be transparent. With specific reference to section 24(3) of the 
ACL, a term is considered to be transparent in instances where the term is conveyed in reasonably 
plain language, when it is readable, and when it is presented clearly to and is freely obtainable by 
any party affected by such a term.444 
 
Section 25 of the ACL provides for certain types of terms which will possibly be reflected to be 
unfair. For purposes of this dissertation, specific reference is made to only the following terms: 
 
• A term which limits, or has the consequence of limiting, a contracting party’s vicarious 
liability for the aforementioned party’s agents;445  
                                                          
441 Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 5 PER/PELJ 522. 
442 Section 23(1) of the ACL. 
443 Section 23(3) of the ACL states that a “consumer contract” is “a contract for (a) a supply of goods or 
services; or (b) a sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual whose acquisition of the goods, services, 
or interest is wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.” 
444 In comparison to section 22 of the CPA, regulation 6 of the UTCCR and sections 64(2) and 68 of the 
CRA. 
445 Section 25(i) of the ACL. 
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• A term which limits, or has the consequence of limiting, a contracting party’s right to take 
legal action against another party.446 
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, as from 12 November 2016, the protection granted in terms of the 
ACL was extended to business-to-business transactions447 for small business, which makes it 
similar to the position under the South African CPA. These additions allow for unfair contract terms 
in small business contracts to be affirmed to be invalid.448 
 
Consequently, the aforesaid is applicable to standard-form small business contracts in instances 
where the contract was concluded or renewed on or subsequent to 12 November 2016. The 
standard-form small business contracts must, however, be used for the supply of goods or a 
service, or for a sale or a grant of an interest in land. Furthermore, at the time the contract was 
concluded, one of the contracting parties must be a business with fewer than 20 employees in its 
employ.449 
 
Terms attempting to exclude any and all legal responsibility of one contracting party are to be 
expected to be unfair under the ACL.450 
 
5.3 English law 
 
By way of court judgments, an immense quantity of legislative enactments over the past few years 
and the institution of certain legislation in the English law, our law was further developed and 
advanced.451 
 
Preceding the enactment of the CRA, there were two contractual fairness-oriented regulators in 
the United Kingdom specifically, namely, the UCTA and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (hereinafter the UTCCR 1999). The UTCA dealt mainly with exemption and 
                                                          
446 Section 25(k) of the ACL. 
447 Also known and referred to as “B2B” (Small business contracts). 
448  Creighton https://www.b2bmagazine.com.au/b2b-contracts-unfair-contract-terms/ (accessed on 22 
September 2018). 
449  Gates and Gates https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5464f93-d8ad-4ccc-922b-
94b1fb46b7e0 (accessed on 22 September 2018). 
450 The so-called grey-list terms, more fully discussed later in this chapter. 
451 Nagel Commercial law [2.02]. 
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limitation clauses, while the dealt mainly with non-negotiated consumer contracts or so-called 
standard-term contracts. Each of the aforesaid pieces of legislation will be discussed shortly. 
 
5.3.1 Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) 
 
The UCTA has been in force since 1 February 1978.452 The introduction of the UCTA in 1977 
indicated that it is an Act imposing further limitations on the degree to which civil legal 
responsibility for breach of contract, or for negligence or other breach of duty, may be 
circumvented through contract terms in countries such as Wales, England, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. 
 
The UCTA directly regulated exemption and limitation clauses in sections 2 to 7 thereof, with 
specific reference to clauses which excluded or limited certain responsibilities of suppliers to 
consumers. It furthermore dealt with non-contractual notices (i.e. disclaimer notices), excluding or 
restricting delictual liability on the part of the supplier.  
 
Section 2(1) of the UCTA provided that an exemption clause was not allowed to be inserted in a 
contract if the purpose of such a clause was to exclude or restrict business liability of the supplier 
for the death of the consumer, or to exclude or restrict business liability for personal injury as a 
result of negligence.453  In terms of section 2(2) of the UCTA, if it were the intention of the supplier 
to exclude liability of such supplier for loss or damage by means of negligence, for example, 
financial loss, other than personal injury, the clause was subject to the reasonableness test.454 In 
terms of section 2(3) of the UCTA, where a contract term or notice intends to exclude or restrict 
liability for negligence, a person’s agreement to such term or notice or their attentiveness to such 
term or notice is not indicative of such party’s intentional acceptance of any risk. What is important 
to note is that section 2 of the UCTA, in terms of section 2(4) thereof, was not applicable to 
consumer contracts and consumer notices. 
 
Section 3 of the UCTA precludes the use of an exemption clause if it attempts to exclude legal 
responsibility for breach of contract, or if it tolerates contractual performance that is significantly 
diverse from the performance expected by the consumer, or if it allows no performance 
                                                          
452 Section 31(1) of the UCTA. 
453 Section 1(1)(a) of the UCTA defines negligence as the breach of an obligation or duty “to take reasonable 
care or exercise reasonable skill”. 
454 Section 1(2) of the UCTA. 
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whatsoever regarding the entire contractual obligation or any fragment thereof (e.g. if it fails to 
satisfy a condition precedent). The exception would be if the clause fulfils the reasonableness 
test. 
 
The reasonableness test455 as referred to in section 2(1) and section 3 of the UCTA is contained 
in section 11 of the UCTA. The UCTA sets course of action which is important when deciding 
whether a contract term fulfils the requirement of reasonableness, and takes account of the 
strength of the relevant parties’ bargaining positions and whether the consumer knew or should 
have reasonably known of the presence or extent of such term. The requirement of 
reasonableness, in terms of section 11 of the UCTA, is that a term would be deemed to be a fair 
and reasonable term with due observation of the circumstances which were or ought reasonably 
to have been identified to the party or in the cogitation of the parties when the contract was entered 
into.456 
 
In the matter of St Albans City and DC v International Computers Ltd457 the issue at hand was 
whether damages could be restricted by a damage-limitation clause as contained in the contract, 
or whether the clause was an unfair contract term within the ambit of the UTCA. Scott Baker J 
held that, because the city council was operative on International Computers Ltd’s written 
standard terms of business, section 3 of the UCTA applied. It was furthermore held that sections 
6 or 7 of the UCTA correspondingly applied and that the contract term under section 11 of the 
UCTA was found to be unreasonable. In terms of section 11(4) of the UCTA, Scott Baker J 
emphasised that International Computers Ltd had sufficient resources and had £50m worldwide 
product liability insurance. Considering Schedule 2 of the UCTA, Scott Baker J held that the 
                                                          
455 Section 52(2) of the CPA grants the courts authority to decide on fair and just conduct, as well as terms 
and conditions that can be regarded as being unfair to the consumer. The reasonableness test, as contained 
in section 11 of the UCTA, is consistent with the factors listed in section 52(2) of the CPA, being the factors 
that a court must take into consideration when determining whether or not an exception clause is 
reasonable. Therefore, the courts observe the application of section 11 of the UCTA when considering the 
reasonableness of an exception clause. 
456 In Schedule 2 of the UCTA, five guidelines to interpreting "reasonableness" are laid down. These are, in 
summary – 
• the relative strengths of the parties' bargaining positions; 
• whether the consumer received any inducement to accept the term; 
• whether the consumer knew or should have known that the term was included; 
• in the case of a term excluding liability if a condition is not complied with, the likelihood of 
compliance with that condition at the time the contract was made; and 
• whether the goods were made or adapted to the special order of the consumer. 
It should be noted that these guidelines are not exhaustive. 
457 St Albans City and DC v International Computers Ltd [1996] EWCA Civ 1296. 
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council was in a weaker bargaining position because it had financial limitations and was not in the 
commercial field. The council had no prospects of other contracts without the term. The council 
had knowledge of the term and made representations about it. Scott Baker J noted that Schedule 
2 of the UCTA ought to be considered just as was the case with section 6 or 7 of the UCTA. The 
Court of Appeal upheld Scott Baker J’s rationale but concluded that the damages were less than 
those determined by Scott Baker J. 
 
In the matter of Hirtenstein v Hill Dickinson LLP458 the contract under dispute was a commercial 
contract concerning the purchase of a yacht. The clause headed Limitation of liability in Hill 
Dickinson’s standard terms stated that the defendant’s legal responsibility for any claim would not 
exceed £3 million. The defendant wanted to depend on the aforesaid clause when the plaintiff 
sued it for professional negligence. 
 
The court found that the limitation clause was unfair and unreasoning since the clause was wide 
enough to constitute an attempt to limit the defendant’s liability for negligence. The defendant did 
not specifically draw the contents of the limitation clause to the knowledge of the plaintiff, nor was 
the clause referred to in correspondence or in any telephonic discussions between the parties. 
 
5.3.2 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR 1999) 
 
The UTCCR 1999 found application only to contracts entered into by a supplier (or a seller) and 
a consumer.459  
 
Schedule 2 of the UTCCR 1999 encloses a so-called grey list, containing certain terms which 
might possibly be seen as unfair. The so-called grey-list terms were not by their mere design 
considered to be unfair; however, it was probable that in most situations such terms would be 
regarded as unfair.460  
 
The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission in 2005 compiled a report on unfair 
contract terms, recommending that provisions in the UCTA and the UTCCR 1999 affecting the 
                                                          
458 Hirtenstein v Hill Dickinson LLP [2014] EWHC 2711. 
459 Regulation 4(1) of the UTCCR. 
460 Section 48 of the CPA contains a so-called grey-list of terms. 
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consumer in this regard ought to be replaced by a single Act of Parliament. In 2013, these 
recommendations were studied and restructured to form part of the Consumer Rights Act.461 
 
5.3.3 Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) 
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (hereinafter the CRA) came into effect on 1 October 2015, 
changing the rules pertaining to the supply of goods, services and digital content of contracts 
concluded after 1 October 2015. As from 1 October 2015 only one Act applies to all contracts, 
including contracts initially falling outside the scope of the UCTA or the UTCCR 1999.462 The CRA 
strives to substitute and expand the current rules regarding unfair terms in consumer contracts 
under the UCTA and UTCCR. Nevertheless, just as the CPA does not find retrospective 
application to a consumer contract, the CRA does not find such retrospective application. If a 
contract was concluded prior to 1 October 2015, such contract will be administered by the UCTA 
or the UTCCR. 
 
The CRA furthermore widened the definition of a consumer, providing further protection. In 
addition, the onus is on the “trader” (hereinafter “the supplier”) to prove that the consumer relying 
on the provisions of the CRA, is not a consumer. The CRA also finds application to consumer 
notices (whether such notices are contractual/non-contractual, verbal or in writing), along with 
consumer contracts, in the classic form.463 
 
Chapter 2 of the CRA applies to a contract of a supplier to supply goods to a consumer.464 It finds 
application only if the contract is a sales agreement,465 a contract for the rental of merchandise,466 
a hire-purchase contract467 or a contract for the transfer of goods.468 
                                                          
461“Exclusion clauses”  
http://www.open.edu/openlearn/people-politics-law/the-law/exclusion-clauses/content-section-0? 
(accessed on 19 September 2017). 
462 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (hereinafter the CRA) also regulates clauses in contracts where goods 
are supplied, including sale, hire, hire-purchase and work-and-materials contracts. “The sale & supply of 
goods”  
https://www.businesscompanion.info/en/quick-guides/goods/the-sale-and-supply-of-goods (accessed on 
19 September 2017).  
463 “Summary guide to the Consumer Rights Act 2015” https://www.wrighthassall.co.uk/knowledge/legal-
guides/2015/10/01/summary-guide-consumer-rights-act-2015/ (accessed on 28 October 2018). 
464 Section 3 of the CRA. 
465 Section 5 of the CRA. 
466 Section 6 of the CRA. 
467 Section 7 of the CRA. 
468 Section 8 of the CRA. 
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Section 31 of the CRA contains a list of circumstances in which a supplier’s liability to a consumer 
can be neither excluded nor restricted. The cause of section 31 is to preclude suppliers from 
contracting out of the consumer’s statutory rights in terms of sections 9 to 16 of the CRA, such as 
satisfactory quality, fitness for purpose and matching the description. It is furthermore applicable 
to sections 28 and 29 of the CRA on time of delivery, the passing of risk and, for contracts other 
than hire, the requirement of right to title contained in section 17 of the CRA. In addition, section 
31 has the effect that any contract term which strives to prevent the consumer from having access 
to statutory rights and remedies or to make exercising these rights and remedies less attractive 
to the consumer by either making it more challenging and burdensome to do so, or by placing the 
consumer at a disadvantage after doing so, will also be void. 469 
 
Further to the aforesaid, Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the CRA, dealing with unfair terms, is applicable 
to a contract between a supplier and a consumer.470 Section 62 of the CRA deals with the fairness 
requirement pertaining to consumer contract terms and notices (and sets fairness criteria similar 
to section 48 of the CPA). Over and above the reasonableness test brought about by the UCTA, 
the CRA went a step further and brought about a fairness test, which is contained in section 62 of 
the CRA. In accordance with the fairness test, it is determined whether there is a substantial 
disproportion in the parties' respective positions, whether the obligation imposed by such a term 
is to the disadvantage of the consumer and whether such a term is in conflict with the demands 
of good faith. 471  In such instance, such a term will be considered unfair and therefore not 
enforceable. An equivalent test exists to determine the fairness of notices.472 
                                                          
469 “A term of a contract to supply goods is not binding on the consumer to the extent that it would exclude 
or restrict the trader’s liability arising under any of these provisions— (a) section 9 (goods to be of 
satisfactory quality); (b) section 10 (goods to be fit for particular purpose); (c) section 11 (goods to be as 
described); (d) section 12 (other pre-contract information included in contract); (e) section 13 (goods to 
match a sample); (f) section 14 (goods to match a model seen or examined); (g) section 15 (installation as 
part of conformity of the goods with the contract); (h) section 16 (goods not conforming to contract if digital 
content does not conform); (i) section 17 (trader to have right to supply the goods etc); (j) section 28 (delivery 
of goods); (k) section 29 (passing of risk). (2) That also means that a term of a contract to supply goods is 
not binding on the consumer to the extent that it would— (a) exclude or restrict a right or remedy in respect 
of a liability under a provision listed in subsection (1), (b) make such a right or remedy or its enforcement 
subject to a restrictive or onerous condition, (c) allow a trader to put a person at a disadvantage as a result 
of pursuing such a right or remedy, or (d) exclude or restrict rules of evidence or procedure. (3) The 
reference in subsection (1) to excluding or restricting a liability also includes preventing an obligation or duty 
arising or limiting its extent.” 
470 Section 61(1) of the CRA. 
471 Section 62(4) of the CRA: “A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer.” 
472 Section 62(6) and (7) of the CRA. 
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Section 63 of the CRA brought about Schedule 2. Schedule 2, specifically part 1 thereof, lists 
illustrations of terms which would possibly be considered unfair (known as the so-called grey list), 
which schedule is an indicative and non-exhaustive list.473 The terms listed are not by unfair 
design, but may of assistance to a court when the application of the fairness test in section 62 is 
considered in each particular case. Since the so-called grey list is non-exhaustive, terms not found 
in the list in the schedule could be found by a court to be unfair by the application of the fairness 
test contained in section 62 of the CRA. 
 
Terms in the grey list are measurable for fairness even in instances where such terms would 
otherwise meet the requirements for being exempt under section 64 of the CRA. Terms in the so-
called grey list are therefore assessable even if such terms are transparent and prominent as 
defined in section 64 of the CRA. 
 
There are, however, certain contract terms which are excluded from the test as set out in section 
62 of the CPA; such limited terms are contained in section 64 of the CRA. Section 64(1) of the 
CRA provides that terms on the main subject matter of the contract (i.e. a term describing the 
goods sold) or the correctness of the price are excused from an assessment of fairness in 
accordance with section 62 of the CRA. Furthermore, in terms of section 64(2) of the CRA, a 
contract term, as referred to in subsection (1), is not subject to the fairness test in instances where 
the contract or notice term is clear and conspicuous.474 A term is transparent (clear) if it is 
                                                          
473 Some of the terms relevant in this dissertation are as follows: 
“A term which has the object or effect of excluding or limiting the trader’s liability in the event of the 
death of or personal injury to the consumer resulting from an act or omission of the trader.” 
 
“A term which has the object or effect of inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the 
consumer in relation to the trader or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance 
or inadequate performance by the trader of any of the contractual obligations, including the option 
of offsetting a debt owed to the trader against any claim which the consumer may have against the 
trader.” 
 
“A term which has the object or effect of excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal 
action or exercise any other legal remedy, in particular by— 
(a) requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, 
(b) unduly restricting the evidence available to the consumer, or 
(c) imposing on the consumer a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, should lie 
with another party to the contract.” 
474 Reference in section 62 of the CRA is made to the words “transparent” and “prominent”. Further to the 
aforesaid, section 64 also provides as follows:  
“(1) A term of a consumer contract may not be assessed for fairness … to the extent that– 
(a) it specifies the main subject matter of the contract, or 
(b) the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price payable under the contract by comparison with 
the goods, digital content or services supplied under it.” 
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conveyed in plain and understandable language and is readable in instances where the term is in 
writing.475 A term is conspicuous (prominent) in instances where it is drawn to the attention of the 
consumer in such a manner that an ordinary consumer would have knowledge of such a term.476 
Section 64(5) of the CRA provides a clear definition of what is meant by the concept of an average 
consumer. Furthermore, section 64(6) of the CRA provides that section 64 is not applicable to 
terms contained in part 1 of Schedule 2, being the so-called grey-list terms as discussed above. 
 
Section 65 of the CRA contains the so-called black-list terms which set a bar on the use of contract 
or notice terms that exclude or restrict liability caused by negligence. 
 
In accordance with section 68 of the CRA, a supplier is required to make sure that a term 
contained in a written consumer contract, or in a consumer notice, is transparent. A consumer 
notice is transparent in instances where it is conveyed in plain and understandable language and 
is readable.  
 
Another section of importance is section 69 of the CRA477, which stipulates that, when contract 
terms are vague and have the ability of being construed in contrasting ways, especially if they are 
not in writing or in an accessible format, this section ensures that the interpretation that is most 
beneficial to the consumer, rather than the supplier, is the interpretation that is used. This section 
confirms the contra proferentem rule.478 
 
In light of the aforesaid laws and the relevant sections thereof, a comparison will be made in order 
to establish whether sufficient protection is offered to the ordinary consumer when it comes to the 
exemption clauses. 
 
5.4 A comparison between the CPA and the consumer protection laws of Australia and 
the UK 
 
A comparison between Australian, British and South African legislation will be made, with specific 
focus on protection against exemption clauses. 
                                                          
475 Section 64(3) of the CRA. 
476 Section 64(4) of the CRA. It can be said that section 64(4) of the CRA is better worded that section 22 
of the CPA due to the fact that section 64(4) is clear and easily understandable. 
477 Section 69(1) of the CPA reads that, if a term in a consumer contract, or a consumer notice, could have 
different meanings, the meaning that is most favourable to the consumer is to prevail.  
478 Such a section is not included in the CPA; therefore, the common law is still applicable in South Africa. 
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 ACL CRA CPA 
Who qualifies as a 
consumer?479 
An individual 
acting for 
purposes that are 
solely or primarily 
free standing 
from that 
individual's trade, 
business, craft or 
occupation.  
 
However, unfair 
contract terms in 
small business 
contracts are 
regulated by the 
ACL. 
An individual 
acting for 
purposes that are 
wholly or mainly 
outside that 
individual’s trade, 
business, craft or 
profession. 
Individuals and 
small juristic 
persons. See 
chapter 4 above. 
Transparency Section 24(3) 
Section 68 and 
Section 64 in 
respect of certain 
terms 
Section 22 
Determining the 
unfairness of a term 
Section 
24(1) & (2) 
Section 62 Section 48(2) 
So-called grey list Section 25 
Section 63, read 
with Schedule 2 
Section 48, read 
with Regulation 
4(3) 
So-called black list  
Section 65, read 
with Schedule 2 
Section 51 
 
 
 
                                                          
479 Due to the limitation of the length of this dissertation, an in-depth discussion regarding a consumer will 
not follow. 
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5.4.1 Plain language (transparency) 
 
It is evident that the principle of plain language plays an important part when deciding if a 
contractual term is indeed unfair. Section 24 of the ACL moved towards providing requirements 
that should be met (elements) when it is to be determined if a contractual term is truly transparent. 
Section 68 of the CRA states that terms and notices that are in writing, ought to be transparent. 
As stated above, a term or notice is transparent in instances where it is stated in plain and 
understandable language and is readable. 
 
5.4.1.1 Section 24 of the ACL 
 
Section 24480 of the ACL describes the meaning of fairness. The aim of the requirements set forth 
in section 24 of the ACL is to make certain that a consumer is completely conscious of a term and 
the meaning thereof. 
 
In the ACL, transparency is clearly defined and not dependent on any circumstantial factors. The 
ACL also does not distinguish between different levels of transparency. Transparency is clearly 
described in the ACL, which is different from the position under the CPA. It is said that a term is 
transparent only when it satisfies all four requirements recorded in section 24(3) of the ACL.481 In 
terms of section 24(3), a term is transparent (a) if it is expressed in reasonably plain language; 
and (b) legible; and (c) presented clearly; and (d) readily available to any affected party. Section 
23(3)(a) provides that, in deciding whether a contract or term is unfair under sections 23 and 24(1), 
the extent to which a term is transparent must be considered.  
 
When it is being determined whether a term is clearly presented, the font used by the supplier to 
showcase the term is one of the relevant factors that must be taken into consideration, and of 
course the size of the font.482  
 
                                                          
480 Section 24(3) of the ACL sets the requirements for transparency as follows: 
“For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), a term of a contract is presumed not to be reasonably necessary in 
order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term, unless that party 
proves otherwise.” 
481 Sise 2017 (17) 1 QUT Law Review 161. 
482 Own insertion. See Bender http://barristers.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Australian-Consumer-
Law-UnfairContracts-by-Dr-Philip-Bender.pdf (accessed on 29 October 2018). 
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Paterson483 correctly submits that the elements as expressed in section 24 of the ACL are in 
accordance with the international principles of the “plain-language English movement” which 
endeavours to provide the average consumer with an easy understanding of legal documents. 
Paterson further contends that a contract would be transparent if the consumer finds it easy to 
read and realise (grasp) their contractual rights and obligations therein.484  
 
When it is to be determined whether a contractual term is unfair, under the ACL, one cannot 
merely look at the contractual term separately from the remainder of the contract. It must be 
considered in view of the contract in its totality.485 It is consequently evident that a court would be 
able to decide on the unfairness of a term, provided that the transparency factor together with the 
contract-as-a-whole factor are considered.486  
 
Only the courts have the power to decide whether a term is indeed transparent or not. What should 
be noted is that, even if it is determined by a court that the term is not transparent, this does not 
automatically mean that the term is unfair. The unfairness in a contract term should still be 
considered.487 The wording of the equivalent provision in the UTCCR (section 7) on the subject of 
unfair contract terms was, to some extent, different from the Australian provisions regarding unfair 
contract terms, as the UTCCR referred to plain and understandable language while the Australian 
laws refer to transparency. 488  However, the CRA included the phrase “plain and intelligible 
language” in the meaning of transparency.489 
 
5.4.1.2 Section 68 of the CRA 
 
                                                          
483 Paterson Unfair contract terms 86. 
484 Paterson Unfair contract terms 86. In this regard, the argument of Stoop (in Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 
5 PER/PELJ 523) regarding the first element of the definition in section 24 of the CRA being unclear and 
subject to scrutiny, should be noted. 
527 Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 5 PER/PELJ 524 – 525. 
(also available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 
2018). 
486 Section 24(2) of the ACL.  
"ACL 2010b http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au 12–13 (accessed on 28 October 2018). 
487  “Commonwealth of Australia 2010” https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/a-guide-to-the-unfair-
contract-terms-law (accessed on 29 October 2018). 
488 Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 5 PER/PELJ 524.  
(also available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 
2018). 
489 See section 64(3) of the CRA in this regard. 
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The most important requirement of transparency, in terms of the CRA, is that a term ought to be 
understandable (plain) to consumers. The transparency test is found in section 68 of the CRA.  
 
Preceding the enforcement of the CRA, in the matter of Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank,490 some guidance was provided pertaining to the term “transparency” in that 
transparency necessitates that the terms be conveyed completely and clearly, be readable, and 
contain no hidden consequences or traps. Suitable importance ought to be provided to terms 
which may function detrimentally to the consumer. 
 
Section 68 of the CRA provides that a supplier be required to make sure that a term contained in 
a written consumer contract, or a written consumer notice, is transparent. Such a term or notice 
is deemed to be transparent when it is in plain and intelligible language. In instances where the 
term or notice is in writing, it must furthermore to legible. As in the CPA, it is clear that the 
requirement of plain and intelligible language is also fundamental in the CRA. 
 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the transparency of a term is of utmost importance 
when it is to be determined whether the term is fair. In terms of the CRA a term must not only be 
in simple (plain) and comprehensible (intelligible) language; it must also be clear enough to read 
(legible). The obligation to ensure that a term is indeed transparent rests on the supplier (the 
person responsible for drafting the contract or notice). 
 
Notwithstanding section 68 of the CRA, specific reference to transparency is made in section 64, 
in that a term dealing with subject-matter and terms regarding the price must be transparent and 
prominent. In the instance when it is determined that such a term is indeed transparent and 
prominent, the term is exempt from being assessed in terms of section 62 of the CRA.491 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, even though there is no clear description of plain language 
in the CPA, section 22(2) contains the right of a consumer to receive information in plain and clear 
                                                          
490 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank (2002) 1 AC 482; [2001] UKHL 52 (hereinafter 
Director General of Fair Trading). 
491  Waller http://www.simplificationcentre.org.uk/2015/10/the-consumer-rights-act-2015-the-end-of-small-
print/ (accessed on 29 October 2018). 
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language. This section, from time to time referred to as the right to plain language, is possibly the 
most significant pro-active measure of procedural fairness enclosed in the CPA.492  
 
Transparency, alternatively referred to as plain language, is merely one of the requirements when 
determining whether a term is fair. In this regard, what qualifies as a fair term will be discussed in 
the paragraph below. 
 
5.4.2 Determining the unfairness of a term 
 
5.4.2.1 Section 24(1) and (2) of the ACL 
 
Sections 23 and 24 of the ACL 493 are of great significance, as these sections lay down what 
constitutes an unfair term in a consumer contract, and evidently describe the meaning of unfair. It 
is essential to bear in mind that the ACL does not explicitly provide for a term to be in plain 
language, but rather provides that a contract term be transparent in instances where the term is 
expressed in reasonably plain language.494 Section 23 provides that terms of a small business 
contract495 or consumer contract496 are void if the terms are unfair and the contract is a standard-
form contract.  
 
                                                          
492 Stoop http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/23191/Stoop-Inaugural%20lecture-
31%20Aug%202017.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed on 7 October 2018). 
493 Section 24(1) and (2) of the ACL provides as follows:   
“1.  A term of a consumer contract or small business contract is unfair if: 
(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract; and(b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who 
would be advantaged by the term; and 
(c) it would cause detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or relied 
on. 
2. In determining whether a term of a contract is unfair under subsection (1), a court may take into 
account such matters as it thinks relevant, but must take into account the following: 
(a) the extent to which the term is transparent; 
(b) the contract as a whole.” 
494 Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 3 PER/PELJ 523.  
(also available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 
2018). 
495 Section 23(4) provides that a contract is a small business contract if the contract is for the supply of 
goods or services, or a sale or grant of an interest in land, and if at the time the contract is entered into, at 
least one party to the contract is a business that employs fewer than 20 persons and either the upfront price 
payable under the contract does not exceed $300 000 or the contract has a duration of more than 12 months 
and the upfront price payable under the contract does not exceed $1 000 000. 
496 Section 23(3) defines a consumer contract as a contract for the supply of goods or services or a sale or 
grant of an interest in land. 
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The test used to determine whether a term is unfair is expressed outright.497 It provides that a 
contract term is deemed to be unfair only when it satisfies all three requirements contained in 
section 24(1). Therefore, in the instance where such term would occasion a substantial 
disproportion in the parties’ rights and obligations ascending under the contract, and is not 
reasonably required in order to safeguard the real interests of the contracting party who would be 
advantaged by it,498 and would cause detriment to a contracting party if it were to be applied or 
depended on, such term would be deemed to be unfair. 
 
The aforesaid test is not open for a wide interpretation. A contract term will therefore be unfair 
only if it fulfils all the aforesaid requirements as set out in section 24(1)(a)–(c).499 
 
In terms of section 24(2), a court can consider such matters as it deems appropriate when deciding 
if a contract term is indeed unfair. However, the court is required to consider the degree of 
transparency of the terms and the contract in its totality.  
 
It is, however, important to note that section 24(1) does not mandate transparency as a 
consideration when determining whether a contract term is unfair. Section 24(2)(a), however, 
necessitates the transparency of the purportedly unfair term to be taken into account, but not the 
transparency of an additional contract term which is not purportedly unfair.500 
 
What is critical to take notice of is that reference to good faith is not used in section 24, but rather 
the appropriate interest measure has been inserted.501  
 
                                                          
497 Section 24(1). 
498 It should be noted that section 24(4) provides that, for the purposes of subsection (1)(b), a term of a 
consumer contract is presumed not to be reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests 
of the party who would be advantaged by the term, unless that party proves otherwise. 
499  Sise 2017 (1) QUT Law Review 163 - 169 (also available at 
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjF9rX3npLgAhU
5VBUIHXj2DOEQFjAAegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Flr.law.qut.edu.au%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F
686%2F621%2F&usg=AOvVaw3ckh76mbN-u_ZR8Eo2acdQ) (accessed on 29 October 2018). 
500  Sise 2017 (17)1 QUT Law Review 167 (also available at ISSN: Online- 2201–7275 160–173 
DOI:10.5204/qutlr.v17i1.686. 
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjF9rX3npLgAhU
5VBUIHXj2DOEQFjAAegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Flr.law.qut.edu.au%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F
686%2F621%2F&usg=AOvVaw3ckh76mbN-u ZR8Eo2acdQ) (accessed on 29 October 2018.). 
501 Section 24(1)(b) of the ACL. For a discussion of “good faith”, see “Section 48” in Naudé and Eiselen 
Commentary (2016) para 48-24. 
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5.4.2.2 Section 62 of the CRA 
 
Section 62502 of the CRA contains the requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair. 
Section 62(4) of the CRA stipulates that a term is unfair in instances where such a term brings 
about a substantial disproportion in the contracting parties’ rights and responsibilities ascending 
from the contract, which disproportion (imbalance) is to the disadvantage of the consumer, which 
is in conflict with the requirement of good faith. The fairness test consequently includes substantial 
disproportion in the contracting parties’ rights and responsibilities ascending from the contract, 
which disproportion (imbalance) is to the disadvantage of the consumer503 and good faith.504 In 
conjunction with section 62(4), the criteria to be considered to determine whether a contract term 
is fair, are set out in section 62(6). These include the essence of the subject matter of the contract, 
as well as all the circumstances prevailing when the contract term was agreed upon between the 
parties, and all the other contract terms, or the terms of any additional contract, by which such 
term is influenced.  
 
Like section 62(4), which is applicable to contract terms, section 62(5) of the CRA stipulates that 
a notice is unfair in instances where such a notice brings about a substantial disproportion in the 
parties’ rights and responsibilities ascending from the notice, which disproportion (imbalance) is 
to the disadvantage of the consumer, which is in conflict with the requirement of good faith. In 
conjunction with section 62(5), the criteria to be considered to determine whether a contract term 
                                                          
502 Section 62 of the ACL provides as follows: 
“1.   An unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer.   
2. An unfair consumer notice is not binding on the consumer.  
3. This does not prevent the consumer from relying on the term or notice if the consumer chooses to 
do so.  
4. A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.  
5. Whether a term is fair is to be determined—  
a. taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and  
b. by reference to all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other 
terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it depends. 
6. A notice is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer.  
7. Whether a notice is fair is to be determined—  
c. taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the notice,  
d. by reference to all the circumstances existing when the rights or obligations to which it relates arose 
and to the terms of any contract on which it depends.” 
503 “A significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer”: direct quotation from section 62(4) of the 
ACL. 
504  CMA https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment 
data/file/450440/Unfair Terms Main Guidance.pdf (accessed on 29 October 2018). 
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is fair, are set out in section 62(7). These include the essence of the subject matter of the notice, 
as well as all the circumstances prevailing when the rights or obligations to which it relates arose, 
and to any additional contract by which such term is influenced.  
 
In the matter of Director General of Fair Trading it was held that a contract term providing a 
substantial benefit to the supplier, without providing a similar advantage to the consumer, would 
possibly fail to fulfil the requirement for a term to be fair. Even though the term significant 
imbalance is not defined in the UTCCR, it was held in Director General of Fair Trading, that “this 
requirement is met when a contract term is so one-sided to the advantage of the supplier as to tip 
the rights and responsibilities under the contract considerably to his benefit”.  
 
From the foregoing section it appears that the common requirement is that there is an imbalance 
between contracting parties. 
 
It should be noted that nowhere in the CPA any reference is made specifically to the substantial 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations as clearly as referred to in the other legislation. 
However, Stoop is of the opinion that substantial disproportion in the contracting parties’ rights 
and responsibilities arising from the contract can be compared to excessively one-sided under 
section 48(2)(a) of the CPA. 505  
 
As referred to in chapter 4 of this dissertation, it is stated, according to section 48(2)(a) of the 
CPA, that a transaction or agreement, a term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a 
notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if it is 
disproportionately unfair in favour of any person other than the consumer or other person to whom 
goods or services must be supplied. In addition to the above, I submit that significant imbalance 
can also be equated to the (unequal)506 bargaining position of the contracting parties.  
 
In terms of the CPA, when the fairness of a term or condition is considered by the courts, the 
courts must take into consideration the circumstances and conditions listed in section 52(2)(b), 
being the nature of the parties to the contract, their relationship to one another and their 
                                                          
505 Stoop: The concept “fairness” in the regulation of contracts under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 115. 
506 Own insertion. 
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comparative capacity, education, capability, sophistication and (unequal) bargaining position, 
when determining the fair and just conduct, terms and conditions of a consumer contract. 
 
5.4.3 The use of grey-list and black-list terms 
 
Naudé states that the grey list and black list507 contained in the relevant consumer legislation 
improve the efficiency of the control of unfair contract terms and this leads to certainty. 508 Naudé 
further defines grey-list and black-list terms. 509  The relevant grey-list and black-list terms 
contained in the ACL and CRA will be briefly discussed below. 
 
5.4.3.1 Grey-list terms 
 
According to Naudé, a grey list assists the bodies authorised to take precautionary action when 
negotiating with less diligent businesses to eliminate the use of unfair terms and decrease the use 
of costly and time-consuming litigation. 510  
 
Section 25 of the ACL511 
 
                                                          
507  For an in-depth discussion of grey-list and black-list terms, see CMA 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment 
data/file/450440/Unfair Terms Main Guidance.pdf (accessed on 29 October 2018).  
508 Naudé 2007 (124) 1 SALJ 131. 
509 See Naudé 2007 (124) 1 SALJ 130. A black list is a list of prohibited terms which are invalid under all 
circumstances, whereas a grey list is a list of terms which may be unfair, but the final decision depends on 
the circumstances of the particular case. 
510 Naudé 2007 (124) 1 SALJ 132. 
511 Section 25 of the ACL provides as follows: 
“Without limiting section 24, the following are examples of the kinds of terms of a consumer contract or 
small business contract that may be unfair: 
(a) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to avoid or limit 
performance of the contract; 
(b) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to terminate 
the contract; 
(c) a term that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, one party (but not another party) for a breach 
or termination of the contract; 
(d) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to vary the 
terms of the contract; 
(e) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to renew or not 
renew the contract; 
(f) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party to vary the upfront price payable under 
the contract without the right of another party to terminate the contract; 
(g) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to vary the characteristics 
of the goods or services to be supplied, or the interest in land to be sold or granted, under the contract; 
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Section 25 of the ACL provides a list of terms that would possibly be deemed to be unfair. The 
foregoing list is better known as the so-called grey-list terms. The list of terms provided for in 
section 25 of the ACL is not exhaustive. It should, however, be noted that the mere fact that a 
contract term would possibly fall within the realm of the terms listed in section 25 does not 
automatically render such a term unfair. Such terms are still subject to the fairness test contained 
in section 24 of the ACL.  
 
Forms of exemption clauses deemed to be unfair that are contained in the so-called grey list 
include terms that inflict a penalty, or have the consequence of inflicting a penalty, on only one of 
the contracting parties for breach of contract.512 These may be, for example, exemption clauses 
that restrict the liability of the supplier for breach of contract, terms that limit the vicarious liability 
of a supplier for its agents,513 and terms that restrict or have the consequence of restricting a 
consumer’s right to take legal action against a supplier.514 
 
Schedule 2 of the CRA515 
 
                                                          
(h) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to determine whether the 
contract has been breached or to interpret its meaning; 
(i) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s vicarious liability for its agents; 
(j) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party to assign the contract to the detriment 
of another party without that other party’s consent; 
(k) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s right to sue another party; 
(l) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, the evidence one party can adduce in proceedings 
relating to the contract; 
(m) a term that imposes, or has the effect of imposing, the evidential burden on one party in proceedings 
relating to the contract; 
(n) a term of a kind, or a term that has an effect of a kind, prescribed by the regulations.” 
512 Section 25(c) of the ACL. 
513 Section 25(i) of the ACL. 
514 Section 25(k) of the ACL. 
515 For the purposes of this dissertation, reference will be made only to the following terms set out in Part 1 
of Schedule 2: 
• “A term which has the object or effect of excluding or limiting the trader’s liability in the event of the 
death of or personal injury to the consumer resulting from an act or omission of the trader. This 
does not include a term which is of no effect by virtue of section 65 (exclusion for negligence 
liability). 
• A term which has the object or effect of inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the 
consumer in relation to the trader or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance 
or inadequate performance by the trader of any of the contractual obligations, including the option 
of offsetting a debt owed to the trader against any claim which the consumer may have against the 
trader.  
• A term which has the object or effect of making an agreement binding on the consumer in a case 
where the provision of services by the trader is subject to a condition whose realisation depends 
on the trader’s will alone. 
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The grey list of potentially unfair contract terms that is contained in the CRA has been imported 
in its totality from the list in the UTCCR, with the addition of three new terms.  
 
Section 63(1) and (2) of the CRA provides that Part 1 of Schedule 2 encloses an indicative and 
non-exclusive list of terms that would possibly be regarded as unfair contract terms for the 
purposes of Part 1. Part 2 of Schedule 2 contains the scope of Part 1, although Part 1 is conditional 
on Part 2 of Schedule 2. However, a contractual term itemised in Part 2 would possibly still be 
evaluated for fairness under section 62 of the CRA, except in instances where sections 64516 or 
73517 are applicable. 
 
A contractual term enclosed in the so-called grey list is still measurable for fairness even in 
instances where such a term is transparent or prominent or both.518  
 
5.4.3.2 Black-list terms 
 
The ACL does not contain a so-called black list of terms which are unenforceable, however, such 
a list is contained in the CRA.519   
 
Schedule 2 of the CRA 
 
As contained in section 51 of the CPA, there are various terms which are automatically deemed 
to be unfair and exempt from the fairness test. If a blacklisted term is contained in a consumer 
                                                          
• A term which has the object or effect of excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal 
action or exercise any other legal remedy, in particular by—  
(a) requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions,  
(b) unduly restricting the evidence available to the consumer, or 
(c) imposing on the consumer a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, 
should lie with another party to the contract.” 
516 In this regard, see section 64(1) of the CRA as discussed above at 5.3.3. 
517 Section 73 of the CRA provides for an exemption from both the fairness and the transparency tests in 
Part 2, for contract terms and notice provisions that reflect mandatory, statutory or regulatory provisions, for 
instance, in legislation and the provisions or principles of international conventions. 
518 A term is prominent for the purposes of this section if it is brought to the consumer's attention in such a 
way that an average consumer would be aware of the term. In this regard, see section 49 of the CPA. See 
also “Summary Guide to the Consumer Rights Act 2015” https://www.wrighthassall.co.uk/knowledge/legal-
guides/2015/10/01/summary-guide-consumer-rights-act-2015/ (accessed on 28 October 2018). 
519 An example is provided in section 65(1), in terms of which a supplier is entitled to use a consumer 
contract term or notice to disregard or limit liability for death or personal injury as a result of negligence. 
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contract, such a term will automatically be unenforceable. 520 Examples of the black-list terms 
relevant in this dissertation are as follows: 
 
• A term or notice may not exclude or restrict legal responsibility for death or personal injury 
due to negligence.521  
 
• A term or notice excluding, or attempting to limit liability where the supplier wishes to 
exclude or limit its obligations and liabilities under the contract or by attempting to 
depreciate the consumer’s legal rights under the contract.522 
 
• A term restricting or excluding a consumer’s right to seek legal redress.523 
 
Before the CRA came into effect in Bennett v Pontins,524 a damages claim for the death of Mrs 
Bennett’s husband, where negligence was proved, was rejected because the circumstances were 
excluded by an exemption clause.  Section 65 of the CRA now prohibits a supplier from excluding 
or restricting its liability for death or personal injury due to negligence.  
 
With reference to any other loss or damage not resulting in death or personal injury, the supplier 
is able to limit its liability only if the term is fair.525 Despite the fact that liability for death or personal 
injury resulting from negligence is not specifically included in the black list contained in the CPA, 
the decision in Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another526 is a step in the right direction 
and I am of the opinion that the decision would have remained the same even if such terms were 
indeed included in section 51. 
 
The CPA similarly contains both grey-list and black-list terms which are, or may be deemed to be, 
unfair.527 Regulation 44(3) of the CPA contains the so-called grey list of terms that may be unfair, 
                                                          
520 Naeme https://www.michelmores.com/news-views/news/guide-consumer-rights-act-2015-part-1-unfair-
terms (accessed on 29 October 2018). 
521 This provision has been imported from the UCTA. Item 1, listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CRA, as 
well as section 65(1) of the CRA. 
522 Item 2 listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CRA. 
523 Item 20 listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CRA. 
524 Bennett v Pontins unreported 1973. 
525 See, in comparison, section 51 of the CPA which provides a list of the types of terms that are considered 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust and are therefore prohibited. However, liability for death or personal injury 
caused by negligence is not expressly included. See a full discussion at para 4.5.5 below. 
526 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) [12]. 
527 See in this regard section 48, read with regulation 44(3) of the CPA, as well as section 51. 
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and the determination of such unfairness is dependent on the circumstances of each and every 
case. The onus to prove that the term listed in regulation 44(3) is indeed fair, is on the supplier. In 
contrast with the aforesaid applicable laws, the grey list in regulation 44(3) is not contained in an 
Act. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Consumer rights and legislation protecting the consumer worldwide afford the consumers the 
opportunity to fight back against offensive business practices with regard to unfair contract terms, 
specifically exemption clauses. 
 
Section 22(2) of the CPA provides that the relevant documentation528, specifically referred to in 
this section, is considered to be in plain language if an average consumer for whom the 
documentation is anticipated529 can understand the meaning, consequence and significance of 
the documentation without unnecessary effort. As a result of the diversity of our country relating 
to the education level of South Africans, it is extremely difficult to interpret this provision, as an 
ordinary consumer, in my view, differs from an ordinary consumer who has obtained only the 
minimum required education. Therefore, characteristics such as the context, organisation, form 
and style of the documentation will be considered, along with the terminology, language usage 
and sentence structure in such documentation.530  
 
The significance of, and the part played by plain language in consumer contracts have been 
emphasised. Pronounced attempts are being made in countries such as South Africa, Australia 
and the United Kingdom to draft consumer contracts in the clearest possible language so that 
ordinary consumers can understand all the relevant terms and their effect, in such a contract. It is 
important to note that consumers are, in their own right, entitled to a contract drafted in simple 
language, and to a transparent contract clearly stating the rights and responsibilities of the 
relevant contracting parties. It can be said that the most vital objective of the requirement of plain 
language is to enable the consumer to realise the contract being entered into. Consequently, it 
would serve no purpose to permit terms in consumer contracts which are clearly misleading and 
                                                          
528 Notice, document or visual representation. 
529 With average literacy skills and minimal experience of the relevant goods or services. 
530 Section 22(2) of the CPA. 
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ambiguous, even in instances where such terms are inserted in simple words and expressions 
that are easy to understand.531 
 
South Africa can learn some lessons from the CRA, which states that a person is not assumed to 
have willingly agreed to a risk that arises from a notice simply because the consumer has accepted 
the notice or is familiar with it.532 In terms of the CRA, a consumer will be bound by the terms only 
in instances where such terms are fair. Where a clause is not binding because it is unfair, the rest 
of the contract will take effect to the extent that this is possible.533   
 
What should be noted is that, unless a challenged term is contained in the self-styled grey list in 
regulation 44(3) of the CPA, the onus of persuasion that such a term is indeed unfair will squarely 
fall on the consumer, to prove such unfairness. The consumer will consequently bear the risk of 
non-persuasion with reference to terms not listed in regulation 44(3).534 Contrary to the aforesaid, 
in respect of the ACL, the onus rests on the contracting party who would have the upper hand if 
the standard term is enforced, to submit evidence that such a term is reasonably required with the 
intention of protecting the valid or real interest of such a contracting party.535 
 
Unfortunately, foreign law, with specific reference to the explicit listing of grey-list and black-list 
terms, was not properly considered and incorporated at the time when the CPA was drafted. It is 
argued, which argument I substantiate, that section 48 of the CPA could have been drafted in 
such a way as to give more guidance on the meaning of “unfair, unjust or unreasonable”, in 
accordance with the models from other legal systems, and regulation 44(3) should have been 
incorporated in section 48 of the CPA.536   
 
Further to the aforesaid, section 51 of the CPA, containing the so-called black-list, contains a 
relatively limited list of contract terms which are prohibited. The consequence of the current 
wording of sections 48 and 51 of the CPA is that many of the problematic terms commonly 
                                                          
531  In this regard, see Stoop and Chürr 2013 (16) 3 PER/PELJ 545. (also available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2013/73.html# ftnref24) (accessed on 6 October 2018).  
532 Stoop “Plain language and the assessment of plain language” 2011 (4) International Journal of Private 
Law 329 at 332. 
533 Section 62 of the CRA. 
534 “Section 48” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2016) para 48-26. 
535 Section 24(4) of the ACL. 
536 “Section 48” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2018) para 48-30. 
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blacklisted or grey listed in other countries’ corresponding legislation are not titled in the CPA.537 
However, section 2(2) of the CPA permits courts to look at international and foreign law for 
guidance, as it is essential to consider similar provisions of legislation enacted in foreign countries 
due to the gaps in the current wording of the CPA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
537 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 537. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Background 
 
As consumers we have entered or had to enter into a contract of some sort at least once in our 
lives. In the majority of such contract conclusions the consumer is on the short end of the 
bargaining position. This happens, for example, when a consumer enters into a cell phone 
contract with a service provider or into a lease agreement, or merely enters the parking area of a 
shopping centre. The supplier in all the listed circumstances will include some sort of exemption 
clause; in the vast majority of cases, such clauses are intended to exclude the liability of the 
supplier. 
 
South African private law (with specific reference to the common law of contract) is in fact 
uncodified. Our law of contract was recognised and founded on the principle of freedom of 
contract, which was subsequently founded on the concept of individual objectivity and sanctity of 
contracts.538 Based on the principle of freedom of contract, if a contract was concluded and such 
a contract contained an exemption clause, the parties agreeing to the terms set out in such a 
contract would be bound to the terms thereof, irrespective of the fairness of the exemption 
clause.539 
 
Exemption clauses ascend in different forms and practices and are stereotypically used in 
standard-form contracts.540 An example of an exemption clause is the exclusion liability for a 
damages claim against a supplier due to any default or breach of the contract by the supplier. 
Such clauses have customarily had a bad reputation since they are often unreasonable and being 
abused by the contracting party in the stronger bargaining position.541 
 
An exemption clause has always been seen as the rule rather than the exception in standard-form 
contracts, and it can therefore be said that the other contracting party, namely, the one in the 
                                                          
538 Hopkins 2007 De Rebus 23. 
539 Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 578; Natal Motor Industries Ltd v Crickmay 1962 
2 SA 93 (N) 96; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners and Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 
2 SA 794 (A); Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 1 SA 982 (SCA) 991; Afrox Healthcare 
v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
540 Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 496; Van der Merwe et al Contract: general principles (2016) 297. For a 
detailed definition of the concept of standard-form contracts, see Kanamugire 2013 (4) MJSS 339–340. 
541 Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 496. 
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weaker bargaining position, in fact has no real freedom concerning the contract terms. This is 
because the majority of such terms are not subject to negotiation.542 For this reason one can say 
that a consumer is confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it situation and is inhibited to agree to the 
provisions set forth in such a standard-form contract. In fact, the consequence of the aforesaid is 
that no actual freedom of contract exists, and it can therefore be said that the freedom is quite 
theoretical or formalistic.543 This factor must be considered by the courts where the supplier 
depends on a disclaimer notice or exemption clause to reduce, alternatively, to abolish its liability.  
 
Preceding the enactment of the CPA, in the instance where the fairness of exemption clauses 
was to be determined, the common law, public policy, ubuntu and the rights of each consumer 
rooted in the Constitution were considered and weighed against the possible effect of such an 
exemption clause. In accordance with the common law, the enforceability of exemption clauses 
was considered on the basis of consensus, lack of the necessary notification, public policy, 
restrictive interpretation, negligence, dolus and fraud.  
 
One of the most important requirements for a binding contract is consensus, or a proper meeting 
of the minds, between the relevant parties to the contract.544  Consensus can, however, be 
influenced by a number of elements, which in certain circumstances are so severe that they affect 
the validity of the contract. Misrepresentation is one such element.545 
 
However, in most agreements, with specific reference to the so-called ticket cases, true 
consensus is hardly ever reached where the agreement is entered into on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.546 Consequently, the party in the weaker bargaining position will be burdened by the party 
in the stronger bargaining position.547 It is unfortunate that in the majority of such circumstances, 
where no true consensus has been reached between the contracting parties, the courts have 
been unsuccessful in protecting the contracting party to an agreement or contract who did not 
                                                          
542 Sharrock 2010 (22) 3 SA Merc LJ 296. With the exception of negotiation regarding the price of the goods 
or services, the relevant payment terms, the delivery date and time, as well as any possible warranties. 
543 See Stoop 2008 4 SA Merc LJ 496–497; Naudé 2006 (3) Stell LR 366; Bhana and Pieterse 2005 (122) 
SALJ 885. 
544 Van Der Merwe et al Contract: general principles (2016) 90; Bourbon Leftley v WPK (Landbou) Bpk 1999 
1 SA 902 (C). 
545 George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A)4471; Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 
893 (A) 906. 
546 See generally Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (A). 
547 Stoop 2008 (20) 4 SA Merc LJ 497. 
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expect that the terms of such an agreement or contract, to which they appended their signature, 
would be bound to them.  
 
Public policy plays an important role when the courts determine whether an exemption clause is 
recognised when interpreting the contract. 548  Public policy imported concepts of justice, 
reasonableness and fairness, and the application thereof, will prohibit the implementation of a 
term which would probably result in injustice. As long ago as 1902, the courts measured 
exemption clauses against public policy.549 In Brisley v Drotsky,550 it was held that public policy is 
now entrenched in our Constitution and the essential values, associated with it, is safeguarded. It 
includes human dignity, the realisation of equality and the development of human rights and 
freedom, non-racialism and non-sexism.551 This norm was confirmed by the CC in Barkhuizen v 
Napier.552   
 
Preceding the enactment of the CPA, the purpose of an exemption clause was to enforce 
imbalanced and unwarranted conditions on a consumer. The SCA, as well as the CC, have 
established that our common-law principles of law of contract are subject to the Constitution.  
 
The Constitution marks a turning point in the South African contract law, with specific reference 
to the use and enforcement of, specifically, exemption clauses. As a result, exemption clauses 
can be declared invalid if they are in conflict with public policy. Public policy, in turn, is rooted in 
the Constitution and is accompanied by the concepts of good faith and ubuntu, as constitutional 
interests. 
 
The effect of the Constitution on the implementation of an exemption clause has been noteworthy. 
It can consequently be said that the principles of freedom of contract and holiness of contract are 
no longer the only concerns. With the enactment of the Constitution, the values of 
                                                          
548 Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775 784–785 had this to say about the notion of public 
policy: “Now in our law it is a principle that agreements contra bonos mores will not be enforced, and that 
is in reality the same as the English maxim as to contracts against public policy. It is a wide-reading 
principle … to succeed on the ground of public policy it must be shown that the arrangement necessarily 
contravenes or tends to induce contravention of some fundamental principle of justice or of general statutory 
law, or that it is necessarily to the prejudice of the interests of the public.” 
549 Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS [294, 302]; Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775. 
550 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
551 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
552 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) [29]. 
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reasonableness, fairness and good faith have materialised, and when the courts have to 
determine the validity of exemption clauses, these values have to be taken into consideration. 
 
Consumer rights and legislation protecting the consumer throughout the world are designed to 
afford consumers the opportunity to fight back against offensive business practices with reference 
to unfair contract terms, specifically exemption clauses. Considering the relevant provisions in the 
ACL and the CRA, it is clear that the drafters of the CPA unfortunately neglected to insert clear 
and precise corresponding provisions. 
 
Consumer rights and legislation protecting the consumer worldwide afford the consumers the 
opportunity to “fight back” against offensive business practices with regard to unfair contract 
terms, specifically exemption clauses. 
 
6.2 The CPA and its shortcomings 
 
The CPA specifies essential consumer rights that include the right to equality, to privacy, the right 
to choose, the right to fair disclosure of information, to fair and responsible marketing, to fair and 
truthful dealing, to fair, just and reasonable terms and the right to fair value, good quality and 
safety.553 
 
With the enactment of the CPA, minimum requirements were set out to guarantee satisfactory 
consumer protection in our country. Even though the CPA is a step in the right direction, in some 
instances this legislation has failed; alternatively, it has neglected to put proper thoughts to paper. 
 
When drafting an exemption clause, the drafter should bear in mind that the exact wording of such 
a clause, the manner in which it is drafted, and its purpose will ultimately determine whether the 
it is unfair, unjust or unreasonable.  
 
Section 22 stipulates that the relevant documentation referred to in this section should be in the 
form set by the CPA. Should there be no such form, the relevant documentation ought to be in 
plain (simple) language.554 Section 22 is consequently applicable only to notices (required by 
legislation), visual representations (i.e. disclaimer boards at shopping centres, venues, etc) and 
                                                          
553 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reynecke Contract: general principles 18. 
554 Section 22(1)(b) of the CPA. 
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written agreements (exemption clauses written on the back of access cards, etc). Section 22 does 
not apply to oral agreements.555 
 
As correctly stated by Stoop556, the prerequisite of plain language is procedural as it is focused 
on the drafting of terms, rather than the effect thereof. It was held in the Four Wheel Drive case557 
that the right at stake in the agreement in casu is the right to information in plain and 
understandable language provided in section 22 of the CPA. The agreement in casu was not “in 
plain language” as Mr Murton was unable to interpret, understand and explain the contents 
thereof, regardless of it being his job to do so. The court further held that in terms of section 
22(1)(b), the producer of the agreement in casu was required to comply with the requirement that 
it must be in plain language, if no form has been prescribed. The agreement in casu failed to 
satisfy the definition of clearly in that the quality of its text did not meet the requirements of section 
22. It is interesting to note that, as stated by Pillay J in the Four Wheel Drive case, enquiries reveal 
that the National Consumer Commission had not published the guidelines anticipated in section 
22 of the CPA.558  
 
I am of the opinion that, in the absence of guidelines set by the Commission in terms of section 
22, a definition of plain language should be inserted in the CPA to eliminate any confusion, 
alternatively, to eliminate extensive and expensive litigation, in order to decide whether an 
exemption clause is indeed in plain language. The mere definition of “clearly” is not adequate 
when deciding whether an exemption clause complies with the requirements set out in section 22. 
 
Over and above the aforesaid section of the CPA, it should be noted that section 48 of the CPA 
provides that every consumer has the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions. This 
section furthermore sets out the circumstances under which terms and conditions will be unfair. 
Further to the aforesaid, section 48 of the CPA sets out the circumstances under which notice for 
certain terms and conditions is mandatory. Section 50 of the CPA provides details as to when 
consumer contracts should be reduced to writing. Section 51 of the CPA sets out the so-called 
                                                          
555 Du Preez 2009 (1) TSAR 58 75. 
556 Stoop The concept ”fairness” in the regulation of contracts under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 206. 
557 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA) [61–62]. 
558Section 22(3) and (4) of the CPA. See also footnote 70 of the Four Wheel Drive case. 
126 | P a g e  
 
black-list terms (i.e. the prohibited terms). Section 52 refers to the powers of the court to guarantee 
fair conduct, terms and conditions.559 
 
Certain terms are assumed to be unfair if they comprise one or more of the purposes or 
consequences set out in regulation 44(3).560 For that reason regulation 44(3) is branded the so-
called grey list.561 It is said that the grey list holds a list of terms which would possibly be unfair.562 
563 The ultimate judgment of a court on whether a term is unfair, is predisposed to the state of 
affairs of each specific situation.564 A grey list is therefore not exhaustive but it gives a good 
indication of what constitutes fairness. It should be borne in mind that, unless a challenged term 
is contained in the so-called grey list, as set out in regulation 44(3) of the CPA, the onus to prove 
the unfairness of such term will directly fall on the consumer. The consumer therefore bears the 
“risk of non-persuasion” with reference to terms not contained in regulation 44(3).565 I am of the 
view that the onus should be on the supplier, in all circumstances, where the fairness of an 
exemption clause is in dispute. 
 
Section 49, in turn, sets out three requirements in relation to the four types of terms listed in 
subsection 1 thereof. The first requirement is that they should be in plain and simple language;566 
the second, that their presence, nature and effect should be conveyed to the consumer in a 
noticeable and conspicuous form;567 and the third, that the consumer must be given reasonable 
opportunity to accept and understand these terms.568  
 
In addition to the three requirements set out in section 49(3)–(5), section 49(2) states that the 
consumer must also sign or initial provisions relating to the risks as listed in this section. Even 
though the possible risks that, for example, an amusement park attempts to exclude, can qualify 
                                                          
559 See chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion of each of these sections. 
560 Stoop The concept “fairness” 102. 
561 Ideally, the grey list should have been included in the text of the Act, in the same part as the black list. It 
would then have had greater legitimacy and would have been more prominent and accessible to consumers. 
See Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 521. 
562 Stoop The concept “fairness” 102. 
563 The terms listed in regulation 44(3) may still be fair in the particular circumstances of the case. 
564 Naudé 2007 (124) 1 SALJ 130. 
565 “Section 48” in Naudé and Eiselen Commentary (2016) para 48-26. 
566 Section 49(3) of the CPA. 
567 Section 49(4)(a) of the CPA. This must be done “before the earlier of the time at which the consumer … 
enters into the transaction or agreement, begins to engage in the activities, or enters or gains access to the 
facility, or … is required or expected to offer consideration for the transaction or agreement.” See section 
49(4)(b)(i)–(ii). 
568 Section 49(5) of the CPA. 
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under section 49(2), such clauses merely reflect either on the reverse side of the entrance ticket 
or are presented on a disclaimer board at the entrance of the amusement park, making it 
impossible to adhere to the provisions of section 49(2).  
 
Naudé569 states that the counter-signing prerequisite set out in section 49 of the CPA is particularly 
challenging, and substantive unfairness alone ought to be sufficient reason for setting aside a 
term, irrespective of procedural traits such as the consumer’s familiarity and understanding of the 
term, as verified by his signature. This requirement should be abolished, as most consumers, 
whether the consumer is a layperson or someone with the necessary knowledge, sign agreements 
without reading the entire agreement. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, most suppliers do not always 
grant consumers the opportunity to read all the terms and conditions. They merely direct them to 
sign at the designated spots. For example, when you as a consumer are admitted to hospital, you 
may not be given the opportunity to read the terms and conditions before you sign the admission 
documents. 
 
Bearing in mind the grey list contained in regulation 44(3), section 51 of the CPA, which contains 
the so-called black list, provides a relatively limited list of contract terms that are prohibited.  
Notwithstanding regulation 44(3), there is no grey list in the text of the CPA. This means that many 
of the problematic terms, ordinarily blacklisted or grey listed in other countries’ legislation, are not 
referred to in the CPA.570 It is clear from this section that a supplier who wishes to limit or exempt 
its liability for any direct or indirect loss due to gross negligence of the supplier is not allowed. 
However, liability for any direct or indirect loss due to negligence causing personal injury or death 
is not contained in section 51, clearly being an oversight as legal systems,571 did indeed included 
such clauses in their blacklisted terms, and I therefore submit that such terms should have indeed 
been included in the CPA.572   
 
Section 52 of the CPA provides the courts with wide authority to safeguard fair and just conduct if 
it finds that a transaction is unconscionable, unjust, unreasonable or unfair. These powers would 
include making appropriate cost orders. This section was correctly applied in the Four Wheel Drive 
                                                          
569 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 512. 
570 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 521. 
571 See, for example, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK), section 2(1); section 6(1)(a) of the Australian 
Consumer Protection Act. These pieces of legislation will be discussed in chapter 5.  
572 See Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ 510. Naudé considers that section 49(2) of the CPA, by laying down 
specific incorporation requirements for such clauses, impliedly sanctions them. 
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case. 573 Naudé submits that section 52 is written merely with the paradigm of court action relating 
to an individual agreement with a particular individual consumer in mind, which is questionable.574 
Subsections (1) and (3) confer power on the courts regarding only transactions or agreements 
between a supplier and a consumer. Subsection (2) provides a list of factors applicable to the 
assessment of fairness. This exclusive paradigm of judicial control over individual consumer 
agreements is extremely challenging in the consumer context, given the inherent limitations of 
court action.575 
 
Considering the drafting of the provisions of the CPA and the necessary recommendations, 
another issue that should be addressed with regard to the CPA relates to section 69.576 This 
section is of significance even though it has not been discussed in this dissertation because 
section 69 regulates the enforcement of rights by the consumer. The intention of the legislature 
by implementing section 69 was clearly to ensure that the consumer has a less expensive resort 
by relying on the CPA. However, this is not always the case as the relevant ombud does not in all 
cases have the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate., This would, in any event, force the consumer 
to approach the civil court, which the consumer could have done from the outset. Based on 
personal experience with the National Consumer Commission, I lodged a query pertaining to the 
aforesaid, and received the following response from the legal advisor of the National Consumer 
Commission: 
 
Dear Consumer 
 
The National Consumer Commission acknowledges receipt of your request for advice dated 13th 
December 2017. Yours [sic] cautions [sic] approached [sic] [your cautious approach] of exhausting 
sector specific remedial action in terms of Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
as confirmed by the Joroy case is a safer one. The National Consumer Tribunal (NCT), however, 
recently ruled in NCC v Western Cars Sales NCT/81554/2017/73/(2)(b) that adjudication of Section 
48 read with 52 remains exclusive reserve of the courts. 
... 
Depending on your prayers, if you are seeking the agreement either to be declared partially, wholly 
invalid or remedied you will have to rely on section 52, and if the NCT approach is correct you do 
not need to observe section 69. [If,] however, in your prayers you [are] seeking to declare non-
compliance with section 7 read with regulation 2 and 3 as a prohibited conduct then you would 
                                                          
573 Drive CC v Leshni Rattan NO (1048/17) [2018] ZASCA 124 (26 September 2018) [68–69]. 
574 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ  526–527. 
575 Naudé 2009 (126) 3 SALJ  526–527. 
576 A mere reference is made to this section, as the application of the relevant section of the CPA pertaining 
to exemption clauses is affected by this clause. 
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probably have to demonstrate that you have exhausted sector specific remedial action by starting 
with lodging a complaint with the NCC. 
 
From the aforesaid it appears that the adjudication of section 48, read with section 52, of the CPA 
falls squarely into the jurisdiction of the civil court. However, with regard to the remaining relevant 
sections of the CPA, and the enforceability thereof, the consumer should be entitled to elect the 
necessary forum in which he intends to proceed with the application of the CPA. 
 
6.3 Final conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the shift towards consumer alertness and fair-mindedness when 
entering into an agreement through the CPA is of great value. However, to ensure that the 
consumer is protected to the maximum, certain amendments, as indicated above, to the CPA 
must be made to guarantee actual safeguard against unfair terms. However, the protection offered 
to the consumer remains limited. It should be noted that exemption clauses still remain lawful, 
binding and enforceable if their wording is unambiguous,577 in other words, if they comply with 
section 22, read with section 49(3)–(5), of the CPA and exclude terms listed in regulation 44(3) 
and section 51 of the CPA.  
 
The CRA, alternatively, the ACL has clear and precise definitions regarding transparency (plain 
language), unfair terms and a clearer indication as to which terms are automatically unfair and 
which terms are deemed to be unfair. Until such time as the National Consumer Commission and 
the Minister578 deem it fit to amend the current wording of the CPA to ensure utmost protection to 
consumers, the courts must have more regard to international and foreign law regarding the 
enforcement of an exemption clause. 
 
Taking all the aforesaid into account, it is important to note that exemption clauses in their totality 
will not die away as they would possibly play a significant part in assigning the risk between parties 
in instances where none of the parties were responsible. Exemption clauses must be formulated 
and conveyed in accordance with the CPA, and taking advantage of a consumer by making use 
of such clauses will subsequently come to an end. 
                                                          
577 Hutchison and Pretorius The law of contract 271. See also Marx and Govindjee 2007 28(3) Obiter 629, 
631; Stoop 2008 4 SA Merc LJ 496–509; and Brand and Brodie Good faith in contract law 108. 
578 As defined in section 1 of the CPA. 
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